The issue of Bar self-governance has become so critical in recent years that it was included among the priorities of the Rule of Law Roadmap approved by Ukraine in May 2025. This is also reflected in last year’s Shadow Report to the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine.

In other words, the matter goes beyond the internal ‘kitchen’ of Ukrainian Bar self-governance — and directly affects the entire justice sector and all European integration processes in Ukraine.

Let us examine what exactly has ‘gone wrong’ in Ukrainian Bar self-governance.

Let us begin with the pressing issue — the elective nature of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies). This is a key element of the institutional independence of the Bar and, consequently, one of the fundamental guarantees of the rule of law and access to justice.

It is precisely the BSG bodies that determine the rules governing the profession in Ukraine. Therefore, the system for their election is of key importance. The highest body is the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, whose delegates are elected at the Conferences of Advocates of the Regions (CAR) according to established quotas. However, this electiveness is merely formal, as the processes within the BSG bodies have for a long time been under the centralised monopoly of the Bar Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) — since their establishment in 2012 following the adoption of the current Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’. In other words, for 13 years the BSG bodies have remained under the leadership of the same individuals, headed by Lidiia Izovitova, who, according to numerous reports, has close ties with Viktor Medvedchuk, accused of high treason. It is the BСU that determines representation quotas and approves the procedure for nominating and electing delegates both to the Conference of Advocates of the Region (CAR) and to the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine.

This effectively preserves Bar self-governance in its existing form and turns it into a closed system with features of manual control, bearing little resemblance to transparency or openness. As a result, the monopoly has produced predictable ‘results’: the term of office of the leadership of the BCU expired as far back as November 2022 (the Law provides for a five-year term, which may be extended only once), yet the Congress of Advocates has not been convened. Everything is attributed to the full-scale war and the alleged impossibility of gathering advocates in one place for security reasons. This not only blocks the re-election of the Bar leadership but also prevents the exercise of constitutional powers — in particular, the delegation of two representatives to the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and one representative to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) under the advocates’ quota.

Instead, the BCU, contrary to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’, unilaterally extended its mandate until the end of martial law, referring to institutional continuity — that is, the principle of continuity of activity.

At the same time, congresses of judges, academics and prosecutors have been held repeatedly, even under conditions of full-scale invasion, although they too could have relied on similar wording and continued to operate in their previous compositions. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also continues its work despite current realities. Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, does not consider the reference to continuity to be legally justified as a basis for failing to convene the Congress of Advocates after 2022. Particularly given that, for example, prosecutors have already held more than one All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors during the full-scale war.

The expert notes that the ‘principle of continuity’ invoked by the UNBA does indeed exist. However, its meaning is interpreted depending on the branch of law in which it is applied. It may refer to the continuity of the state in international law, the preservation of constitutional institutions during the transition from one legal regime to another, territorial continuity and so forth. Accordingly, if legislative norms are to be invoked, they should be applied in full rather than selectively, and not limited solely to those formulations that are convenient for extending the powers of the BSG bodies.

Over nearly four years of full-scale war, the BCU has repeatedly had the opportunity to initiate changes to the mechanism for holding the Congress of Advocates. For example, through online voting via Diia or other means of simplifying the procedure for electing delegates, as the Agency for Legislative Initiatives has previously written. However, the leadership of the Bar has not done so.

Instead, Lidiia Izovitova seeks reasons why this would not work: ‘Proposals are being made regarding electronic voting. Let us return to our realities: front-line territories… electronic warfare systems — they jam communications, you cannot transmit information — that is the first point… The second — lack of electricity and, as a consequence, lack of internet access. What kind of electronic voting can we speak of?’. At the same time, regions with (potential) hostilities — Kherson, Odesa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia — have once again been cited among the reasons why elections cannot be held. Daria Pysarenko, Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, has noted that such reasoning is at the very least contradictory, as the UNBA previously held large-scale events without difficulty, including in Kharkiv in 2024 at the premises of the Law University.

A de facto non-functioning system of Bar self-governance leads to problems of another nature — disciplinary ones. Among other functions, the work of the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine is also directed at disciplinary matters, as it elects the Head and Deputy Heads of the High Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar (HQDCB), as well as the composition of the High Audit Commission of the Bar (HACB).

According to Daria Pysarenko, Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, this situation gives rise to serious concerns regarding the disciplinary system of the Bar. These concerns were brought into sharper focus by the formation of the competition commission for the selection of senior positions in the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

Oleksii Shevchuk, a lawyer, was appointed to the commission. According to journalistic investigations, he has been linked to high-profile cases, including a corruption scheme involving the unlawful departure of men abroad and the disappearance of 10,000 military first-aid kits from the United States, worth over UAH 33 million. Notably, in 2023, Oleksii Shevchuk participated in the competition for the High Council of Justice (HCJ), during which he received a negative opinion from the Ethics Council, meaning that he was found not to meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity. Although such an opinion is not binding for other competitions and does not entail legal consequences of a different nature, it nevertheless established facts of unethical conduct in the past. In the same year, the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar of the Kyiv Region (QDCB) attempted to deprive Oleksii Shevchuk of his right to practise law for violating the Rules of Legal Ethics. However, the decision was overturned, and Shevchuk subsequently assumed the position of spokesperson of the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA).

This raises the question of why the disciplinary system did not function properly in this case. ‘There is no possibility of reviewing all decisions adopted in the relevant disciplinary proceedings, which once again underscores the urgent need to establish a comprehensive public register of disciplinary decisions’, notes Daria Pysarenko.

According to the Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, this situation demonstrates the necessity of strengthening the independence of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar. As is known, the Head of the HQDCB is currently appointed by decision of the Bar Council of Ukraine, whereas the law expressly provides that he or she must be elected exclusively by the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine. ‘Such interference in the activities of a disciplinary body is unacceptable and undermines trust in the entire system of professional self-governance’, the expert emphasises.

The prolonged absence of genuine electiveness and the artificially frozen composition of the governing bodies of the Bar systematically harm the entire sector. Instead of transparent and democratic practices, the UNBA and the BCU pursue advocates for criticising the leadership, while disciplinary practice has become a closed instrument of influence. All of this is justified by reference to the war and to the principle of continuity.

Moreover, the consequences have long extended beyond the Bar itself and directly affect — and damage — the entire justice system. The opacity of disciplinary practice and of the BSG bodies as a whole, the failure to exercise constitutional powers, the blocking of the Congress of Advocates and the deliberate disregard of the obligation to delegate representatives to the HCJ and the QDCP paralyse the renewal of the judiciary and the reform of law enforcement bodies. Accordingly, they also hinder Ukraine’s European integration.

It is therefore logical that the state cannot remain on the sidelines when the governing bodies of the Bar have, since 2019, blocked any attempts to reform the sector. The actions of the Ministry of Justice, in particular the establishment of a working group on improving legislation in the field of the Bar and practice of law, constitute a necessary and logical response to a deep institutional crisis which the Bar itself has long refused to address. Although the Bar is a self-governing profession, the element of state regulation is significant — it is sufficient to examine the relevant Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’. Given that the Bar occupies a central place within the justice system alongside the courts and the prosecution service, it is impossible to speak of reforming the justice sector without reforming the Bar.

These are precisely the European integration obligations concerning the Bar, which each year become more specific and more clearly defined. Whereas previously the European Commission would diplomatically hint, in a single sentence, at the need for reform, the most recent Enlargement Report stated unequivocally: ‘Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar’. Moreover, given Ukraine’s inability to independently formulate a reform agenda, the EU has gone so far as to propose substantive directions for change in its reports — something the European Commission would not ordinarily be expected to do. At the same time, European partners have emphasised that ‘Re-elections of Bar self-governance bodies have not been conducted despite the expiry of their mandates’. In essence, they have made it clear that the war is not a reason to postpone the Congress of Advocates and the re-election of the Bar leadership, nor to refrain from reforming the sector.

The year 2025 brought Ukraine certain progress in reforming the justice sector.

The Service of Disciplinary Inspectors of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) became fully operational.

The High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) completed a number of competitive selection procedures, as a result of which, for the first time in 12 years, new judges appeared in some courts of appeal. However, not all of them have taken the oath and begun administering justice due to delays on the part of the President.

At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed two new judges of the Constitutional Court (CCU), thereby unblocking its work after a six-month suspension, as well as two members of the HCJ, which in turn appointed another member of the HQCJ, thus completing its composition.

At first glance, it may seem that everything is finally moving in the right direction, albeit not as quickly as everyone would wish.

Unfortunately, far from everything. And here is why.

For the third consecutive year, Ukraine has lacked a comprehensive Strategy for the Reform and Development of the Justice Sector, although its draft has long been prepared by the Office of the President (Office, OP). However, despite the declared importance of this document, the President’s signature had still not appeared on it in 2025.

Political actors pretend that this is acceptable: allegedly, what matters is not the signature but implementation. Moreover, the most important provisions are said to be reflected in the Rule of Law Roadmap adopted by the Government, which records Ukraine’s European integration commitments in this area.

This is both true and not true at the same time. One cannot implement a document that does not exist, even if certain elements of the reform are moving in the right direction. At the same time, there is nothing to reproach the team of the Deputy Head of the Office of the President, Iryna Mudra, or the Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal Policy, Denys Maslov — a candidate for the position of Minister of Justice — in this matter. Before the President signs documents within ‘his vertical’, they must bear not only the signature of the concerned deputy (Mudra) but also that of the Head of the Office of the President.

After ‘Mindichgate’, it is entirely understandable why the previous Head of the Office had little time for judicial strategies (although he has recently had his right to practise as a lawyer restored). All hopes now rest with the current Head of the OP, Kyrylo Budanov, who may be far removed from judicial specifics but certainly understands the importance of strategic planning better than the ‘lawyer’ Yermak.

The key judicial institutions — the HCJ, the HQCJ and the Supreme Court — also lack their own strategies. Consequently, even the proper performance of their functions (which is far from always the case) does not lead to substantial — and, crucially, irreversible — positive change. For example, the absence of a strategy within the HQCJ has resulted in the non-priority filling of vacancies in commercial courts of appeal (where, moreover, a crowd of relatives and friends of certain members of the HQCJ and HCJ, and even two sitting members of the High Council of Justice, rushed to apply — something unacceptable in countries with established democracies). Meanwhile, in the courts of appeal of large cities such as Odesa and Dnipro, there is simply no one to work. Although they are expected to receive judges in 2026, this will be one to one and a half years later than it should have been.

The absence of a strategic vision for the development of the Supreme Court (SC) within its Plenum has already led to a personnel crisis during the election of the leadership of the cassation courts. The Civil Cassation Court elected its Head only on the sixth attempt — Maryna Chervynska, who became a compromise figure after five unsuccessful rounds of voting. Meanwhile, the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court (ACC SC) elected Ihor Dashutin as its Head by the minimum number of votes required — a judge who has been the subject of journalistic investigations concerning alleged illicit enrichment. Such a choice is unacceptable, particularly for a court that examines cases against the President and Parliament. It is difficult to explain to international partners why, in a country that seeks to become a member of the EU as swiftly as possible, judges with questionable reputations continue to be elected to senior judicial positions. And all this takes place against the background of the Kniazev case, the DACK and other scandals.

There has also been a change in the Secretary of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court (GC SC): on 13 January, the judges of the GC SC elected the civil law specialist Serhii Pohribnyi to this position. He is regarded as an ideological academic ally of the current Head of Parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk. It should be recalled that it was precisely thanks to Stefanchuk and a cohort of civil law scholars loyal to him that, in 2025, the Commercial Code of Ukraine (CCU), which had been in force since 2004, was finally repealed. What consequences this will have remains to be seen over the coming years. However, many judges and academics warned against taking such steps during wartime, proposing that a calmer period be chosen for major transformations.

However, the greatest problem of the GC SC lies in the judges of the former Supreme Court of Ukraine who entered the current composition of the SC by circumventing the 2017 reform. Due to complex legislative casuistry and with the support of former colleagues from the Constitutional Court, several judges were transferred to the Supreme Court at the beginning of 2024. Now sitting within the Grand Chamber, they are reinstating old case law and openly lobbying the interests of the old system, blocking further judicial reform and European integration, and effectively steering the ‘new’ SC towards yet another reform. Although at the beginning of 2026 the GC SC managed — by a majority of one vote and after one and a half years of chaos — to return to the agenda one of the previously repealed elements of judicial reform, the Kryvenda–Yemets tandem, according to sources within the SC, is already preparing further attacks on decisions of the HCJ and the HQCJ concerning the dismissal of judges lacking integrity. The remaining judges of the Grand Chamber would therefore do well to reflect carefully on the kind of country in which they — and their children — wish to live: a country of ‘kniazevs-and-vovks’ or one governed by the rule of law.

In 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and the National School of Judges of Ukraine adopted their own Strategies. This was certainly timely.

The HACC has faced considerable criticism for the excessive length of its proceedings. The Nasirov case remained pending at first instance for six years, effectively creating an opportunity to avoid punishment, as the limitation period for holding Nasirov liable will expire in April 2026. It is highly unlikely that the appellate court will manage to complete its examination within that timeframe. Unfortunately, this is not the only high-profile case in which proceedings have moved more slowly than a tortoise. 

The HACC is aware that this situation cannot continue. However, time will tell whether the Strategy and the appointment of new judges (who are expected to join the court this year, provided that the next competition to the HACC does not fail) will make a difference.

In October 2025, the prosecution service also adopted its own Strategy for Reform and Development. It largely repeats requirements already contained in other state policy documents — requirements that the prosecution service itself has disregarded, for example by cancelling, in July 2025, the basic competition for positions in higher-level prosecutor’s offices. Is there anything about this in the Strategy? Of course not. This is therefore a case of good intentions leading to a familiar outcome. In the past week, the media and the public have been stirred by news of the formation of a competition commission for selection to senior positions in the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Alongside international experts, the commission includes the appointment of a lawyer Oleksii Shevchuk.

The issue here is not at all about whose interests he may have represented in the past (the right to defence is constitutional and universal). The problem lies in how Shevchuk’s candidacy is perceived by society and the expert community: when the state seeks to increase trust in the selection of the leadership of the SAPO, this is certainly not achieved by appointing to competition commissions individuals whose reputation and ethical standards raise questions. Moreover, these are direct statutory requirements — ‘impeccable business reputation, high professional and moral qualities, public authority, integrity’. It is regrettable that the Prosecutor General, holding such a high office and extensive powers, either fails to understand this or, even worse, deliberately undermines trust in the competition commission before it has even begun its work. Why, then, does Ukraine spend the time and resources of our international partners (and donors), if the Prosecutor General disregards such fundamental categories as ethics and morality?

The situation within the Bar is no better. It lacks not only a comprehensive development strategy (the previous one expired at the end of 2025), but also re-elected leadership that should have been responsible for drafting such a document. Incidentally, it was precisely the absence of any meaningful positive changes within the Bar that the European Union highlighted in its Enlargement Report published in November. Experts have also drawn attention to this issue year after year in shadow reports.

(Literally during the preparation of this material, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) announced the approval of its Strategy for 2026–2028. Incidentally, the Strategies of SAPO and the HACC were developed with the support of international technical assistance projects.)

The absence of a comprehensive strategic document and a detailed, realistic consolidated implementation plan has already led to delays in fulfilling several of Ukraine’s international obligations.

Under previously approved plans set out in documents such as the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Memorandum with the IMF, Ukraine was expected in 2025 to fill 25 vacancies at the HACC and to adopt new legislation on judges’ integrity declarations.

In the end, the HACC was reinforced by only two new judges, while the draft laws concerning judges’ integrity declarations (as well as disciplinary liability) received numerous critical comments from the Venice Commission and, as of the end of 2025, had not been adopted by Parliament.

Ukraine did not receive almost €700 million under the Ukraine Facility — a significant amount for a country at war — and by the end of the first quarter must remedy the situation regarding the selection of HACC judges (at least 23 more judges), and by the end of the third quarter — regarding integrity declarations. Only then can the country expect to receive the specified funds.

The chances of meeting these obligations in 2026 are fairly high. In December, the qualification examination in the competition to the HACC and its Appeals Chamber was completed. Seventy-three legal professionals successfully passed it. Next, the HQCJ and the Public Council of International Experts will assess the integrity of the candidates. Those who successfully pass this stage will be included in the ranking and will determine their place of work — either at the HACC court of first instance or its Appeals Chamber.

Next in line is the competition to two higher administrative courts — the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA). Since Parliament took more than a year to adopt the two laws necessary to launch this competition, last year the HQCJ managed only to collect documents from potential candidates. There turned out to be 268 individuals (356 applications, as some candidates applied to both courts).

This is progress that Ukraine has been awaiting for three years: the SDAC and SACA will examine the ‘political’ category of cases previously heard by the DACK, which was dissolved back in December 2022. It is therefore entirely understandable why the political authorities are in no hurry to ensure the swift launch of these courts.

Overall, at the beginning of 2026, 4,794 judges are serving in Ukraine. This is 208 fewer than as of 1 January 2025. In other words, the HCJ and the HQCJ are operating almost at ‘full capacity’, yet the number of judges continues to decline.

There are currently 1,399 vacancies in courts of first instance, 725 in courts of appeal, 80 judges are lacking in the higher specialised courts (competitions to which are ongoing), and 50 judges are lacking in the Supreme Court, where a competition is also forthcoming.

As regards appointments to courts of appeal, some of the newly selected judges (those who came from the Bar and academia) have already been working for one and a half months without having taken the oath. They have been formally enrolled in the staff of the courts, receive remuneration and undergo training, yet they are unable to perform their primary function — administering justice. The dates for their oath-taking have not been publicly announced by the Office of the President. The judges themselves do not know these dates either, although they indicate that it will be ‘not earlier than March’. Thus, we have an interesting situation: Ukraine has reported to the EU that a certain ‘gestalt’ regarding the appointment of judges under new rules (as required by the Ukraine Facility) has been closed, yet the judges have not actually begun to perform their duties.

Unfortunately, this is precisely the endless paradox of judicial reform that we at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives have written about more than once: one step forward, two steps back, or one step forward — and then standing still. This is exactly what is happening, for example, with the Constitutional Court: the President appointed two judges, yet Parliament failed to secure the necessary votes to appoint two others. At the same time, the Advisory Group of Experts has, on top of everything else, failed for the third time in a row to complete the competition under the quota of the Congress of Judges, having been unable for almost two years to identify a single decent candidate. One may, on the one hand, blame the candidates — as some civil society organisations do — or, alternatively, take a critical look at the competition rules and acknowledge that certain requirements are excessive. What exactly should be amended was analysed in detail as early as a year ago, yet the cart remains where it was.

Ukraine is beginning yet another year of judicial reform — a reform that has been ongoing almost since independence. For conscientious judges, this phrase has long provoked nausea rather than inspiration, while those lacking integrity exploit protracted procedures for their own purposes, obtaining judgments in their favour against Ukraine before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

For example, former judge Tandyr, who fatally struck a National Guard serviceman, received one such judgment last week: namely, that he had been held in detention for an excessive period without the possibility of bail. Yet he himself significantly contributed to the prolonged court proceedings by repeatedly changing his testimony and generally abusing his procedural rights. Unfortunately, this is not the first case in which a judge against whom the Ukrainian justice system has serious concerns receives an opportunity to ‘slip away’ through an ECtHR judgment in his favour. The above-mentioned judges of the former Supreme Court of Ukraine likewise have ECtHR judgments delivered in their favour.

In such stories, the pattern is evident: the absence of clear strategies and a thorough implementation plan, the chaotic conduct of reforms and political decisions that neutralise previous efforts generate legislative inconsistencies. Moreover, poor legislative drafting of draft laws, a long-standing shortage of judges, significant underfunding (the courts are financed at approximately 60% of their needs) and the abuse of rights by judges lacking integrity all contribute to ECtHR judgments against Ukraine. Formally, such judgments may comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, yet in practice they roll back reforms and the years of effort invested by Ukraine.

Is the ECtHR to blame for this? Hardly. Ukraine — consciously or unconsciously — has chosen inconsistency and chaos as the principal drivers of reform in the justice sector and has, for many years, tolerated the absence of honour and dignity in the work of key law enforcement bodies.

When searches are conducted without warrants, beginning at 5 a.m., and people are threatened with walls being broken down. When, during such searches, mothers are not allowed into rooms where their minor children are present and photographs of individuals in their underwear circulate online even before the searches are completed. When photographs of a naked civil society activist are leaked from his seized telephone to Telegram channels and no one is held accountable. When the selection of heads of law enforcement bodies is entrusted to individuals with questionable reputations. When court staff are paid 8,000–10,000 UAH per month for years on end… What kind of European integration can be discussed under such conditions?

If one adds political cases, corruption and the still-existing blue wall of silence among parts of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, then with such a picture even russians are not needed to undermine our state.

Unfortunately, from the words ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘corruption’ the phrase ‘rule of law’ does not emerge. If we do not begin to bring order to this judicial chaos, the hydra will remain a hydra — no matter how many roadmaps are fed to it.

Much has been said about the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning former judge Oleksii Tandyr — primarily in terms of a possible opportunity for Tandyr to evade liability in the case concerning a fatal drink-driving road accident. However, at most, the judgment allows for a review of the preventive measure applied to the former judge, taking into account the ECtHR’s critical remarks. The case will continue to be examined by the court. Therefore, hope for justice — remains.

At the same time, the judgment once again highlighted a whole ‘bouquet’ of problems within the criminal justice system — excessive length of judicial proceedings, detention without proper substantiation of the risks of absconding from trial and similar issues. Moreover, it is not an isolated case: previously, the ECtHR had already drawn attention to the problem of the quality of reasoning in decisions on pre-trial detention, specifically in the case of Ignatov v. Ukraine (2016), while such problems had also existed under the old Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine) of 1960 — Kharchenko v. Ukraine (2011).

What should be changed to reduce the number of ECtHR judgments against Ukraine? Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, draws attention to the following:

1. The problem lies in the length of investigations and insufficient control over the implementation of preventive measures in criminal proceedings (primarily detention). First and foremost — and most simply — amendments should be introduced to the CPC of Ukraine to ensure that, at the trial stage, a 12-month limit applies to the maximum duration of this preventive measure, including any extensions (by analogy with the pre-trial investigation stage). At present, the average duration of court proceedings in cases concerning serious and especially serious crimes amounts to 3–5 years, or even longer. It is also necessary to consider current conditions, where the length of proceedings is extended due to a shortage of judges, air raid alerts leading to adjournments of hearings and similar factors.
2. Another problem concerns the abuse of procedural rights by the parties to criminal proceedings. The CPC of Ukraine addresses abuse of rights only in relation to motions for recusal and excessively lengthy opening statements. In all other instances — failure of all defence counsel to appear, ‘flooding’ the court with identical motions, various attempts to delay the judicial proceedings — such conduct effectively remains the ‘norm’ in criminal procedure. Unfortunately, the disciplinary bodies of the prosecution service or the Bar respond to such behaviour extremely moderately and interpret violations of professional ethics in a very limited manner. As a result, criminal proceedings that could — and should, as a matter of priority — be examined within one year may instead last five, or even ten, years.
3. Another shortcoming is the excessive workload of forensic institutions, which may take months to complete even the simplest expert examinations. This significantly slows down criminal proceedings. Even more problematic is the availability of alternative and repeated expert examinations. Of course, the parties are entitled to request them, and this corresponds to the adversarial principle of criminal procedure. However, in practice, this often leads to unlawful conduct by specialists, as improper influence on expert institutions remains widespread. It is precisely for this reason that NABU and SAPO increasingly speak of the need for an ‘independent examination’, while the Ministry of Justice is working to improve forensic activities. State strategic policy documents provide for a review of the legislative framework in this field, so that law enforcement bodies may gain access to ‘high-quality, objective and prompt forensic examination’. This includes the introduction of a new system for licensing experts, ensuring the functioning of expert self-governance, expanding the types of examinations that private forensic experts may conduct, digitalisation of forensic activities and similar measures.
4. Another problem concerns supervision over compliance with preventive measures, that is, the functioning of a law enforcement structure capable of monitoring compliance with the obligations imposed — not to tamper with evidence, not to communicate with certain individuals, to remain within a specified territory and similar requirements. While the latter may still be monitored, the destruction of evidence, pressure on victims and witnesses, or the possibility of committing other offences are difficult to prevent due to the lack of time and resources within the police. Alternatives may include house arrest or bail, yet even these provide only weak guarantees of the suspect’s or accused’s participation in criminal proceedings, as the law enforcement infrastructure in this segment remains underdeveloped — and there is no corresponding demand for its development. Judges, for their part, are more inclined to order detention wherever possible. Any other decision concerning a less restrictive preventive measure will inevitably be met with allegations of ‘evasion of justice’ and may provoke public outrage.

Amendments to legislation resolve this systemic problem only partially. It is also advisable to change attitudes towards alternative preventive measures to detention that are not associated with restrictions on freedom of movement. This would contribute to addressing the problem. At the same time — strict supervision must be ensured in relation to house arrest, bail and other measures designed to prevent pressure on witnesses or victims, destruction of evidence or absconding. In other words, preventive measures must achieve their purpose — ensuring the participation of the accused and preserving the evidentiary basis necessary to establish a person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives took part in CourtUP: the First Annual Court Administration Conference. The event brought together representatives of the judiciary, primarily court staff, to discuss key aspects of effective court administration, workload optimisation, staffing needs and modern approaches to organising the work of courts.

A key part of the conference was a discussion on digital solutions to improve both public access to justice and the day-to-day work of Ukrainian courts, particularly in wartime.

The e-court system was a central focus of the panel discussion ‘Digitalisation and Court Administration: Modern IT Solutions to Enhance the Effectiveness of Justice’. Participants discussed the concept and implementation timeline for the project’s core modules, currently planned for the fourth quarter of 2027.

One of the key components of the e-court system is electronic document management, which requires a fundamental upgrade using the latest technologies and considering the needs of both courts and external users.

Improving this tool will be possible with the support of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives within the project on digitalising Ukraine’s court system.

Head of the Rule of Law Area at the ALI, Karyna Aslanian, noted that implementation of the project has already begun. It has every chance of becoming the largest joint initiative of the judiciary, bringing together all key stakeholders — courts, judicial governance bodies, development teams from the Ministry of Digital Transformation, international partners and donors, civil society, as well as representatives of the IT industry selected through transparent procedures.

She stressed that the digitalisation of processes in the judicial system is both a requirement of international partners under the Ukraine Facility and a recommendation of the Shadow Report by the coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. Moreover, the task of digitalising court files and document flow is also envisaged in the Rule of Law Roadmap and is subject to specific deadlines.

