Ukraine’s law enforcement system resembles Orwellian ‘doublethink’: inwardly — a ‘strong hand’ and control; outwardly — a display of reform. In reality, there is an ongoing struggle between the ‘old’ bodies, heavily influenced by the President, and the independent anti-corruption institutions. The question is whether Ukraine can move from facade to genuine change.

In his article ‘Reforms and Facade: The Double Standards of Law Enforcement Agencies in the Context of European Integration’, Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, sets out his view of the situation.

Ukraine’s law enforcement system resembles Orwellian ‘doublethink’ — existing in two parallel dimensions. One is internal, where citizens are shown a ‘strong hand’ that keeps order under control during wartime, cracks down on ‘enemy agents’ and corruption schemes. The other is for international partners, where these same law enforcement bodies present themselves as exemplary reformers, fulfilling commitments on EU accession and actively implementing European standards.

In reality, we are witnessing a fierce confrontation between law enforcement and justice bodies heavily influenced by the President — the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU) — and the independent anti-corruption bodies established with the support (and often under pressure) of international partners. At the same time, the European Union expects the successful experience of building new institutions — the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) — to be extended across the entire system, in particular through open competitions for leadership positions and audits.

The gap is becoming ever more apparent between the Government’s declared commitments and the reality in which the country lives. The law enforcement system is still far from being recognised by citizens as effective and fair, rather than an instrument in the hands of those in power. The question is how long such a strategy can justify itself — and whether what we are seeing is not in fact a reversal of the declared state policy of European orientation in the opposite direction.

Behind the facade of European integration progress hides the ‘old guard’ of law enforcement bodies. Many police leaders successfully passed the vetting process in 2015–2016, while the new bodies — the SBI and ESBU — were staffed by the same personnel carrying the institutional memory of earlier times. They often still act according to post-Soviet principles, where loyalty and control take precedence. At the level of routine cases (thefts, robberies, bodily injuries), old practices are reproduced — unlawful actions, concealing reports from being registered, persuading victims that ‘it is their own fault’, and so on. And at the level of high-profile cases, the situation is even worse, with arguments of political expediency apparent everywhere.

The media and civil society often point out that behind the blocking of law enforcement reform — which is disadvantageous to the authorities — stands the Deputy Head of the Office of the President, Oleh Tatarov. According to investigative journalists, it is he who has built the ‘power vertical’ that influences key law enforcement bodies, obstructs judicial reform, appoints loyal cadres to leadership positions, and more.

By contrast, representatives of law enforcement bodies in private conversations say that Tatarov’s influence is overstated. At times, the urge to explain all problems with a single surname is sheer reductionism: it explains nothing and merely creates the false impression that replacing one person in office would change everything. The system does not work that way. What really matters is the function, which must be performed properly by whoever is appointed. Whether that person is Tatarov or someone else is of little consequence. There are plenty of people capable of providing such ‘services’ to the President. The issue lies rather in the approaches and, as is often said, the values. The real struggle should be against the desire to control independent institutions and branches of power — a desire which, during martial law, is increasingly taking forms that pose risks to democracy.

The Security Service of Ukraine, for instance, is increasingly invoking the narrative of a ‘Russian connection’ as a tool for exerting pressure on opponents. And, regrettably, not only in cases where there is truly indisputable evidence of a person’s ties to the aggressor state. Naturally, this raises questions about political bias, but criticising such actions is also uncomfortable. During wartime, the SSU performs an essential role — destroying the enemy and actively countering collaborators and traitors. Nevertheless, the SSU is above all a counter-intelligence agency, and the more powers it accumulates, the more likely it becomes that ‘the right hand will not know what the left is doing’.

At the same time, these same structures and individuals, at international meetings, assure partners of their commitment to reform, present pilot project slides, speak of implementing EU standards, and declare their readiness for change.

At the level of state policy, above all in the Rule of Law Roadmap, Ukraine has begun to build such a system. The head of the National Police is to be appointed on the basis of an open competition (currently — without one). Senior positions in law enforcement bodies are likewise to be filled by mandatory competition (currently — not everywhere). Plans are in place to improve the system of internal control, adopt standard codes of ethics, introduce an evaluation system and periodic audit. Finally, a law on law enforcement agencies is to be adopted, which will define the list of these bodies and unify their status. The Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice are actively working on this. This is the reality of European integration.

At the same time, there is an internal political reality:

• The SBI replicates the practice of urgent searches without a court order. Lawyers constantly complain about the work of this body, and a real example of the SBI’s inefficiency is its handling of the war crimes. In these cases, the problems are only growing — from unauthorised absence from a military unit or place of service to corruption in the army, which negatively affects the country’s defence capability.
• The SSU uses ‘links to Russia’ as a tool of pressure on independent bodies, while human rights defenders and scholars criticise the negative practice of prosecuting pensioners for collaboration for nothing more than liking posts on Odnoklassniki (for the sake of performance indicators).
• The NPU is attempting to rewrite the draft law on competitions (currently under consideration by the Government) in such a way as to turn European plans into a mere formality.
• Transparent competitions for regional prosecutors’ offices and for the Prosecutor General’s Office are being cancelled, which in effect opens the door to hand-picked appointments. The President’s law did not repeal all the harmful changes adopted on 22 July 2025. In the end, this means a prosecution service for ‘one’s own’.

As a result, the opposition between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ law enforcement agencies is intensifying. It existed before but was mostly reduced to a material criterion — detectives of the ‘elite’ NABU always received higher salaries, and the state protected their guaranteed level of remuneration better than judges’ pay. So, there was envy, it seems, but also an understanding that to join the Bureau one had to pass an open competition and withstand high competition, since there were fewer than three hundred positions for the entire country. Today, however, that envy has turned into a gulf — the NABU and SAPO have lost the support of the authorities within the state because of their overly active stance.

The ‘old bodies’ — the NPU, SBI, ESBU, and the SSU — are supported by the authorities internally, while the ‘new’ bodies — the NABU and SAPO — are supported by civil society and European partners. The proposal of the former is to liquidate the latter. We seemed close to this on 22 July 2025, since restricting procedural independence by strengthening the role of the Prosecutor General was only the first step. In effect, the anti-corruption bodies — the NABU and SAPO — would have become just like the ‘old’ ones, and any reforms introducing merit-based principles of appointment or audits of performance could have been sabotaged.

Ukraine has climbed out of this gulf — or rather, avoided falling fully into it. But the ‘aftertaste remains’ — such insincerity undermines trust in reforms, and this is noticed by international partners, including the EU. Yet they still do not perceive the ‘doublethink’ in the actions of the Ukrainian authorities. Publicly, questions about the seriousness of intentions regarding European integration reforms are not put to the President, because his authority in the world is enormous. For now, the EU is trying to balance between comprehensive support for Ukraine and an awareness of domestic political problems, often ‘writing them off’ to the war. But this cannot continue indefinitely.

The key requirements for Ukraine’s accession to the EU in the sphere of law and order are contained in two chapters — 23 (‘Rule of Law’) and 24 (‘Justice, Freedom and Security’). These set out quite broad frameworks but do not always provide clear indicators for measuring success. Largely for objective reasons, since it is extremely difficult to measure whether you have more rule of law and/or less corruption. This allows governments to manoeuvre: promising change, while at the same time taking steps in the opposite direction. At least for now, when most of the obligations consist of drafting and adopting laws, and the deadlines have not yet expired. Working groups have been created, draft laws are being developed, but it is too early to speak of their quality.

In 2024, Ukraine completed the screening, which made our European integration framework clearer than ever, and the Government’s Rule of Law Roadmap is confirmation of this. However, such a tactic will lead us into a dead end when, in 2026, it will be necessary to show the results of these ambitious plans.

Chapter 24, ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, is devoted entirely to the fight against serious crime (organised crime, drug crime, terrorism, cybercrime, and so on). More precisely, to the capacity of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies to keep such crimes under control at a relatively safe level. In other words, the EU is less concerned with which body in Ukraine is responsible for which category of crime, and more with how capable these bodies are, and how well they can make use of European instruments for crime forecasting, strategic planning, prioritisation, and the like.

For European partners, what matters is not only the formal existence of law enforcement agencies, but also their actual ability to combat serious crime, their integration into European analytical and planning instruments, and their independence from political influence. This is what is often lacking — especially in the ‘old’ bodies such as the NPU, SSU, and the Prosecutor General’s Office. At times, it is lacking in the ‘new’ ones too, since the SBI is not by chance trying to remain ‘in the orbit’ of the President rather than of the executive.

At the same time, the EU has recognised that certain bodies — the NABU and SAPO — have indeed produced results thanks to their autonomy. This is why recommendations appeared on the ‘resetting of the ESBU and the SBI’ (a recommendation from January 2025, not yet public). Their essence lies not only in appointing a new director through a competition in which members nominated by international organisations have the decisive vote. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian authorities have for some time actively promoted the idea of abandoning the involvement of international experts in selection commissions. Their argument is that a reforming Ukraine is now capable of handling this task independently. Ukrainians saw how this works in practice in the competition for the post of the ESBU Director, where it was only thanks to the position of the international experts that the process was conducted transparently. How the Government was ‘ready to cope independently’ — by violating the law and failing to appoint the winner, Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi, as Director — was also on full display. And the role played in this by the SSU’s letter — which is not grounds for refusing an appointment and had already been taken into account by the commission during the competition — was not forgotten.

