Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for Ukrainska Pravda
The Ukrainian Parliament entered its 14th session carrying a burden of challenges pressing in from all sides. On the one hand, there are the deadlines of European integration commitments and constant pressure from external partners expecting decisions from the Verkhovna Rada. On the other hand, there are internal crises — public distrust and a series of political scandals.
Quantitative indicators of parliamentary work only reinforce this state of tension. In particular, the number of procedural violations and draft laws registered with a single signatory has increased. At first glance, this may appear to be a surge in activity; however, behind the figures, it is increasingly not effectiveness but system overload that is revealed. Parliament finds itself in a situation where it must maintain the pace of reforms against the backdrop of a low capacity to renew its own working mechanisms.
Experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives analysed these processes in the Verkhovna Rada during the 13th session using quantitative data. We examine how the figures reflect the real state of the legislative machine, how the dynamics of its work are changing under the pressure of war, European integration and public distrust, and whether Parliament is managing to remain an effective centre of decision-making under such conditions. More details on the key features of the Verkhovna Rada’s work during the 13th session can be found in the parliamentary Monitoring by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.
Parliament Retains Capacity but Is Operating at Reduced Speed
Parliamentary dynamics in 2025 appear restrained — and this restraint is not accidental; it is confirmed by quantitative indicators. Following the crisis triggered by the attempt to undermine the independence of anti-corruption bodies in July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada entered a phase of decline: August is traditionally a low-productivity month. More troubling signals, however, did not disappear in the autumn.
Between September and November 2025, Parliament adopted only 38 laws — significantly fewer than during the same period in 2024 (58 laws). By comparison, during the same period in 2023 (the 10th session), 46 laws were adopted — a session that recorded a historically low number of adopted acts. Thus, even by wartime standards, the current result points to a downturn, signalling either the gradual exhaustion of the Verkhovna Rada or the continuation of the crisis following the July events.
At the same time, the figures show that this decline did not emerge in a vacuum. During the 13th session, the Verkhovna Rada demonstrated the lowest productivity of all ‘spring’ sessions. If these trends persist, the 14th session will consolidate a new level of ‘normality’ — one in which a smaller number of adopted decisions no longer appear exceptional but become the rule. Even under such conditions, however, Parliament remains capable of adopting strategically important decisions. Among the laws adopted are No. 14048 (on ensuring the legality and transparency of the activities of local self-government bodies), which is required to secure financial support from the EU under the Ukraine Facility, as well as another European integration draft law — No. 13202-1.
Overall, these indicators point to the functional capacity of Parliament to perform its legislative functions. The Verkhovna Rada remains capable of acting, but under conditions of constant strain and political fatigue — each time with a smaller reserve of energy and a growing need for time.
The European Integration Dimension: From Quick Wins to Complex Decisions
When Ukraine obtained EU candidate status in June 2022, Parliament found itself on the threshold of a major transformation. The Verkhovna Rada was expected not merely to provide political support for the EU course, but to engage in daily, systematic work — adopting dozens of laws intended to bring Ukrainian legislation closer to the acquis of the European Union. More than two years after the start of accession negotiations, it is necessary to face reality: a fast start does not guarantee the same pace across the entire distance.
To accelerate the European integration process, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483 in July 2022, introducing a separate procedure for the consideration of relevant draft laws. Each committee was expected to establish subcommittees on the adaptation of legislation to EU law. This was an important, but interim step — a kind of ‘add-on’ to the Rules of Procedure that has never undergone formal amendment.
In parallel, Parliament sought to accelerate the consideration of European integration initiatives through other means: the requirement to conduct a regulatory impact assessment was removed; the legislative work plans for 2024 and 2025 introduced dedicated sections on adaptation to EU law; and following the update of the Verkhovna Rada website in 2025, it became possible to track the progress of draft laws marked as European integration-related. These decisions did indeed help to partially speed up the process at the initial stages. However, it became clear quickly that without legislative amendments to the Rules of Procedure, such an ‘accelerator’ would not function indefinitely.
For example, in 2022–2023 Parliament adopted dozens of European integration laws (26 during the eighth session and 22 during the ninth). With each subsequent session, however, their number declined: only four during the 10th session, 16 during the 11th, 12 during the 12th, nine during the 13th and just one during the first half of the 14th session. At the same time, the average time required to consider such draft laws has been steadily increasing. This may indicate fatigue (a point also raised by Members of Parliament), a loss of consensus and a continuously rising level of decision-making complexity.
The ‘obvious’ European integration decisions have already been adopted. What remains are more complex, technically demanding draft laws that require longer coordination both within Parliament and beyond it. The duration of their passage has also increased. Whereas during the eighth session draft laws took an average of 403 days from registration to adoption, by the 13th session this figure had risen to 573 days. During the 14th session so far, only one law has been adopted, and it underwent the procedure for more than 150 days.
The dynamics have changed. A fast pace is undoubtedly a positive sign. Although European integration must be operational, the quality and thoroughness of decisions should remain a priority. The Ukrainian Parliament should take its own experience into account and acknowledge that every decision in this process requires inter-institutional coordination and political will. New steps will require more time. Therefore, it is worth engaging in dialogue with society and international partners on realistic timeframes for fulfilling commitments. The European integration process will continue to unfold under ‘burning’ deadlines if expectations of swift decision-making remain detached from practice ‘on the ground’.