The Project will be implemented jointly with key judicial institutions — the Supreme Court, the High Council of Justice, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. More about the digital products to be developed for the justice sector within the Project is available here.

The expert also recalled that the Agency for Legislative Initiatives had previously examined the needs of court staff in its Green Paper on the Functioning of Civil and Patronage Service in the Judiciary, where process digitalisation is among the top demands and areas for change. The ALI is now working on a White Paper – a comprehensive document setting out recommendations for concrete steps to be taken by both key public authorities and the courts to improve processes in the Ukrainian justice system, including through the introduction of digital solutions.

The event was organised by the All-Ukrainian Association of Court Staff with the support of the EU Project ‘Pravo-Justice’, implemented by Expertise France.

The EU is launching a frontloading process. This will enable Ukraine to prepare for the opening of negotiating clusters even before the Hungarian veto is lifted. Within this framework, the European Union and Ukraine have agreed ten priority conditions to be fulfilled over the course of a year under Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals’, in addition to other obligations. Meeting these conditions will confirm Ukraine’s readiness for accession.

It is important to note that all the requirements of the EU priority plan are aligned with the recommendations of the Shadow Report prepared by a coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI).

Specifically, ALI has repeatedly emphasised the need to revise the highly politicised procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, to reinstate competitive selection procedures in the prosecution service at all levels (suspended for the duration of martial law in July 2025), to reform the State Bureau of Investigation and to address related issues.

Another priority area, alongside anti-corruption policy and law enforcement reform, is, as ever, judicial reform. Specifically, the EU requires Ukraine to:

1. appoint without delay the judges of the Constitutional Court and the members of the High Council of Justice who have passed international vetting;
2. reinstate international experts on the selection panel of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ);
3. adopt the draft law on judges’ integrity declarations.

It should be added that most of these conditions are already provided for in the Rule of Law Roadmap approved by the Government in May 2025. Taken together, the Roadmap and the EU’s frontloading process set the priority directions of travel, while the ALI and its partners indicate how exactly these requirements should be implemented.

The High Council of Justice is an independent constitutional body of state authority and judicial governance that operates to ensure the independence of the judiciary, its functioning on the principles of responsibility and accountability to society and the formation of an ethical and highly professional corps of judges.

The key powers of the HCJ include:

1. submitting proposals to the President of Ukraine on the appointment of judges to office;
2. ensuring the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against judges;
3. granting consent to the detention of a judge or to holding a judge in custody or under arrest;
4. adopting decisions on the dismissal of judges from office, the temporary suspension of judges from the administration of justice, the transfer of judges from one court to another, as well as exercisingConstitution of Ukraine, Article 131; On the High Council of Justice: Law of Ukraine dated 21 December 2016 No. 1798-VIII, Article 3. other powers.

The HCJ consists of 21 members. Of these:

• 10 are elected by the Congress of Judges of Ukraine (from among judges or retired judges);
• 2 are appointed by the President of Ukraine;
• 2 members each are elected by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors and the Congress of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Institutions and Scientific Establishments. In addition, the President of the Supreme Court is a member of the HCJ ex officio.

Members of the HCJ are elected (appointed) for a four-year term. The same person may not hold the position of an HCJ member for two consecutive terms.

The HCJ is quorate provided that at least 15 members have been elected (appointed), the majority of whom are judges (including retired judges), and that they have taken the oath.

As of the end of November 2025, the HCJ consists of 17 members, with four positions remaining vacant: two under the quota of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine and two under the quota of the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine.

Although the Law of Ukraine ‘On the High Council of Justice’ (the Law) requires that the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors and the Congress of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Institutions and Scientific Establishments convene for the purpose of electing HCJ members no later than two months before the expiry of the term of office of the respective HCJ member, in practice not all appointing (electing) entities comply with this requirement.

In 2025, for more than half a year starting in March, the HCJ operated at the quorum threshold — with a composition of 15 members — due to the expiry of the terms of office of two members appointed under the quota of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine and the failure to fill vacanciesShadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 26. under the quotas of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine.

In October 2025, the President appointed two HCJ members under his quota, following a selection process that had been ongoing since November 2024. Prior to this, these positions had remained vacant for more than three years.

Representation of the Bar within the HCJ has been absent for almost four years. The last Congress of Advocates of UkraineThe highest body of bar governance in Ukraine, convened by the Bar Council of Ukraine at least once every three years. took place in February 2019, at which two HCJ members were elected; they resigned from office early at their own request in January 2022.

In September 2022, the Bar Council of Ukraine adopted a decision to convene the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine and approved its agenda, which included, inter alia, the appointment of members of the HCJThe Bar Council of Ukraine has decided to convene the Sixth Congress of Lawyers of Ukraine. National Bar Association of Ukraine. 2022.. However, according to the National Bar Association of Ukraine, the congress is planned to be held after the termination of martial law.

The selection of candidates for the HCJ is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Law through a competitive procedure based on the criteria of professional competence, ethics and integrity.

In order to be elected as an HCJ member by the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, the Congress of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Institutions and Scientific Establishments, or the All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors, a candidate must submit the required documents to the HCJ no later than 30 days before the date of the relevant congress or conference.

After the document submission period has ended, the HCJ Secretariat forwards copies of the submitted documents to the Ethics CouncilThe Ethics Council is established to assist the bodies that elect (appoint) members of the High Council of Justice in determining whether candidates for membership of the High Council of Justice meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity.. Having reviewed the documents and conducted interviews, the Ethics Council submits to the body convening the respective congress or conference its opinion on each candidate’s compliance with the criteria of professional ethics and integrity, as well as a list of candidates recommended for election to the position of HCJ member. This list must include a number of candidates that is at least twice the number of vacant HCJ member positions.

At the same time, if the number of recommended candidates is lower than required by the LawAbout the High Council of Justice: Law of Ukraine dated 21 December 2016 No. 1798-VIII, Part 8 of Article 9., a new competition is announced.

Thus, the Law requires the Ethics Council, following the selection process, to compile a general list of candidates recommended for election to the position of HCJ member, the number of whom must be at least twice the number of vacant positions.

By way of comparison, a different approach is applied by the legislator when selecting candidates for vacancies in another key body of judicial governance — the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) — as well as for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU).

Specifically, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges’ provides that the competition commission conducts the selection of candidates for the position of HQCJ member who meet the criteria of integrity and professional competence, at a ratio of no fewer than two candidates per vacant positionOn the judicial system and status of judges: Law of Ukraine dated 02.06.2016 No. 1402-VIII, Part 5 of Article 95..

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’, if, following the assessment by the Advisory Group of ExpertsThe advisory group of experts is formed with the aim of assisting the entities responsible for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court in assessing the moral qualities and level of competence in the field of law of candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court., the number of candidates who meet the criteria of high moral character and a recognised level of competence in the field of law is fewer than two persons per vacant position of a CCU judge, a new competitive selection is announcedOn the Constitutional Court of Ukraine: Law of Ukraine No. 2136-VIII dated 13 July 2017, Article 10–8..

Thus, the selection of candidates for vacant positions in the HQCJ and the CCU is carried out on the basis of at least two candidates for each individual vacant position, without reference to the total number of such positions, unlike the model used for forming the list of candidates for the HCJ.

The requirement of the Law to form a consolidated list of candidates recommended by the Ethics Council for election to the position of an HCJ member, in a number at least twice the number of vacant positions, in practice leads to difficulties in its implementation.

In this context, the situation surrounding the selection of candidates for two HCJ member positions under the quota of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, interviews for which were conducted in February 2025, is illustrative.

On 6 March, the Ethics Council announced that it had completed the selection process and approved the list of candidates recommended for appointment. As a result of the evaluation, two candidates were found to meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity, while five were found not to meet these criteria.

However, since the number of recommended candidates proved to be lower than required by the Law, it became necessary to announce a new competition.

Thus, under the current wording of Part 8 of Article 9 of the Law, the electing (appointing) body — the Congress of Judges of Ukraine — on the basis of the above-mentioned decision of the Ethics Council, is unable to fill even a single vacant HCJ member position.

It should be noted that over the past 11 years, the HCJ has ceased its activities twice. In the coming years, there is a risk of a repeated suspension, as nearly a quarter of the members required to form its full composition are currently missing.

In addition, the terms of office of three HCJ members — appointed under the quotas of the Congress of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Institutions and Scientific Establishments and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine — will expire in August 2026. In January 2027, eight HCJ member positions under the quota of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine will become vacant simultaneously.

Another problem in the selection of HCJ members is the extremely short timeframe established by law within which the Ethics Council must carry out the selection of candidates. This process includes the review of submitted documents, the results of special background checks and information from open sources, interviews with shortlisted candidates, and the preparation of a list of candidates to be recommended to the appointing (electing) bodies of HCJ members. In practice, the Ethics Council often fails to complete candidate assessmentsShadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 26. within such a compressed timeframe.

Thus, shortcomings in the legislative regulation of procedures for selecting HCJ members, the failure (or delayed failure) by certain appointing (electing) bodies to fill vacant positions, as well as the expected release of a significant number of positions in 2026–2027, collectively create risks of a renewed blockage of the HCJ’s activities.

Amend the Law of Ukraine ‘On the High Council of Justice’ to provide for the following:

1. In the second paragraph of Part 8 of Article 9 — by analogy with the procedures for selecting candidates for vacant positions in the HQCJ and the CCU — establish that the list of candidates recommended by the Ethics Council for election to the position of HCJ member is to be formed on the basis of at least two candidates per one vacant position.
2. Extend the time limits granted to the Ethics Council for conducting the selection of candidates for the position of HCJ member, to ensure high-quality and timely assessment and to avoid delays in the overall procedure for the election (appointment) of HCJ members.

This document was prepared with the support of Sweden. The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of CSO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

One of the indicators under the Ukraine Facility Plan — specifically within the implementation of the reform of the enforcement of court decisions in the ‘Judicial System’ section — is the entry into force of legislation on the digitalisation of enforcement proceedings. The Plan itself serves as the basis for receiving financial support from the European Union and constitutes the main instrument for recovery and European integration. The deadline for meeting this indicator is the second quarter of 2025. The implementing authority is the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

It is envisaged that the implementation of measures aimed at the digitalisation of processes in the field of enforcement of court decisions will deliver the following results:

• as of the fourth quarter of 2025 — a system for collecting data on the enforcement of court decisions is operational;
• as of the second quarter of 2026 — an upgraded IT system for enforcement proceedings is operational, facilitating the enforcement process, the tracing of debtors’ assets, the blocking of bank accounts and debt recovery.

The reform is expected to result in more effective procedures for the compulsory enforcement of court decisions, which would help Ukraine improve its international reputation as a reliable jurisdiction for doing business.

However, due to the failure to adopt this law, inter alia, within the established timeframe, Ukraine did not receive the planned funding from the European Union.

On 4 November 2025, the Verkhovna Rada adopted at first reading the European integration draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Simplifying Enforcement Proceedings through Digitalisation’, registration No. 14005 of 4 September 2025 (Draft Law No. 14005), which is currently being prepared for second reading by Parliament.

Following this, a number of media publications appeared claiming that Draft Law No. 14005 changes the procedure for levying enforcement on property and may lead to a significant narrowing of debtors’ rights, as it envisages the possibility of depriving them of their only home in the event of arrears in housing and communal services payments.

Following an analysis of Draft Law No. 14005, experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives identified a number of key conclusions.

The non-enforcement of decisions of national courts remains a systemic problem, as indicated, inter alia, by shadow reports prepared for the European Commission by a coalition of civil society organisationsShadow report to Chapter 23, ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights,’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine in 2023, p. 109; Shadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 157. led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The total amount of debt under enforcement proceedings in 2024 amounted to UAH 2.2 trillion. Between December 2024 and March 2025, Ukrainians accumulated more than 164,000 new debts. In 2024, the State Enforcement Service bodies and private enforcement officers recovered UAH 25 billion under enforcement proceedings, which constitutes 1.2% of the total amount that was to be recovered from debtors. In additionShadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 157., 6.5 million enforcement documents were subject to execution, of which only 1.9 million were actually enforced.

As of 1 June 2025Due to the fact that the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine does not publish statistics on the enforcement of court decisions in the public domain, more recent data is not available., enforcement authorities across the country had effectively executed more than 800,000 enforcement documents, recovering over UAH 6 billion. Overall, at the beginning of June 2025, the State Enforcement Service was handlingShadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 157. more than 4 million documents with a total value exceeding UAH 1.5 trillion.

In order to address this problem, in January 2025, the Government extended the implementation period of the National Strategy for Addressing the Problem of Non-Enforcement of Court Decisions, adopted in September 2020, where the debtor is a state authority or a state-owned enterprise, institution, or organisation — until 2027 and approved an Action Plan for its implementation.

According to this document, the key reasons for the non-enforcement of court decisions include an insufficient level of automation of enforcement proceedings, as well as the absence of a unified system of electronic interaction between registers of court decisions and the automated enforcement proceedings system, including documents necessary to ensure the analysis and collection of information on the enforcement of court decisions.

The purpose of Draft Law No. 14005, as stated in its explanatory note, is to ensure the enforcement of court decisions and decisions of other authorities (officials) through the digitalisation of certain stages of enforcement proceedings, as well as the optimisation of their phases and the time limits for carrying out enforcement actions.

According to its authors — a group of Members of Parliament (Motovylovets A. V. et al.) — the amendments proposed by this draft law are intended to streamline the stages of enforcement proceedings, shorten the timeframes for enforcement actions and enhance the overall effectiveness of enforcement proceedings.

Introduce amendments to the Laws of Ukraine ‘On Road Traffic’, ‘On Notaries’, ‘On Banks and Banking’, ‘On the Depository System of Ukraine’, ‘On State Registration of Rights to Immovable Property and Their Encumbrances’, ‘On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Public Associations’, ‘On Enforcement Proceedings’ (the Law), ‘On Capital Markets and Organised Commodity Markets’ and ‘On Compulsory State Social Insurance’, which would provide for the following.

To expand the functional capacity of the Automated Enforcement Proceedings System, which is intended to ensure the automation of operational processes of the State Enforcement Service bodies, private enforcement officers and the conduct of enforcement proceedings as such. Specifically, the system is intended to provide parties to enforcement proceedings with access to relevant information and documents, as well as the ability to submit such documents in electronic form.

The system is also intended to ensure electronic interaction between State Enforcement Service bodies and private enforcement officers, on the one hand, and state authorities, banks, other financial institutions, non-bank payment service providers and electronic money issuers, on the other. Enforcement officers will obtain access to information on debtors, their property, income, and funds (including electronic money), including confidential information contained in state electronic databases, registers, and other automated information systems.

In this regard, the proposal to grant enforcement officers unrestricted access to an undefined range of information about debtors, including confidential data, raises concern.

This runs counter to the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, which provide that the collection, storage, use, and dissemination of confidential information about an individual without their consent are not permitted, except in cases expressly provided for by law and only in the interests of national security, economic well-being and the protection of human rights. Confidential informationArticle 32 of the Constitution of Ukraine, Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Information’, Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Protection of Personal Data’. relating to an individual includes, inter alia, data on their nationality, education, family status, religious beliefs and state of health, as well as their address, date, and place of birth. Moreover, this provision of the draft law does not comply with international legal instruments, in particular Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Accordingly, the draft law creates risks of excessive interference by enforcement officers in the sphere of debtors’ personal data and of potential violations of their right to the protection of such data.

Granting enforcement officers access to information contained in state electronic databases and registers has the potential to significantly accelerate enforcement proceedings and enhance their transparency. At the same time, the draft law does not define a specific list of electronic databases and registers to which such access is to be granted, nor does it specify the categories of data or information — including whether such data exist or not — that enforcement officers would be entitled to request.

The lack of regulation in this area creates legal uncertainty as to the scope and limits of access to information.

The draft law also proposes the introduction of the automatic lifting of seizures from a debtor’s accounts once the debt has been fully repaid, without the need for an additional application to the enforcement officer. Thus, where funds are credited to the relevant account of the State Enforcement Service or a private enforcement officer in an amount sufficient to satisfy the creditor’s claims, pay the enforcement fee, enforcement costs, fines and the basic remuneration of the private enforcement officer, the automated enforcement proceedings system would generate a notification serving as grounds for removing the debtor’s details from the Unified Register of Debtors (URD) and lifting the seizure from the debtor’s funds, electronic money and securities in electronic form.

This notification will be sent, on the day it is generated, to banks, other financial institutions, non-bank payment service providers, electronic money issuers and depository institutions for the purpose of lifting the seizure from the debtor’s relevant assets.

According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, this innovation is expected to significantly simplify the procedure for debtors and reduce the workload of the enforcement service.

At the same time, the automatic generation of such notifications will not apply in all cases, as the categories of enforcement documents in respect of which they will be generated are proposed to be defined additionally in a subordinate legal act of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

Moreover, the draft law does not provide for the automatic lifting of seizure from movable and immovable property.

To ensure electronic interoperability of the Unified Register of Debtors (URD), which forms part of the automated enforcement proceedings system, with other electronic databases and registers

The URD has been operational since January 2017 and constitutes a systematised database of debtors, available in open access on the official website of the Ministry of Justice, where information on debtors’ unfulfilled pecuniary obligations can be verified.

To expand the grounds for entering and removing information on debtors in/from the URD

The draft law expands the grounds for entering information on a debtor into the URD. Specifically, information is to be entered simultaneously with the issuance of a ruling on:

• the opening of enforcement proceedings (already provided for by the current Law);
• the resumption or renewal of enforcement proceedings;
• the revocation of rulings or other documents that served as the basis for removing information on a debtor from the register;
• the imposition of a fine on a debtor in cases involving non-pecuniary decisions (the current Law provides for this only in relation to decisions on establishing contact with a child and removing obstacles to such contact);
• the entry of information on a debtor into the register pursuant to a decision on the recovery of periodic payments (alimony), where the amount of arrears exceeds the amount of the relevant payments for three months (already provided for by the current Law).

In addition to the existing grounds for removing debtors from the URD, which provide for the issuance of decisions on: the return of the enforcement document to the creditor; the completion of enforcement proceedings; the lifting of enforcement measures under an enforcement document on the recovery of periodic payments on the day the absence of arrears is established; as well as the issuance of a decision provided for in Part Four of Article 40 of the Law, the draft law additionally proposes to include the following grounds:

• the generation of an automatic notification confirming repayment of the debt;
• the issuance of a decision cancelling the decisions on the basis of which information on the debtor was entered in the Register;
• based on a court decision.

To introduce additional restrictions on debtors’ rights to dispose of their own property

If the draft law is adopted, the following restrictions will apply to property owners whose details are included in the URD:

• Refusal to carry out registration actions in respect of a motor vehicle

Territorial bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and bodies responsible for departmental registration of motor vehicles, as under the current legislation, will be obliged to refuse a debtor’s request for the re-registration of a motor vehicle or its removal from the register.

At the same time, the draft law provides for exceptions. Such refusal will not apply in the following cases: where re-registration is not related to the disposal of the motor vehicle; acquisition of a motor vehicle or its receipt in satisfaction of a debt; acquisition of a motor vehicle in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 30 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Securing Creditors’ Claims and Registration of Encumbrances’; or the gratuitous transfer of a confiscated motor vehicle.

• Refusal to carry out actions in respect of the debtor’s property

State authorities, local self-government bodies, notaries and other entities exercising public powers, as well as investment firms, will be obliged to refuse to carry out actions related to the disposal or pledging of property owned by the debtor.

Exceptions: the property has been transferred to the creditor; gratuitous transfer of confiscated property; conclusion of a transaction providing for the acquisition of ownership of the property by the mortgagee, pledgee, or a third party under a transaction concluded by the mortgagee or pledgee.

• Refusal to perform notarial acts

Notaries and officials authorised to perform notarial acts will refuse to carry them out not only in cases involving the disposal of property (as provided for under current legislation), but also where such property is transferred as collateral (mortgage).

• Refusal of state registration of rights

In addition to the existing prohibition on state registration of ownership rights based on a transaction involving the disposal of property by a debtor, the draft law proposes, subject to certain exceptions, to additionally prohibit the debtor from state registration of:

1. a special property rightA type of property right that consists of owning and disposing of an unfinished construction project, a future real estate property. based on a transaction involving its disposal;
2. a mortgage over immovable property, an unfinished construction object, or a future immovable property object, where the owner of such property or the holder of the special property right is the debtor.

• Restrictions on the disposal of rights to securities and rights under securities

A debtor will not be permitted to dispose of their rights to securities or rights under securities in paper form. Likewise, the disposal of rights to securities and rights under securities in electronic form will not be allowed if restrictions on their circulation are indicated in the securities depository accounting system.

To retain the existing procedure for enforcement against a debtor’s funds and other property

As under the current legislation, enforcement will first be levied against the debtor’s funds, electronic money and other valuables held in accounts, electronic wallets or in custody with banks and other financial institutions, non-bank payment service providers and electronic money issuers.

If such funds or other valuables are insufficient, enforcement will be levied against other property belonging to the debtor, including cash, with the exception of property that is exempt from enforcement under the law.

The debtor may propose which types of property or items should be realised as a priority; however, the final decision is taken by the enforcement officer.

Enforcement shall be carried out in the amount necessary to satisfy the enforcement document, considering the recovery of the enforcement fee, enforcement proceedings costs, fines imposed on the debtor during enforcement proceedings and the principal remuneration of the private enforcement officer.

The seizure of the debtor’s funds and other valuables held in accounts with banks or other financial institutions, as well as electronic money stored in electronic wallets, shall be imposed by the enforcement officer no later than the next working day after their identification, by issuing the relevant decision. The seizure shall be imposed in an amount corresponding to the sum subject to recovery, including the enforcement fee, enforcement proceedings costs, fines and the principal remuneration of the private enforcement officer.

The draft law also reiterates the existing provision prohibiting enforcement against a debtor’s sole dwelling and the land plot on which it is located where the amount of debt subject to recovery under enforcement proceedings does not exceed 20 minimum wages (as of 2025 — UAH 160,000). In such cases, the enforcement officer is required to take measures to recover the debt from other property belonging to the debtor (Part Seven of Article 48 of the Law).

The draft law contains no other provisions that would allow for the deprivation of a debtor’s sole dwelling.

Accordingly, the draft law does not expand the possibilities for depriving debtors of their sole dwelling and the land plot on which it is situated. Enforcement is primarily directed at the debtor’s funds and other property. A sole dwelling and the land plot beneath it may become subject to enforcement only in cases already provided for by law — where the amount of debt, as of 2025, exceeds UAH 160,000 and subject to compliance with the established order of enforcement.

The draft law also does not alter the existing procedure for determining the value of a debtor’s property, conducting its valuation, arranging its storage, or selling property against which enforcement has been levied.

To introduce changes to terminology

The draft law proposes, in most cases, to replace the term ‘seizure of property’ with ‘levying enforcement on property’ in the Law.

At the same time, it defines levying enforcement on a debtor’s property as encompassing its identification, inventory and seizure, removal (or debiting of funds from accounts) and compulsory sale (including the presentation of electronic money for redemption in exchange for funds transferred to the relevant account of the State Enforcement Service or a private enforcement officer).

Accordingly, the concept of ‘levying enforcement on property’ is broader, as it comprises several stages, including the seizure of property.

At the same time, the text of the draft law repeatedly uses these concepts side by side (‘enforcement against property and seizure’) or applies individual elements of enforcement in parallel. For example, it provides that, during enforcement proceedings, the enforcement officer has the right ‘to enforce against the debtor’s property, seal it, seize it, transfer such property for safekeeping and realise it’.

In our view, an example of incorrect terminological revision is the proposed wording of Article 58 of the Law, which in its current version regulates the procedure for the safekeeping of property subject to seizure. Under the existing regulation, property on which seizure has been imposed is transferred for safekeeping to the debtor or to other persons designated by the enforcement officer in the ruling on the description and seizure of the debtor’s property, against signature. By contrast, the draft law proposes to provide for the safekeeping of property against which enforcement has been levied. However, the term ‘property against which enforcement has been levied’, as used in the draft law, covers not only the stages of identification, description and seizure, but also the subsequent stages of removal and compulsory sale (realisation) of the property. In effect, this refers to property to which the entire enforcement procedure has already been applied, rather than merely property subject to seizure.

At the same time, Part Five of the new version of Article 56 of the Law states that, when conducting the inventory and seizure of property, the enforcement officer may, inter alia, transfer the property for safekeeping to other persons, which must be indicated in the decision on the inventory and seizure of the debtor’s property.

Considering the above, the proposed new title of Article 61 of the Law — ‘Sale of property under enforcement proceedings’ — also appears to be incorrect. Such a conflation of terms creates legal uncertainty, complicates the understanding of the provisions, and may lead to difficulties in their subsequent practical application.

It should be noted that Draft Law No. 14005 is not the first attempt to reform the system of compulsory enforcement of court decisions and to introduce digitalisation in the field of enforcement proceedings.

The version of Draft Law No. 14005 adopted at first reading is almost identical to Government Draft Law No. 9363 of 7 June 2023, which was adopted as a basis in November 2024 but, following consideration at second reading, was rejected by Parliament in August 2025 and removed from consideration. That draft law attracted a degree of criticismShadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 161. from the Private Enforcement Officers Association of Ukraine.

In addition, issues related to the digitalisation of enforcement proceedings, among others, were also addressed in Draft Law No. 5660 of 14 June 2021, which, after being adopted at first reading, was never considered by Parliament at second reading. Given its proposed innovations and potential positive impactShadow report to Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package in 2024, p. 159. on the enforcement of court decisions, that draft law was supported by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal Policy, the Private Enforcement Officers Association of Ukraine and the International Union of Judicial Officers (UIHJ).

1. Further refine Draft Law No. 14005, taking into account the provisions of previous draft laws (No. 5660 and No. 9363) and the comments expressed in relation to them, with a view to unifying approaches and shaping a coherent state policy in the field of enforcement of court decisions that reflects the positions of both the Private Enforcement Officers Association of Ukraine and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.
2. Revise the provisions of Draft Law No. 14005 that provide for unrestricted access of enforcement officers to an undefined range of information about debtors from registers and databases, including confidential information, to bring them into compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine, the laws of Ukraine and international legal instruments.
3. Define an exhaustive list of electronic databases and registers to which enforcement officers are to be granted access and specify the categories of data, or information on the presence or absence of such data, in the relevant databases and registers that may be requested by enforcement officers within enforcement proceedings.
4. Within the framework of the digitalisation of the judiciary, ensure electronic interoperability between the Unified Register of Debtors and the modules of the Unified Judicial Information and Telecommunication System.
5. Harmonise the terminology used in Draft Law No. 14005 to eliminate legal uncertainty and ensure consistency in law enforcement practice.
6. Consider the introduction of mechanisms to incentivise debtors to voluntarily comply with court decisions of an obligation-based nature.
7. Provide for an effective administrative mechanism for appealing against decisions, actions or omissions of enforcement officers in cases where errors, including technical errors, occur in the URD, given the existing restrictions on individuals’ rights to dispose of their property.

This document was prepared with the support of Sweden. The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of CSO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

A coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives presented the Shadow Report on Chapter 23 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ of the European Commission’s 2024 Report on Ukraine in Brussels (Belgium).

The presentation took place as part of the event ‘Justice and Resilience in Ukraine: the Perspective of Civil Society and the Human Dimension of the Judiciary’, organised with the support of the EU Project Pravo-Justice, implemented by Expertise France, at the Permanent Representation of France to the EU. The event brought together representatives of Ukrainian civil society, the judiciary, EU institutions and the international expert community.

The European path to membership is Ukraine’s own choice. This was underlined by Wolfgang Nozar, Head of the Rule of Law, Anti-Fraud and Financial Management Unit of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations of the European Commission.

‘The reforms that need to be implemented are of critical importance. We fully support the efforts Ukraine is making to carry out reforms; however, Ukraine must assume responsibility and set clear deadlines. It is important that these deadlines are both ambitious, as Ukraine seeks rapid accession to the EU, and realistic, so that the reforms can in practice be implemented,’ he noted.

Representatives of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives also stressed the need to move more actively and swiftly in implementing reforms, particularly in the areas of the rule of law and law and order.

Karyna Aslanian, Head of the ‘Rule of Law’ Area at the ALI, noted that despite constant power cuts, missile strikes and drone attacks, Ukrainian courts continue to operate during the war:

The expert noted some progress in judicial reform, while at the same time drawing attention to critical challenges that could slow this progress or even undo years of work. These include delays by appointing authorities in selecting members of the High Council of Justice and judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, as well as the urgent need to maintain the involvement of international experts in the selection processes for judicial governance bodies and key courts. More recently, an additional concern has been the activity of the Temporary Investigative Commission on alleged corruption- or corruption-related offences in law enforcement bodies, courts and judicial authorities. ‘Instead of focusing on systemic problems in the justice sector and law enforcement bodies, the TIC has begun questioning members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges, the Public Integrity Council and civil society activists. This is an attempt to interfere with the independence of the judiciary and to obstruct the work of civil society,’ Karyna Aslanian stressed.

At the same time, Oleksandra Egert, Deputy Executive Director for Operations and Project Coordination at the ALI, highlighted Ukraine’s progress in meeting the requirements of Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ through strengthening institutions, improving policies and deepening cooperation with European partners.

Experts from specialised civil society organisations — the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, the ZMINA Human Rights Centre, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe without Barriers and the Ukrainian Bar Association — have formulated more than 500 recommendations. The Shadow Report has, in effect, become a detailed answer to the question of how the Ukrainian authorities can fulfil the European Commission’s requirements.

For his part, Serhii Tereshko, Deputy Representative of Ukraine to the EU, underlined that it is the Shadow Report of the CSO coalition led by the ALI that provides an alternative view of developments in the rule of law, human rights protection and the state of the judicial system in Ukraine.

‘The Ukrainian Government remains firmly and consistently committed to advancing along the path of the rule of law. We are fully aware that without adherence to key European principles, progress on the road to EU membership is impossible,’ he noted.

By way of reminder, the Shadow Report focuses not only on Ukraine’s progress but also on the challenges and problems the state faces in implementing European standards in the areas of the rule of law (the judiciary, prosecution service, Bar and legal education), the fight against corruption and organised crime, the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, visa policy and migration. It serves as a complement to the EU Enlargement Report, offering an independent expert analysis with step-by-step, concrete and practical recommendations. The Shadow Report is based not only on the subjective views of civil society organisations but also assesses the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with EU law and of the system as a whole with EU standards.

The Report has been prepared with the financial support of the European Union under the EU Project ‘Pravo-Justice’. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and other civil society organisations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives is launching a project to digitalise Ukraine’s judicial system, to be implemented jointly with the key institutions of the judiciary — the Supreme Court, the High Council of Justice, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

The first step will be the digitalisation project for the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). This is crucial for the entire judicial system, which today requires not simply renewal but deep transformation — transparent, technology-driven, data-based and centred on fairness.

Kateryna Chernohorenko — one of the main architects of the digital transformation of the state and the defence sector — has been selected as Programme Lead.

As Deputy Minister of Defence for Digital Development in 2023–2025, she and her team created large-scale digital products such as Reserv+ and Army+, advanced the DELTA combat management system, launched a military cyber centre and fostered technological innovations that became a model for NATO partners. Her experience in systemic transformation and digital reform will now be directed at one of the state’s key reform priorities — the modernisation of the judicial system.

The winner of the competition to provide expert services for the comprehensive support of the HQCJ digitalisation process is the Ukrainian GovTech company Strimco.

In recent years, the Strimco team has implemented more than 80 government IT projects in some of the most sensitive sectors: defence, social policy, healthcare and education. It was this team that helped create products that have now become standards of the digital state: Reserv+, Army+, VeteranPRO, services for the International Register of Damage and dozens of other systems.

In addition, the company is an active driver of Ukraine’s GovTech ecosystem: a partner of the CDTO Campus and the Global Government Technology Centre, the initiator of the GovTech Alliance and a contributor to the establishment of the Ministry of Digital Transformation’s Centre for Digital Competences.

1. A new HQCJ website. The current version of the website has not been updated for years and is functionally very outdated. The new website will prioritise openness and user-friendliness for all categories of users.
2. An electronic document management system (EDMS). Each year, the Commission processes around 70,000 incoming and outgoing documents, plus several thousand internal documents. According to research, introducing an EDMS will save up to 50% of the time spent on document handling and will also reduce costs for printers, copiers and other consumables.
3. Judicial Career Portal. Each candidate will have a personalised user account. The functionality will provide round-the-clock remote access to exam and test results, as well as to all submitted documents. In addition, candidates will be able to apply for a competition with a single click — the system will automatically generate application packages using documents already uploaded. Developers of exam tasks, examiners, members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges, the High Council of Justice, the Public Integrity Council and the Public Council of International Experts will also have their own accounts with tailored functionality. The entire process — from announcing a competition to issuing a recommendation for appointment — will be stored within a single system. This will ensure maximum data protection, as the system will grant strictly limited access to specific exam materials for clearly defined users.  
4. Judicial Position Registry. In essence, this will function as an electronic dossier for both judges and candidates. The system will feature automated data entry, search tools, data protection, analytics, integration with state registers, statistical tools, personalised online access for users and full integration into the Unified Judicial Information and Telecommunication System.

We are confident that this cooperation will lay the foundation for building a new digital ecosystem for the HQCJ — one that ensures transparency and trust in the processes of judicial selection and integrity monitoring.

ALI is implementing the Programme within the project ‘Reinforcing the European Dimension of Ukrainian Civil Service in Law-Making, Justice and Public Finances’, supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

The European Commission warns that Ukraine has slowed the pace of reforms in the justice sector. Pressure on the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) has not gone unnoticed in Brussels.

What specific steps does the EU require from Ukraine — in reforming the judiciary, the prosecution service and the Bar?

Analyst at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Karyna Aslanyan, outlines the key signals for the Ukrainian authorities in the article ‘“The war discount” is not unlimited: the EU demands that Ukraine accelerate justice reforms’.

On Tuesday, 4 November, the European Commission presented its Annual Report within the 2025 European Union Enlargement Package, which covers all EU candidate countries, including Ukraine.

Following the political authorities’ assault on the NABU and the SAPO, many expected a rather critical report. Indeed, on this point, the assessment is clear and not particularly diplomatic: ‘Parliament adopted a law that repealed important guarantees of the independence of the NABU and the SAPO and subordinated their operational activities to the politically appointed Prosecutor General. After domestic protests and international criticism, another law was adopted, restoring the independence of the NABU and the SAPO. At the same time, the risks of undue pressure on anti-corruption institutions remain a matter of concern’.

Moreover, the European Commission reiterated a requirement from previous Reports: the need to adopt legislative amendments that would ensure that the procedures for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General become more objective, transparent and merit-based. In essence, Ukraine has been warned that the Prosecutor General can no longer remain a political figure and that the selection process should more closely resemble judicial competitions — which is entirely logical, as the Prosecutor General is also part of the justice system in the broader sense. And it is hardly conceivable in a democratic country, that district court judges undergo competitive selections for two years, sitting four exams and taking part in two public interviews, while the Office of the President can pull a card with the Prosecutor General’s name from its pocket half an hour before a vote in Parliament.