Going forward, there must also be a cleansing of the personnel of these bodies (through vetting), competitions for leadership positions, strengthening of the detective staff, and the like. And of course, the introduction of real control instruments — such as periodic audits of activity, as a result of which a director may lose office and the work of a body may be significantly adjusted from outside, by the Government and Parliament.

…The success of the anti-corruption bodies can and should be scaled up across all law enforcement agencies. If, however, the path of ‘doublethink’ continues, the absence of progress will soon become obvious. And this may obstruct the European integration of the entire country because the rule of law is fundamental. Otherwise, the risk of remaining trapped by the ‘strong hand’ and unfulfilled promises is not hypothetical but all too real.

Attention to court staff, unlike the judiciary itself, which has been the focus of constant reform, has remained fragmentary and usually limited to responses to current challenges. Yet it is court staff — civil servants, judicial assistants, technical personnel — who organise the work of the court on a daily basis. Nevertheless, despite the decisive role of staff in ensuring the effective functioning of justice, this category of employees remains systematically undervalued in both legal regulation and in public perception.

The issue of paying attention to the activities of court staff has become particularly important since the start of the full-scale invasion, as the conditions under which the justice system now operates have undergone fundamental change.

Given the identified relevance, the new study by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives not only describes existing problems in the period 2020–2024 but also provides a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the functioning of the civil and patronage service in courts based on empirical data, practices, regulatory analysis and European approaches. Moreover, the study initiates a discussion on forming new personnel and the ethical and managerial culture of the judiciary.

In conducting the study, the ALI relied on both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis: 

• In-depth interviews: 42 semi-structured interviews were conducted with judges and court staff, which allowed a deeper understanding of the situation and the identification of structural and regional features.
• Survey of court staff: more than 1,000 employees of the civil and patronage service in first-instance and appellate courts took part.
• Examination of legal regulation, organisational approaches and funding.
• International context: the study analysed models of judicial administration and career development of court staff in such countries as Spain, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico and others.

The study revealed deeply rooted problems that have developed over a long period and have been exacerbated by martial law:

1. a critical staffing shortage that has become chronic;
2. a personnel selection system that is fragmented and non-transparent;
3. non-competitive remuneration that does not correspond to the level of responsibility and workload;
4. insufficient material and technical support for courts;
5. inequality of working conditions between lower-level courts and higher courts;
6. problems of professional development and training of staff. Respondents pointed to formalism, lack of practical orientation and limited accessibility of training;
7. the impact of the war and the absence of adaptation mechanisms. The judiciary of Ukraine, under the extremely difficult conditions of martial law, has demonstrated an ability to maintain its functionality. At the same time, the adaptation mechanisms themselves have proved insufficiently flexible and slow;
8. corruption risks and the absence of proper control mechanisms, as well as a lack of anti-corruption training, which reduces trust in the judiciary.

Such systemic shortcomings have both objective and managerial causes. Some are driven by external factors, above all the impact of martial law; others are the result of the long-term neglect of personnel policy and proper funding of the judiciary.

Based on the analysis of respondents’ answers, interviews and collected documents, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives has prepared more than 40 comprehensive recommendations for the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, in particular regarding:

1. reforming the system of remuneration and material and technical support;
2. improving the existing system of recruitment for the civil and patronage service in judicial bodies;
3. ensuring internal independence and effective interaction;
4. improving the system of professional training for court staff;
5. increasing the efficiency of the functioning of the civil and patronage service in judicial bodies under martial law;
6. reducing corruption risks in the civil and patronage service of courts.

More on the key problems and recommendations for addressing them can be found in the new study by the ALI.

This study was carried out within the framework of the project ‘Ukraine Governance and Policy Improvement Initiative: Empowering Policymaking for Social Progress’, supported by Switzerland. Responsibility for the content of this study lies solely with the NGO Agency for Legislative Initiatives. The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the donor.

On 24 July 2025, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives held the second presentation of the Green Paper on civil and patronage service in judicial bodies. This time, the event was co-organised with the All-Ukrainian Association of Court Employees (UACES). The roundtable focused primarily on exchanging experiences, discussing the needs and visions of court employees themselves — heads of court apparatuses, their deputies, judicial assistants, and others. The presentation took the form of a professional dialogue: informal in tone yet centred on systemic issues and potential solutions.