The President’s ‘Silent’ Veto
Another problematic aspect of the legislative process is the President of Ukraine’s failure to comply with the constitutional requirement to sign laws adopted by Parliament within the prescribed timeframe. Clearly, this issue lies beyond Parliament itself; nevertheless, such striking figures cannot be ignored. In addition to the obvious lever — the ‘silent’ veto as a means of controlling parliamentary decisions — such violations risk laws being declared unconstitutional if signed in this manner.
At least every second law adopted during the 13th session was either signed in breach of the constitutional deadlines or has still not been signed at all (54%). This is the highest figure throughout the entire ninth convocation and possibly in the entire history. For instance, Law No. 3291-IX on measures aimed at settling arrears on the wholesale electricity market was adopted by Parliament in July 2023, yet the President signed it only in January 2025 — after 518 days of waiting.
As of today, 43 laws remain neither signed nor vetoed at all. All these laws are in a state of ‘legislative limbo’, and there is still no real understanding of what should be done with such acts. The authors of the Constitution clearly could not have envisaged such a situation. This practice creates a dangerous precedent. The signing of a law is not a symbolic act, but a constitutionally defined stage of the legislative process. When the President simply ‘keeps’ a draft law in a drawer, he effectively acquires an additional instrument of influence over Parliament that is not envisaged by the Constitution and is more ‘silent’ than a veto.
Among the reasons for breaching the deadlines for signing laws may be both political motives and the limited capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus. Indeed, in the turbulent conditions of martial law, a law may have lost its relevance by the time it reaches the signing stage; however, such a volume of laws signed late requires not explanation, but a response.
The Balance Between Oversight and Law-Making
During the 13th session, ‘Question Time to the Government’, when ministers report to the Verkhovna Rada, lasted a total of more than 11 hours — the highest figure since the start of the full-scale invasion. The use of another oversight instrument of the Verkhovna Rada — MPs’ inquiries — also increased: during the 13th session, MPs submitted a record number for the period of martial law — 303.
As is well known, quantity does not always translate into quality. When it comes to the oversight function, Parliament finds it difficult to maintain a balance. On the positive side, MPs are making more active use of the available oversight instruments. The claim that they are entirely incapable of overseeing the Government’s actions would be unfair. However, the scale of unused potential is striking. Plans to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the Government, approved by a Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada as far back as 2016, have remained just that — plans. New instruments that were intended to be introduced during the ninth convocation, such as interpellation, have also remained at the draft law stage. Oversight instruments — whether old or new — are expected to deliver results. Yet this has not materialised either: neither the relevant committees nor the Accounting Chamber (which is an instrument of parliamentary oversight) identified problems in the work of the executive authorities that ultimately led to the resignations of Ministers Halushchenko and Hrynchuk.
‘Legislative Spam’
Legislative spam is a systemic problem of the Verkhovna Rada. It refers to the mass submission of a large number of draft laws without proper preparation, support or realistic prospects of adoption, which overloads the parliamentary system and imitates legislative activity. At present, the situation may appear ambiguous at first glance. The large number of registered draft laws can be partially explained by their re-registration following a change of Government. However, when looking specifically at MPs’ initiatives, the picture is somewhat different. The key indicator of legislative spam is the record share of draft laws with only a single signatory — 45% of all draft laws registered by MPs. This is the highest figure across all sessions of the ninth convocation. In practice, almost every second document was submitted without the support of colleagues, indicating an almost zero chance of being backed in the chamber.
Parliament may give the impression of a hyperactive institution generating a large number of new initiatives, but around half of them have almost no chance of becoming law.
The Verkhovna Rada has remained functional and has continued to fulfil its duties despite all challenges, at least until the most recent events related to the corruption scandal highlighted by Operation ‘Midas’. How Parliament will emerge from the current crisis remains an open question. Nevertheless, signs of systemic institutional exhaustion have been evident for some time. An analysis of quantitative data makes it possible to highlight specific problems, the resolution of which is critically important for the further work of the longest convocation in the history of independent Ukraine.
Much will depend on how institutions — and the Verkhovna Rada in particular — emerge from this crisis, notably on the effectiveness of parliamentary bodies such as the Temporary Investigative Commission (TIC) on economic security, as well as on decisions taken by the Office of the President. The pace of the TIC’s work is already notable: within a week of the searches, it held an open meeting with NABU, SAPO and key officials from the Anti-Corruption Committee, which addressed the scandal at its own meeting a week later. Parliament has already dismissed the ministers involved in the scandal. Yermak was dismissed by the President. How new ministers will be appointed will become a new test for the Verkhovna Rada. If the situation is repeated, and these ministers do not feel accountable to Parliament as the body that appointed them, then the issue of their accountability will remain unchanged.
It will be possible to speak of a demonstration of extraordinary resilience and institutional capacity for decision-making if the legislative process does not come to a halt and a functioning majority continues to operate in the Verkhovna Rada. Transforming the current effort to keep the system ‘afloat’ into gradual forward movement will require realistic expectations regarding European integration, a reduction in ‘legislative spam’, strengthened parliamentary oversight and, above all, the successful navigation of a new ‘storm’.
Author of the material:
