Commission for the Selection of SAPO Leadership: Why the Appointment of Shevchuk Raises Concerns

On 23 December, by his order, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko appointed lawyer Oleksii Shevchuk as a member of the competition commission responsible for selecting prosecutors to senior positions in the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), including the Deputy Head of SAPO, a position that is currently vacant. According to the law, members of such a commission may only be persons of impeccable business reputation, high professional and moral qualities, public authority and proven integrity.

Although the commission consists of six members and three of them are yet to be delegated by international development partners, the central issue concerns doubts as to Oleksii Shevchuk’s compliance with these criteria. Given his reputation and his flamboyant conduct in proceedings, one may also speak of the risk of commission meetings being disrupted even by a single member. Thus, the matter concerns not only an individual included in the composition of the commission, but also a much broader issue — the limits of permissible influence of the Prosecutor General over an institutionally independent anti-corruption system.

A Candidate with an Extensive Competition Record

Oleksii Shevchuk has repeatedly participated in competitions for key public positions. In different years, he applied for the positions of Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Head of the Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision, Head of the National Police of Ukraine (2017), Head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), and, during the full-scale war, for the position of member of the High Council of Justice (HCJ).

None of these competitions proved successful for him. At the same time, the 2023 competition for the HCJ is of particular significance, as it resulted in a formalised decision of the Ethics Council finding that the candidate did not meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity. That decision set out the factual circumstances underlying the negative assessment.

Clearly, such a decision does not automatically produce legal consequences beyond the specific competition in question. However, the established facts cannot simply be ignored — they have neither disappeared nor lost relevance. A renewed assessment of the same individual within another competition procedure should logically entail, at a minimum, a renewed analysis of those circumstances. Accordingly, both the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, which (according to its clarification) had a single uncontested candidate from outside the prosecution system, and the Prosecutor General, as the appointing authority, should have examined this matter and assessed the candidate. In our view, that assessment should have been negative, as there is a failure to meet the criterion established by Article 29-1 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, namely that ‘Members of the Competition Commission shall be persons of impeccable business reputation, high professional and moral qualities, public authority and integrity…’. What, then, is the basis for such a conclusion?

Facts Giving Rise to Reasonable Doubt

In its decision, the Ethics Council referred to a number of established circumstances. Let us focus only on those that are directly relevant to the assessment of moral and professional qualities, primarily integrity.

First, it was established that Oleksii Shevchuk failed to confirm compliance with the obligation of an advocate to undertake continuing professional development in 2020–2021. During the review, he did not provide convincing documents to substantiate such compliance. Against this background, it is noteworthy that in 2024–2025, the Higher School of the Bar of the UNBA submitted hundreds of disciplinary complaints against advocates who had not undertaken continuing professional development for five years. The question of whether this aspect of Shevchuk’s own professional activity was examined in disciplinary proceedings remains open.

Second, more serious are the circumstances related to the use of questionable documents. In 2018, a law firm headed by Shevchuk submitted a tender proposal to a state enterprise, attaching a reference letter bearing a logo and name visually and substantively similar to the branding of the well-known civil society coalition ‘Reanimation Package of Reforms’. Such similarity could have created a misleading impression of endorsement by a reputable civic initiative. Despite Shevchuk’s statements that he was unaware of this issue, the Ethics Council concluded that he understood the potentially misleading nature of using such branding.

Third, in 2018 Shevchuk applied to register the trademark ‘Sudovyi Reporter’, while an independent journalistic outlet of the same name already existed and was known within the professional community. The circumstances of this attempted registration, as well as subsequent pressure on the outlet’s editorial team, were publicly described by journalist Iryna Salii and caused significant public resonance.

Overall, the Ethics Council referred to eight established circumstances which, taken together, were deemed sufficient to conclude that the candidate lacked integrity. Among these were issues relating to disciplinary proceedings concerning Oleksii Shevchuk.