Svitlana Matviienko, Executive Director of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, emphasised that the Green Paper serves as a starting point for sustained dialogue:

The meeting was moderated by Bohdan Kryklyvenko, Head of the Secretariat of the High Anti-Corruption Court and UACES Board Member. According to him, the presentation of the study is a significant step towards ensuring that the voices of court staff are heard and that real change can begin.

Karyna Aslanyan, Head of the Rule of Law Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, presented the findings of the research and invited everyone to the discussion:

The discussion participants — including Yurii Fedorovych (Commercial Court of Kharkiv Region), Olha Pasichnyk (Odesa District Administrative Court), Serhii Andrushchenko (Commercial Court of Odesa Region), Oksana Kolomiiets (Vyshhorod District Court), among others — shared experiences based on their day-to-day professional situations. All of them highlighted several pressing issues: a shortage of staff in courts located in smaller towns, a mismatch between workload and remuneration, and difficulties with digitalisation and the use of electronic systems due to inadequate technical support.

Olha Pasichnyk, Head of the Secretariat of the Odesa District Administrative Court, raised important concerns related to the recognition of court staff, professional training and its assessment, and the lengthy process of special vetting for candidates seeking civil service positions — noting that the lack of clear regulation around vetting timelines directly affects the court’s daily operations.

Nataliia Korol, Head of the UACES and Head of the Secretariat of the Vinnytsia Court of Appeal, noted:

All participants agreed that it is important not only to identify problems but also to propose solutions. It is vital that court staff are heard — something clearly demonstrated by the research conducted by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. For instance, according to Karyna Aslanyan, one of the in-depth interviews lasted nearly four hours.

The Green Paper on the Functioning of Civil and Patronage Service in the Judicial Authorities of Ukraine is soon to be published on the platforms of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The event took place within the framework of the project ‘Governance Improvement Initiative in Ukraine: Empowering Policy Making for Societal Progress’, supported by Switzerland. Responsibility for the content of the research and its presentation lies solely with the NGO Agency for Legislative Initiatives. The views and opinions expressed during the presentation and in the study do not necessarily reflect those of the donor.

The task of administrative justice is to ensure the fair, impartial and timely resolution of disputes in the field of public law relations by the court in order to effectively protect the rights, freedoms and interests of individuals, as well as the rights and interests of legal entities from violations by public authorities.

However, administrative justice is not only a mechanism for resolving disputes, but also a tool of democratic oversight and reform of public administration. It ensures a balance between the authorities and citizens, promotes transparency, legal certainty and trust in the state.

The right of individuals and legal entities to challenge decisions, actions or omissions of public authorities enables them to provide feedback to the state and monitor the extent to which the authorities comply with the law. 

Administrative courts also play a role in shaping law enforcement practice through judicial precedents and typical court decisions, which force authorities to review their decisions and approaches to decision-making. 

Gaps identified during court proceedings stimulate changes in legislation, and thus, administrative justice acts as a catalyst for reform.

The existence of an effective administrative justice system is a sign of a democratic, law-abiding state where the government is accountable to its citizens, which is important in the context of European integration and the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. In particular, an applicant country must have stable institutions that promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minority rightsThe Copenhagen criteria.. That is why the liquidation of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) (as an example of the instability of such institutions) came to the attention of the European Commission.

The DACK had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals against acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, ministries, other central executive authorities, the National Bank and other bodies whose powers extend throughout Ukraine. In other words, the DACK was a court that considered cases of national significance and had a direct impact on the functioning of the highest authorities.

The liquidation of the DACK was initiated due to a series of high-profile scandals, allegations of corruption and decisions that were considered politically motivatedFor example, the cancellation of PrivatBankʼs nationalisation, the cancellation of the new Ukrainian spelling rules, the scandal with the so-called ‘judicial roulette’ — a system for circumventing the automatic distribution of cases among judges, and many others.. On 13 December 2022, Law No. 2825-IX on the liquidation of the DACK was adopted, and on 15 December 2022, this court ceased to administer justice.

At the same time, this transformative decision, which civil society perceived as a step towards restoring trust in the judicial system and state authority, had a downside — it caused a collapse in the administrative justice system and led to violations of citizens’ rights and a weakening of the protection of state interests.

At the time of its liquidation, the DACK had more than 60,000 cases and files pending, of which almost 21,700 were received between 1 January and 14 December 2022 alone. This was one of the highest figures among all district administrative courts. During the same period, DACK judges considered 21,500 cases, of which 82% (17,500) were decided in favour of the plaintiffs.