The ‘small justice triangle’ — the judiciary, the prosecution service and the Bar — must not only formally comply with EU standards but function accordingly.

So, apart from the situation with the NABU and the SAPO, what else has drawn the European Commission’s attention in the rule of law sphere this year?

Even before the full-scale war, Ukraine’s legislation on the judiciary introduced a new safeguard against corruption, cronyism and arbitrariness — international experts on selection commissions for appointing candidates to the highest judicial positions. This mechanism was used for the first time in the competition for the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and later extended to the relevant commissions responsible for selecting candidates to the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and even disciplinary inspectors of the HCJ.

In 2021, the authorities believed that international experts, as a compromise solution, would work for three to six years, conduct one or two selection processes and then transfer their expertise (and powers) to the respective self-governing bodies — the Council of Judges, the Council of Prosecutors and the Bar Council (in the case of the HCJ and the HQCJ), as well as to the appointing authorities for CCU judges.

Time has passed, and in several selection commissions, the mandate of international experts has expired. As a result, an obvious dilemma has emerged: is Ukraine ready to dispense with international experts, or, on the contrary, is it impossible to ensure impartial and transparent selection without them?

The European Commission remained publicly silent for a long time, emphasising during private meetings that Ukraine should gradually phase out the assistance of international experts. However, after the situation involving the NABU and the SAPO, the rhetoric changed dramatically. In the Enlargement Report, we now see a clear requirement to continue involving international experts, not only in the selection of future members of the HQCJ but also in the appointment of new Supreme Court judges. The same applies to the vetting of judges of the higher courts.

The EU stresses the need to continue the work of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) in selecting new judges of the HACC. The previous competition failed, as only two out of twenty-five vacancies were filled. A repeat competition is now underway for twenty-three vacancies in the HACC and its Appeals Chamber, which, according to the HQCJ’s schedule, should be completed in March 2026. However, anticipating the outcome, the European Commission has already indicated that the PCIE must remain involved until all vacancies are filled. In other words, if this competition does not produce a full complement of judges, the PCIE’s mandate will be extended accordingly.

Incidentally, these are precisely the proposals put forward by the coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in the Shadow Report, which they have been preparing for the European Commission for the second year in a row.

Brussels has also taken note of attempts to undermine the involvement of international experts through the Constitutional Court or Parliament. ‘There is growing resistance to the participation of independent international experts in selections and vetting procedures, including a pending constitutional submission and a registered draft law that calls all “international” procedures into question. This is a matter of serious concern’, the European Commission emphasises.

This is therefore a signal to the political authorities from both civil society and the EU: any attempt to encroach on the anti-corruption infrastructure or on the role of international experts will trigger an immediate reaction and increased oversight. One can only hope that, despite the public enthusiasm over a diplomatically positive EC report, Bankova will take this lesson to heart.

The existing experience of involving international experts in selection procedures now requires systematisation, unification and standardisation, as each commission or council currently operates according to its own standards and procedures. This somewhat undermines the lofty phrase ‘Ukraine’s path to the rule of law’, as there have been numerous cases in which these commissions or councils have reached radically different conclusions about the same candidate. And it remains unclear whether a candidate truly meets integrity and ethical standards if one commission has recognised them as compliant, while another — only a few months earlier — concluded the opposite.

The European Commission notes some progress by Ukraine in conducting competitions and appointing new judges, yet points out that ‘the judicial system still suffers from a serious staffing deficit’. It also notes that the bodies of judicial governance are functioning adequately. At the same time, the issues of selecting and appointing their members, as well as their institutional capacity (including IT tools, analytics and access to databases), require urgent resolution. The Commission also recommends strengthening the capacity of the public oversight body: ‘The Public Integrity Council needs reinforcement, including improved access to judicial dossiers, enhanced analytical capacity and the establishment of a secretariat.’

The coalition of civil society organisations supports these recommendations in its Shadow Reports — both last year’s and this year’s.

The European Commission pays no less attention to the presence of quorums in key bodies of judicial governance — the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), as well as the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The HCJ operated for an extended period on the edge of a quorum (15 members), while the Constitutional Court suspended its work for six months due to the lack of one.

This is unacceptable in stable democracies, yet it occurs regularly in Ukraine. Over the past eleven years, the HCJ and the HQCJ have twice halted their work. The CCU has done so once completely and several times partially due to periodic internal conflicts or external interference (such as the unlawful dismissal of two CCU judges by a Presidential decree). Despite the fact that in the past three months the President has appointed two CCU judges and two members of the HCJ, there remains a real risk that these bodies could cease functioning. A quarter of HCJ members and almost a third of CCU judges are still lacking for full composition.

When competitions take six months to a year, forming stable compositions is practically impossible: by the time some appointments are made, the mandates of others have already expired. And some appointing authorities deliberately neglect their obligations. For example, Parliament last month failed to vote for two CCU judges, and the Congress of Advocates has not convened for nearly four years to elect its two representatives to the HCJ, citing the war as the reason.

The European Commission notes that the authorities responsible for appointing CCU judges ‘must urgently resume competitive procedures and avoid further delays’.

In its Report, the European Commission states that no progress has been achieved in reforming the Bar. ‘Concerns about the abuse of disciplinary mechanisms against lawyers and uneven disciplinary practices remain. The Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) has still not launched the competition for the HCJ members from its quota. In addition, the Bar’s self-governing bodies have not held elections, despite their mandates having expired.

Whereas in previous years the European Commission hinted diplomatically — often in a single sentence — at the need for reform, this year it stated it clearly: ‘Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar’. At the same time, the Commission stresses that the formation of UNBA bodies must be based on ‘transparent and credible procedures’ and that access to the profession and the qualification system must be ‘substantially improved’. It also raises concerns about financial management, disciplinary liability and the system of continuous professional development for lawyers.

In essence, the European Commission has made clear that war is not a legitimate reason to postpone convening the Congress of Advocates and re-electing the leadership of the Bar, nor to delay reforms of the financing or qualification systems.

However, reform of the Bar always consists of two components: the state, represented by Parliament, which must adopt the necessary amendments to the Law and the lawyers themselves, who must then implement these changes without state interference. One may comply with as many ‘EC requirements’ as possible, but it is the legal community that must carry out the Bar reform. The question is whether the UNBA has a critical mass of lawyers who are willing and able to meet the European Commission’s stated requirements.

There is a well-known saying: those who want to act look for opportunities; those who do not look for excuses. Undoubtedly, even before this Report — over nearly four years of war — the Bar Council could have taken the initiative to propose amendments to the Law on the Bar to change the mechanism for convening the Congress. For example, through online voting in Diia or other ways to simplify the procedure for electing delegates. But this has not happened. Therefore, even if the Congress of Advocates were to be scheduled by law (such proposals do periodically appear — clearly misguided), under the current mechanism, it would still be impossible to convene it. And in a year, the European Commission will ask: what has been done? Thus, it is better to look for opportunities than to hide behind excuses.

This issue drew significant attention due to the attack on the independence of the NABU and the SAPO in the summer of 2025. However, such attacks are not limited to these institutions. In the spring, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) carried out searches at the HQCJ and questioned its members in several criminal proceedings. At the time, the HQCJ described this as interference in its work — a concern also reflected in this year’s Enlargement Report.

The situation concerning the criminal cases against the HQCJ has since continued to develop. Following a meeting of the Temporary Special Commission (TSC) of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on investigating possible acts of corruption or corruption-related offences within law enforcement agencies, the courts and judicial governance institutions, which involved the Head of the HQCJ, the SBI opened a criminal case regarding unauthorised interference with information (automated) systems during the verification of exam results. The HQCJ publicly stated that the TSC was exerting pressure on the institution.

However, in its Report, the European Commission stressed that ‘the Parliamentary TSC (June 2025) should not undermine trust in institutions’.

Despite the European Commission’s positively balanced 2025 Report, Brussels has clearly identified the areas where reforms must accelerate and where critical attention from the Ukrainian authorities is required. In addition to the key directions outlined, there are also ‘simpler’ recommendations — for example, adopting the already drafted Strategy for the Development of Judiciary and Constitutional Justice.

There are also very specific requirements: to finally allocate premises of sufficient size for the HACC. In principle, such recommendations should not appear in strategic documents at the level of an EC Report. Yet when the Cabinet of Ministers has spent six years ‘kicking the can down the road’ regarding premises for the HACC, the European Commission has said: we see this as well.

Summarising this year’s requirements for Ukraine, three points can be stated with certainty.

First — yes, Ukraine is given a ‘war discount’, but only where this is reasonable.

Second — the European Union will not allow anyone to undermine the progress achieved over the past ten years; any such attempts will have the opposite effect.

Third — our path to the EU remains fairly long. It will certainly not be limited to the timelines set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap, which runs until early 2028, as even a significant portion of the measures planned for 2025 has not been implemented.

And, indeed, it is time to begin implementing these requirements actively so that next year’s Enlargement Report will not require any ‘discounts’ to be positive.