Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for ‘LB.ua’
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine began 2026 not very actively, yet ‘vividly’ — the greatest interest in the work of Members of Parliament is currently demonstrated by the anti-corruption bodies. This cannot but affect the capacity of Parliament and its ability to adopt draft laws, including those related to European integration. It also once again raises the question of whether the Verkhovna Rada is capable not only of adopting decisions but also of exercising effective oversight over the executive branch.
‘The attention of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office to the activities of Members of Parliament is directly linked to MPs’ performance of their direct duties — bribes for “necessary votes”, false asset declarations, accusations of land misappropriation and so on. This time, officers of NABU and SAPO did not overlook the Head of the “Batkivshchyna” faction, Yuliia Tymoshenko.’
This entire anti-corruption track — including the corruption scandal in the energy sector — could not but affect the ‘New Year agenda of the parliamentarians. Most importantly, it has evidently also affected the effectiveness of the first plenary meetings.
At first, Parliament dismissed two ministers and, only on the second attempt, adopted a decision to appoint Denys Shmyhal and Mykhailo Fedorov to other positions — First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine — Minister of Energy of Ukraine and Minister of Defence of Ukraine respectively. However, MPs have still not voted for a new Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, nor for changes in the Ministry of Justice.
As for legislative activity, from 1 January to 2 February 2026, Members of Parliament considered only 12 draft laws, six of which were adopted. The total plenary time during this period amounted to 11 hours. During the same period in 2025, the Verkhovna Rada considered 46 draft laws and plenary time in the chamber totalled almost 18 hours.
It should be noted that the President has also not demonstrated productivity in the legislative sphere from early January to 2 February — he was expected to sign or submit proposals regarding 13 laws. However, four laws did not receive any response from the President despite the expiry of the 15-day deadline (as of 17 February 2026, two of them have already been signed). Among them is draft law No. 3195 on introducing mandatory reporting by members of the Government prior to their dismissal.
In the context of this draft law, the article analyses whether there is a chance for effective parliamentary oversight during the 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada. It also examines why parliamentary oversight does not function effectively and how this can be remedied.
Reporting by Government Officials: Background
On 17 December 2025, an overwhelming majority of Members of Parliament adopted in the second reading and in its entirety draft law No. 3195, which obliges ministers to report before parliamentary committees and, ultimately, before Parliament when their resignation is being considered. With 285 votes in favour, the Verkhovna Rada of the IX convocation attempted to assert — strengthen — restore its own institutional agency through reinforcing parliamentary oversight. The fact that draft law No. 3195 was supported by virtually all factions and groups may be regarded as an institutional demand for stronger oversight.
The dismissal of Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko and Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk, which took place without their presence in the Rada, once again demonstrated the gap in interaction between the Government and Parliament. The entire arsenal of available instruments has proven insufficient to ensure ministerial accountability and responsibility before Parliament.
After the energy sector, the security and defence sector is the next sphere where new scandals with even more far-reaching consequences can be expected — both for the country’s defence capability and for its socio-political resilience. In this area, parliamentary oversight of the Government traditionally does not differ from that in other sectors.
The Oversight Function Today: Increased Activity Without Systemic Change
Although recent monitoring of the Verkhovna Rada’s work records a significant increase in quantitative indicators — in particular, a rise in the number of requests and appeals submitted by MPs — this does not always indicate genuine parliamentary oversight. In many cases, it reflects pressure or personal gain. Recordings from Operation ‘Midas’ revealed that a criminal group had asked Members of Parliament to submit certain requests.
In terms of dialogue, government officials and parliamentarians held nine ‘Question Time with the Government’ sessions, which was also noted in the report of the European Commission.
However, even though energy infrastructure was the most frequently discussed topic during these ‘Question Time with the Government’ sessions, the Verkhovna Rada failed to identify in advance the problems that ultimately resulted in the largest corruption scandal — at least since the beginning of the full-scale war.
This once again highlighted the weakness and ineffectiveness of this mechanism. Ukraine has many established rules and practices intended to maintain balance within the triangle of power that correspond to general European and Euro-Atlantic counterparts. In practice, however, the application of these instruments does not produce results. Attempts to introduce fines for ignoring an invitation to attend a parliamentary session in draft law No. 11387 were vetoed by the President.