Disciplinary Record and the Problem of Procedural Opacity

Particular attention should be paid to Oleksii Shevchuk’s disciplinary record as a member of the Bar. One of the key circumstances was his being held disciplinarily liable in 2023 for violating the Rules of Legal Ethics, which resulted in the deprivation of his right to practise law. That decision was subsequently overturned by the High Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar (HQDCB) on procedural grounds — without refuting the existence of the violations. Thereafter, Shevchuk became the spokesperson of the Ukrainian National Bar Association. Such a timeline also raises questions.

In addition, other disciplinary complaints were filed against him, including in connection with publicly expressed insulting statements and threats to use military service as a form of punishment.

Two further complaints were submitted by lawyer Masі Nayyem, requesting that Shevchuk be held liable for insults and harassment directed at him in relation to his injury, for public accusations made without evidence and for the dissemination of false information. Unfortunately, not all decisions on these complaints are publicly available.

The absence of an open register of disciplinary decisions within the Bar makes it impossible to fully assess how the system of accountability operates and whether disciplinary sanctions are applied fairly — or perhaps selectively. This is not merely an individual issue but a systemic one, directly affecting trust in Bar self-governance. The existence of a public register of all disciplinary decisions concerning advocates would significantly increase confidence in the system.

The situation is further complicated by an institutional crisis within Bar self-governance itself: the Congress of Advocates, which is responsible for electing governing bodies, was due to take place back in 2022. For more than three years, key appointments have been made by decisions of the Bar Council of Ukraine (BCU) contrary to the law — for example, the appointment of the Head of the HQDCB, although the law expressly provides that the Head of this Commission may be appointed only by the Congress of Advocates. As a result, the highest disciplinary body is dependent on the BCU. In practice, leading positions within Bar self-governance bodies continue to be held by representatives elected as far back as 2012 and who have remained in power for more than 13 years. The reference to continuity as a justification for the failure to convene the Congress of Advocates appears legally flawed, given that congresses of judges and conferences of prosecutors have taken place after 2022. In what way is the Bar worse than judges and prosecutors, whose degree of self-governance and state regulation is significantly more limited?

Appointment to the SAPO Commission as Part of a Broader Context

On 26 January, the Council of Prosecutors published a statement effectively shifting responsibility for Shevchuk’s appointment onto Ruslan Kravchenko. Three prosecutors and one advocate applied to participate in the competition for membership of the commission. The Council of Prosecutors delegated three prosecutors. However, subsequently one of the prosecutors submitted a request to withdraw from the commission of her own accord. Under the law, the Prosecutor General thereby obtained the formal right to appoint one member of the commission at his own discretion. That person became Oleksii Shevchuk.

For its part, the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) stated that the current legislation does not provide for the possibility of recalling a member of the commission on reputational grounds. At the same time, both the Council of Prosecutors and the PGO emphasise that the commission is currently not quorate due to the absence of candidates delegated by international and foreign organisations.

In this context, a legitimate question arises: will international partners be prepared to delegate their representatives to a commission with such a composition, and will they be able to work effectively in conditions of evident public distrust? Moreover, what should be done if the three representatives of international partners clearly state that they are unwilling to work ‘with Shevchuk’? This already puts the entire process at risk. It would be far more constructive to resolve the conflict here and now rather than to force the situation further.

Another issue concerns the representation of prosecutors within the commission. All six members are determined by the Prosecutor General: three — upon nomination by international partners and three — upon nomination by the Council of Prosecutors. It is logical and expected that the prosecution service should be directly represented in this body, as this is important for taking into account the professional position and the specific nature of prosecutors’ work. It is evident that the prosecutorial community counted on representation precisely under the quota of the Council of Prosecutors. However, the appointment of a lawyer by the Prosecutor General effectively deprived prosecutors of such an opportunity. This raises the question: were there truly no worthy and willing candidates among prosecutors who could have ensured proper representation within the commission?