To consider administrative cases with territorial jurisdiction in Kyiv (replacing the DACK), it was planned to establish a new Kyiv City District Administrative Court. Until its launch, the consideration of cases was temporarily transferred to the Kyiv District Administrative Court (Kyiv Oblast). However, at that time, only 23 judges were working in this court, who were already considering more than 30,000 cases, and the process of transferring files was delayed due to the low throughput capacityAccording to the then-head of the Supreme Court, V. Knyazev, the capacity of the Kyiv City District Administrative Court (if it only deals with this issue) is about 100–200 cases per day, or 3–4 thousand per month, and the transfer of all 60 thousand cases could take years. Administrative collapse, or how the ‘victory’ over the DACK will lead to widespread violations of Ukrainians’ right to a fair trial. of its office.

The citizens who appealed against the actions of state or local authorities were the most affected by the liquidation of the court. Significant difficulties also arose in cases that could previously only be considered by the DACK, which explained its special role in the national judicial system — in cases involving central executive authorities. 

The Kyiv City District Administrative Court was only registered as a legal entity. Its launch was delayed due to a staffing crisis linked, in particular, to the fact that the bodies responsible for selecting judges — the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) — were undergoing reform and were not functioning.

Thus, after the liquidation of the DACK, the system was unable to promptly replace this key institution, which led to delays in the consideration of cases, violations of deadlines and restrictions on citizens’ access to justice. 

The European Court of Human Rights in the case of Zimmermann and Steiner emphasised that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms obliges Contracting Parties to organise their legal systems in such a way as to enable courts to ensure that cases are heard within a ‘reasonable time’. However, a temporary backlog of unresolved cases does not lead to the Contracting Party being held liable if it takes prompt measures to resolve the situation. At the same time, as MPs note, Ukraine remains one of the few countries in the Council of Europe where the European Court of Human Rights systematically finds structural problems with excessive length of court proceedings. The complication of the situation could have an extremely negative impact on Ukraine’s European integration prospects.

The establishment of a new court to hear administrative cases involving public authorities is identified as one of the indicators of Ukraine’s implementation of the European Union’s Ukraine Facility within the framework of the reform of Ukraine’s judicial system to strengthen the accountability, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary.

In its EU Enlargement Report 2024, the European Commission noted that since the liquidation of the DACK in December 2022, a new court has not yet been established. The temporarily authorised Kyiv District Administrative Court is unable to cope with the volume of cases, which significantly undermines access to administrative justice, especially in cases against central executive authorities.

In the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of 4 October 2024, Ukraine assured the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its commitment to improving the rule of law and continuing judicial reforms. In particular, Ukraine’s intentions, as announced by the IMF, included the establishment of a High Court for Public Law Disputes (HCPLD) (with chambers of first and appellate instances), which would hear administrative cases against national state bodies (e.g. the NBU, NABU and NACP) by judges who have undergone proper screening for professional competence and integrity, with the decisive and determining vote of independent experts with international experience, based on the model of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE). The new body will have jurisdiction over cases falling within the competence of the liquidated DACK regarding appeals against central executive authorities whose powers extend throughout Ukraine, as well as administrative cases regarding appeals against the procedures of competition commissions and external audit commissions involving the participation of independent experts (in particular, the NACP, NABU and SAPO). December 2024 has been set as the structural benchmarkA structural benchmark is a clear guideline or promise made by the government as part of its cooperation programme with the IMF, the fulfilment of which signals the successful progress of reforms.. 

Financial support from international partners and donors is usually tied to specific conditions and requirements set by the IMF. Fulfilling these conditions becomes the ‘key’ to further support and trust. According to the IMF, the establishment of a new administrative court will help strengthen the independence of the judiciary and predictability in dispute resolution for businesses.

In order to restore proper access to justice for citizens and legal entities in the Kyiv region in public law disputes, Law No. 3863-IX created the regulatory conditions for the distribution and transfer to all district administrative courts of Ukraine of the remaining unresolved cases of the DACK, which, under Law No. 2825-IX, were transferred to the Kyiv District Administrative Court. 

In pursuance of Law No. 3863-IX, the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine adopted the Procedure for the Transfer of Court Cases Not Considered by the District Administrative Court of Kyiv, which stipulates that court cases that have not been considered by the District Administrative Court of Kyiv and have been transferred to the Kyiv District Administrative Court, but not distributed among judges, shall be transferred for consideration and resolution to other district administrative courts of Ukraine by means of their automatic distribution among these courts, taking into account the workload, according to the principle ofThe cases of the liquidated DACK will be distributed among the administrative courts of Ukraine in proportion to their workload. random chronological receipt of cases.

In order to restore access to administrative proceedings involving central executive authorities, Law of Ukraine No. 4264-IX of 26 February 2025 was adopted, which amended the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges’ and certain other legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the legal basis for the establishment and functioning of the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA). This Law aims to ensure the efficiency and transparency of the work of administrative courts in Kyiv through a clear division of jurisdiction between courts of first instance and courts of appeal, reducing corruption risks by adhering to the principle of judicial independence and bringing the judicial system in line with European standards. The law was signed by the President on 24 March 2025 (effective 26 March 2025). 

Pursuant to Law No. 4264-IX, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine shall announce a competition for the positions of judges of the relevant courts within one month after the law comes into force. These courts shall be established in order to take over the powers of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK).

As provided for by Law of Ukraine No. 4264-IX, from the start of its work, the SDAC will hear administrative cases against national state bodies, such as the NBU, NABU and NACP. It will be possible to appeal decisions on the appointment of ministers, heads of anti-corruption bodies, etc., as well as any acts (except for decrees of the President of Ukraine), actions or omissions of central executive authorities. In view of this, it can be argued that the decisions of these courts will have political and state significance. 

The SACA will act as a court of appeal and review the SDAC’s court decisions. Cases will be heard by judges who have undergone proper screening for professional competence and integrity.

In order to assist the HQCJ in determining whether candidates for the position of judge of the SDAC and SACA meet the criteria of integrity and professional competence, an Expert Council will be established and will operate for the purpose of qualification assessment. It will consist of six members: three from the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU) and three from international and foreign organisations. 

By its decision, the CJU announced on 3 April 2025 the commencement of the selection process for the position of member of the Expert Council (under the CJU quota). The deadline for the acceptance of documents from candidates was 21 April 2025. 11 candidates had submitted their documents as of the end of the selection process. As a result, the CJU decided to send the HQCJ a list of nine candidates for the Expert Council under the CJU quota.

The final decision on the composition of the Expert Council rests with the HQCJ, which decides on the appointment of members of the Expert Council both under the CJU quota and from the quota of international experts.

In May 2025, the President of Ukraine submitted draft law No. 13302 to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which provides for the establishment of the SDAC and SACA with their location in Kyiv and territorial jurisdiction extending to the entire territory of Ukraine. 

In July 2025, draft law 13439-3 was registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which provides for changes to the State Budget of Ukraine for 2025, in particular for the implementation of the provisions of Law No. 4264-IX regarding the creation of a legislative basis for the functioning of two separate higher specialised courts: SDAC and SACA, as well as the implementation of the European Union’s Ukraine Facility. This draft law defines the tasks for the creation of a new court that will hear administrative cases against national state bodies: SDAC in the amount of UAH 880,400; SACA in the amount of UAH 880,300. That is, a total of over UAH 1.7 million in expenditures. 

It is expected that the establishment of the SDAC and SACA will increase the effectiveness of protecting the rights, freedoms and interests of individuals in the field of public law relations. At the same time, there are certain risks involved in forming the judiciary of these courts and their subsequent activities.

Attempts to overcome the collapse of the administrative justice system have not been sufficiently effective. 

Despite assurances that the issue of establishing the HCPLD would be resolved by the end of 2024, Law No. 4264-IX, which creates the legal basis for the establishment and operation of two courts — the SDAC and SACA — was only adopted in February 2025, while draft law No. 13302, which provides for the establishment of these courts, was submitted by the President in May this year and is still pending its second reading.

In addition to current judges, lawyers and academics, candidates who have professional experience in civil service positions of A and B categories may apply for positions as judges of the SDAC and SACA. 

For example, the head of a ministry’s legal department who has worked in that position for 20 years will be able to participate in the competition for the position of SDAC/SACA judge. At the same time, they can go through the competition procedures without leaving their position and remain a civil servant until the moment of appointment.

In such a situation, there is a risk of conflict of interest. A person who has worked in the public administration system for a long time, has been directly associated with the executive authorities and therefore depended on them, may in the future find themselves in the role of a judge hearing cases against these same authorities.

This could call into question the impartiality of the court and increase public distrust of the judicial system, especially in cases involving central executive authorities. This situation contradicts the principle of separation of powers and the independence of judges, who must be free from the influence of state institutions whose decisions they evaluate in court.

Unlike the PCIE, which includes retired foreign judges, prosecutors and lawyers — experts who have no personal or professional interests in Ukraine and are responsible for selecting judges for the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) — the Expert Council is expected to have a different format of participation.

The Expert Council is to include three representatives from the Council of Judges of Ukraine and three from international or foreign organisations. This structure creates a potential risk of conflict of interest, as CJU representatives may be connected to the internal judicial community and have personal or institutional interests in the outcome of the selection process.

This raises concerns about the impartiality and independence of the candidate evaluation and selection procedures, especially in the case of key judicial institutions that are supposed to strengthen public confidence in the judicial system.

In addition, the list of candidates submitted by the CJU to the HQCJ includes individuals whose integrity is questionable. In particular, this concerns a DACK judge, a CJU member, regarding whom the Public Integrity Council (PIC) approved a conclusion in 2019 that they did not meet the criteria of integrity and professional ethics; a judge of the Kyiv District Administrative Court, a CJU member, who did not pass the qualification assessment at the HQCJ. 

The presence of such candidates on the list of applicants for new institutions of the judicial system undermines confidence in the transparency and impartiality of the selection process and contradicts the overall goals of judicial reform aimed at establishing the principles of integrity, independence and professionalism.

Draft law No. 13439-3 provides for amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2025’, inter alia, with the aim of allocating funds for the establishment of SDAC and SACA. On 16 July 2025, draft law No. 13439-3 was adopted as a basis with a shortened preparation period, and it is currently pending consideration. 

Similar provisions were contained in the initial government draft law No. 13439, regarding which the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Budget pointed out the risks to fiscal stability in its conclusion. In particular, it was noted that the implementation of this draft law would lead to an increase in public debt and the state budget deficit, and in the medium term — to an additional burden on the budget associated with servicing and repaying debt obligations.

In the context of high spending on the security and defence sector, as well as the overall budget deficit, these proposals require careful financial and economic justification and prioritisation of expenditures.

In addition, due to the lengthy procedure for selecting judges and the fact that there are only about five months left until the end of the current fiscal year, it makes no sense to allocate funds in the state budget for 2025 for the work of the SDAC and SACA, since their actual establishment and start of work will likely take place no earlier than the next fiscal period.

The conclusion of the Expert Council on the non-compliance of a candidate for the position of judge of the SDAC and SACA with the criteria of integrity and/or professional competence shall be considered adopted if it is voted for by at least four members of the Expert Council, at least two of whom are nominated by international and foreign organisations. After the conclusion of non-compliance is adopted, as well as in the event of an equal number of ‘for’ and ‘against’ votes, the further fate of the candidate will be determined by a joint meeting of the HQCJ and the Expert Council. 

During the joint meeting, the support of the majority of the joint composition of the HQCJ and the Expert Council is required for the candidate to proceed further. At the same time, the decision shall be supported by at least two international experts.

This approach to the selection of SDAC and SACA judges will only be applied for three years, i.e., during the first selection process. In the future, the HQCJ, together with the CJU, will be responsible for the competition. In other words, the selection of judges will take place without the participation of international experts.

Reducing the role of independent international experts (as a safeguard against lobbying for ‘desired’ candidates) in the process of selecting judges for the new specialised administrative courts may affect the quality of selection and the independence of future judges.  

As of today, the HQCJ is facing a significant workload due to the simultaneous conduct of several large-scale procedures: (1) qualification assessment of current judges; (2) competitions for vacant positions in local and appellate courts; (3) selection of judges for the HACC.

These procedures are lengthy by nature, so there is a high probability that the selection of judges for the SDAC and SACA will also take a long time.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the new administrative courts will be launched before the third quarter of 2026. This, in turn, should be taken into account when forming the budget and planning organisational steps for their creation.

Considering all possible risks, it would be advisable to consider the following issues:

1. introduction of a mechanism for verifying the integrity of candidates to the Expert Council from the CJU;
2. the exclusion of category A and B civil servants from potential candidates for the SDAC and SACA through appropriate amendments to Law of Ukraine No. 4264-IX;
3. excluding the 2025 State Budget expenditures for the functioning of the SDAC and SACA from draft law No. 13439-3. 

This publication has been prepared within the framework of the ‘Improvement of Governance in Ukraine: Enhancing Policy Making for Social Progress’ Project with the support of Switzerland. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the NGO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’. The opinion of the authors does not necessarily reflect the views of the donor.

The presentation gathered the leadership of the Supreme Court, heads of staff from appellate courts across Ukraine and district courts in Kyiv, representatives of the High Council of Justice, the High Qualification Commission of Judges, the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, and members of judicial associations. 