When discussing the provision of parliamentary oversight and the accountability of the executive branch, structural constraints are becoming increasingly visible. Performing these functions is difficult in a system where the key centre of decision-making is the President — both in the perception of government officials and often of MPs themselves. In such a configuration, the question of accountability remains open: why report to Parliament if it is not, in fact, Parliament that determines your ministerial fate? As a result, the instruments of parliamentary oversight continue to exist on paper but in reality remain largely a formality.
Reporting as a Component of Parliamentary Oversight: International Experience
When discussing the strengthening of parliamentary oversight in Ukraine, international experience is often invoked in the search for quick and effective solutions. Although foreign practices and regulations in the field of parliamentary oversight may differ significantly and the respective countries are not currently in a state of war, examining how these mechanisms operate elsewhere allows for a better understanding of why the approach proposed by Ukrainian legislators is unlikely to work as expected.
As a rule, the Prime Minister and other ministers have the right to resign on their own initiative. In developed democracies, government reporting to Parliament — as one component of a broader architecture of oversight — is largely voluntary. In some countries, the resignation of a minister does not require mandatory discussion at all — as, for example, in North Macedonia or Serbia.
The Government of Finland annually submits a report to Parliament on its activities and, separately, reports on the state of the economy and the implementation of the budget. Parliamentarians may also request thematic reports. Their consideration may result either in approval or in a vote of no confidence in the Government or in an individual minister.
In the United Kingdom, ministers are required to report on their work as well as on the activities of their departments and agencies. Moreover, they may bear responsibility for the actions of the latter. The instruments of oversight include parliamentary questions and committee hearings. If the results of a report are deemed unsatisfactory, a minister may be dismissed by the Prime Minister or submit a resignation.
In Sweden, the Government annually presents to Parliament a programme defining its main priorities and objectives and submits a report on the implementation of the budget. In addition, it reports on the work of commissions established to develop proposals for addressing pressing issues. The Government may also submit to Parliament a statement or report on matters related to the governance of the country or international relations. The consideration of such a statement may result in a vote of no confidence in the Government or in a minister.
The Polish Government also reports annually on the implementation of the budget. Following its consideration, a resolution is adopted either granting or refusing consent for the Government to continue its activities. There are also thematic reports (for example on the state of the healthcare system or environmental policy) which Parliament may approve or reject. The rejection of a report does not automatically result in the resignation of the member of the Government responsible for the relevant public policy.
The rules of procedure in some countries also provide for interpellations. An interpellation is a procedure whereby Parliament summons representatives of the Government and government officials must explain their policy, specific documents or actions. Following an interpellation, a member of the Government may receive immunity for a short period or a procedure for their dismissal may be initiated. For example, in the Czech Republic there are both oral and written interpellations.
Effective parliamentary oversight abroad is based not on isolated procedures but on a coherent system of instruments that ensure regular access of Parliament to information and the accountability of the Government. It is precisely from this perspective that draft law No. 3195 should be considered — whether it complements the existing arsenal of parliamentary oversight instruments in Ukraine and whether it is capable of strengthening it in practice.
Draft Law No. 3195: Why Reporting Only at the Time of Resignation Is Not Enough
Draft law No. 3195 provides that a minister who submits a resignation must personally be present and report on their work during the consideration of the issue of their dismissal — both at a meeting of the relevant committee and in the plenary chamber. The authors also propose aligning certain provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada with the Constitution in the part concerning the appointment of members of the Cabinet of Ministers.
However, in its current version, draft law No. 3195 is unlikely to strengthen the oversight function of Parliament, as it contains several shortcomings.
For example, the requirement to report does not apply to dismissals initiated upon the submission of the Prime Minister, the President or on the initiative of the Verkhovna Rada itself.
Draft law No. 3195 also does not establish any requirements regarding the structure, content or standards of such a report. In other words, the minister will be able to determine independently what exactly and in what form should be communicated to Parliament. This effectively turns both oral and written reporting into a formality.