Public Reaction and the Question of Responsibility

As of today, a joint statement demanding the revocation of the order appointing Shevchuk has been signed by more than 60 civil society organisations, Members of Parliament, lawyers and public figures. In response, the Prosecutor General and his Office have limited themselves to formal explanations regarding the absence of legal powers to reconsider the appointment.

Oleksii Shevchuk himself has claimed that he faced pressure and threats following his appointment, having appealed to law enforcement bodies and to the President of Ukraine to ensure his protection. However, no evidence of such threats has been publicly provided. Moreover, beyond statements made during a press conference, nothing further is known about these alleged threats — neither the factual circumstances, nor the existence of criminal proceedings, nor the submission within such proceedings of a request for the application of security measures in accordance with the law.

Why This Issue Is Not About One Individual

The problem does not lie in the absence of a criminal conviction against Oleksii Shevchuk or in the fact that decisions of Bar disciplinary bodies were overturned. Legislation and integrity standards do not require the existence of a final judicial or disciplinary decision, as the appointing authority has the autonomous right to assess whether a candidate meets the necessary moral and professional qualities. To exclude a person from sensitive procedures requiring a high level of public trust, it is sufficient that there be a reasonable doubt as to compliance with the established criteria. In this case, such doubt arises from the cumulative effect of numerous documented circumstances. We do not deny that there is a lack of a unified approach to assessing ethical conduct and the criterion of integrity in competition procedures. However, this approach should be developed rather than merely lamented as absent. Moreover, the Unified Indicators for Assessing the Integrity and Professional Ethics of a Judge (Judicial Candidate), approved by the High Council of Justice in December 2024, provide a useful benchmark in this regard.

The commission to which Shevchuk has been appointed will select the Deputy Head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office — the second most influential position within a body that has a formally and practically independent status from the Prosecutor General. It is precisely for this reason that the composition of this commission is of decisive importance.

In this context, it is worth recalling the crisis of July 2025, when the authorities attempted to significantly limit the powers of the NABU and the SAPO. According to media reports, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko was among the active implementers of the strategy pursued at that time. Had these changes been implemented, Ukraine would likely never have learned the details of the so-called ‘Mindichgate’, Andrii Yermak would have continued to head the Office of the President without public reputational consequences and Members of Parliament who allegedly ‘purchase votes’ would have continued to feel immune from accountability. Indeed, under full procedural control over anti-corruption bodies by a Prosecutor General who is still appointed on the basis of political preferences rather than professional criteria, it would be difficult to speak of objective and comprehensive investigations involving individuals holding high-level positions.

However, attempts to limit the activities of anti-corruption bodies are far from over. Among the instruments that may be deployed is the preparation of a notice of suspicion against the Head of SAPO, Oleksandr Klymenko, as has already been reported in media outlets that regularly cover justice and anti-corruption issues.

If Klymenko were to be suspended from office for the duration of the investigation, his powers would normally be assumed by the First Deputy. However, at present, the Head of SAPO has no such deputy. Under these circumstances, the personnel decision of the Prosecutor General effectively creates the possibility of implementing a scenario of indirect control over the leadership of the anti-corruption prosecution service.

The appointment of a person with such a controversial reputation appears not merely as a hiring mistake, but as a signal of readiness to disregard public expectations regarding transparency and integrity in the anti-corruption sphere.

An Open Question

In this situation, a key question remains: how do the prosecutors of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office themselves view the fact that their evaluation and the effective selection of SAPO leadership may be influenced by a person whose reputation is subject to well-founded doubts?

Oleksii Shevchuk has been delegated to two strategically important commissions — one for the selection of members of the HQCJ and another for the selection of candidates to senior positions in the SAPO. Neither of them has yet been able to commence full-fledged work. Perhaps the issue is not limited to individual personalities, yet it is precisely such personalities that become a litmus test for a systemic problem.

If even formally lawful decisions result in the paralysis of key anti-corruption procedures, this indicates that the problem does not lie in a single individual, but in the overall quality of public governance and in the willingness of the authorities to listen to society.