Parliamentary oversight must operate in conjunction with all available instruments, since only then can it be effective. This arsenal could be expanded through the introduction of interpellation. However, draft laws No. 3499 and No. 13596 registered in the Verkhovna Rada on this issue have still not been brought to the Parliament’s agenda. The Main Scientific and Expert Department and the committees of the Verkhovna Rada have expressed substantial comments on them, yet it remains important to assess interpellation as a potential instrument of parliamentary oversight.
Merely reporting on one’s activities prior to a minister’s resignation is insufficient. It is more of a symbolic gesture than an effective instrument of oversight. It cannot replace systemic mechanisms — interpellations, regular and extraordinary reports, well-developed committee work and others.
Draft law No. 3195 positions ministerial reporting as a sanction that is triggered at the very end, when a minister resigns, rather than as an instrument of regular accountability. In other words, the minister is effectively punished by having to report — a public ‘examination’ is imposed at the moment of dismissal. Such an approach transforms the position of minister from the apex of a political career into compulsory ‘community service’, from which one cannot even depart without first submitting a report.
Chronic Weakness of Oversight over the Security and Defence Sector
If the intention to strengthen parliamentary oversight is a genuine objective rather than merely an imitation, action must be systematic rather than selective. Extracting only one instrument from the entire set — reporting — and applying it situationally will not solve the problem. This is particularly true in the context of scandals in the security and defence sector — where parliamentary oversight and accountability must be strengthened as a matter of urgency. Draft law No. 3195 does not address this issue. Instead, Parliament is once again attempting to adopt a narrow measure that does not correspond to the scale of the problem.
Limited parliamentary oversight fits poorly within the framework of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. It is precisely through the oversight function that Parliament can guarantee a balance between security and freedom, the observance of democratic principles and the protection of human rights — all of which are fundamental to accession to the European Union.
For a country in a state of war, this is of particular importance when it comes to the security and defence sector. This is traditionally a closed sphere that requires oversight, alignment of security and political objectives and the establishment of safeguards against abuses by the executive branch. By exercising oversight over the security sector, Parliament ensures its effectiveness, transparency and accountability, as well as supervision over the proper use of funds. However, as long as the Verkhovna Rada is unable to transform the existing set of instruments into an institutionally developed system of oversight, the security sector itself is unlikely to submit to such oversight. Is it possible to change this? In the Green Paper, experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives analyse whether, under martial law, the Verkhovna Rada uses the available instruments of parliamentary oversight to their full extent, to what degree this function of Parliament is limited under wartime conditions, and which practices of NATO member states should be adopted in the future.
European partners emphasise the need for reform of the Security Service of Ukraine, stressing that oversight of this key national security body must be strengthened, alongside the relaunch of the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) and the central and regional units of the National Police. They also point to political risks associated with the work of the recently merged Defence Procurement Agency and the State Rear Operator.
In the Verkhovna Rada, the response has unfortunately been slow. MPs’ draft laws No. 13602 on the relaunch of the SBI (registered in August 2025) and No. 4210 on democratic civilian oversight have been left idle. The creation of a committee for oversight of special-purpose bodies, which would have expanded powers of parliamentary oversight, was initiated as far back as the IV convocation and is provided for under current legislation. However, this decision has also not been adopted for several years, although it depends exclusively on the Verkhovna Rada.
Parliamentary Oversight Between War and Post Bellum
Without a comprehensive approach, the Verkhovna Rada will continue to have formal powers but remain limited in its capacity to use them effectively. Yet it is precisely this capacity — particularly with regard to oversight of the security and defence sector — that serves as a marker of a mature democracy and a key condition for Ukraine’s European future.
A significant share of the problems currently observed by Ukrainian society and international partners is the result of decisions that postponed issues of accountability and oversight (as well as many others) ‘until after the war’ and/or left their resolution to successors. However, it appears that remaining suspended in such hypothetical anticipation can continue for a very long time. Will the President and Parliament change in the near future? Evidently not. Yet the resolution of the problems described depends precisely on this Parliament and this President — and it is they who will determine when and how the long-awaited post bellum moment arrives.