Rasim Babanly, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Court, emphasised that ALI research marks a crucial step toward constructive dialogue between civil society and the judiciary. He noted that the Green Paper is not just a critical assessment of existing problems but also a commitment to joint solutions grounded in thorough analysis and respect for institutions. 

The Green Paper focuses on civil servants, judicial assistants, and technical staff who ensure the daily functioning of courts — from record-keeping and technical support to public communication. The research is based on a survey of more than 1,000 court staff members and 42 in-depth interviews covering all jurisdictions of first-instance and appellate courts.

Stanislav Kravchenko, President of the Supreme Court, stated in his address:

However, Karyna Aslanian, Head of the Rule of Law area at ALI, pointed out that court staff remain overlooked in reforms: ‘Court employees are systematically undervalued — in terms of status, pay, HR policy, and professional development’.

The Green Paper also highlights long-term risks to institutional memory, ethics, and the independence of the judiciary. A significant share of court staff (judicial assistants) is not covered by anti-corruption policies, face substantial disparities in social guarantees and career advancement, while training and professional development often remain merely formal. 

ALI experts not only analyse problems but also propose institutional solutions. Key challenges include:

• Overtime work: According to the survey, 21% of court staff work overtime almost daily, 19% often, 22% occasionally, 17% rarely, 16% very rarely, and only 5% never;
• Underfunding and out-of-pocket expenses for court needs: More than 70% of respondents reported having to purchase office supplies, refill cartridges, or even repair court premises at their own expense. Specifically, 696 respondents bought paper and stationery, 424 refilled cartridges, 231 purchased furniture and equipment, 218 paid for postage, 175 carried out office repairs, and 61 covered other expenses;

Oleksandr Sasevych, member of the High Council of Justice, emphasised:

Maksym Pampura, Acting Head of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, highlighted low salaries in the judiciary as a critical issue:

• Lack of a clear HR strategy: More than 3,000 vacancies in court staff positions remain unfilled;

Viktor Kapustynskyi, the Supreme Court’s Chief of Staff, added that without a sustainable vision for personnel development, we cannot build an effective strategy for the judiciary. According to him, it is crucial to lay the groundwork for tomorrow’s solutions by rethinking HR philosophy and revising approaches to job classification, remuneration, and digitalisation.

• Low salaries: 74% of court staff consider their pay demotivating. Respondents also identified it as one of the key factors affecting their professional independence;

Taras Neshyk, Head of the Secretariat of the High Qualification Commission of Judges, emphasised that low salaries and outdated functional models prevent the judiciary from attracting a new, qualified workforce. According to him, the current work format is also incompatible with the digital era.

• Unsatisfactory working conditions: Most courts lack bomb shelters or stable internet access.

Nataliia Fulei, a representative of the National School of Judges of Ukraine, noted that the Green Paper is not only an analytical document but also a tool for shaping state policy that should serve as a starting point for systemic changes in the treatment of court staff.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives hopes the Green Paper will lay the groundwork for reforming the court staff, and its recommendations will help improve the efficiency of the judiciary in Ukraine. Key findings are published in the presentation, and the full report is forthcoming.

The event took place as part of the Improvement of Governance in Ukraine: Enhancing Policy Making for Social Progress Project, with the support of Switzerland and the organisational assistance of the Supreme Court. The content of the research and presentation is the sole responsibility of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. The views expressed in the presentation and research do not necessarily reflect those of the donor and the Supreme Court.

On 22 July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine supported Draft Law No. 12414, which dismantles the autonomy of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the procedural independence of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Yet the problem runs much deeper — this undermines the independence not only of these bodies but of any prosecutor in Ukraine. Rumours about the ‘dismantling of the anti-corruption system’, which the country had been building for over a decade, have become a reality. Symbolically, the draft law was submitted on 16 January — the country is, for the second time, effectively reverting to a centralised system of ‘manual control’ over the prosecution service reminiscent of Viktor Yanukovych’s rule.

Draft Law No. 12414, which initially had a purely humanitarian aim — to facilitate the search for persons missing under martial law — was rapidly transformed into a threat to key post-Revolution of Dignity achievements. News of the added amendments appeared late on the night of 21 July. According to sources from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, the meeting of the Committee on Law Enforcement took place in turbo mode at 08:40 on 22 July — what was approved remains unknown. Just before that, at 08:23, MP Maksym Pavliuk was granted authority as Acting Chair of the Committee.

Not without controversy, but just as swiftly — Parliament passed the proposed amendments by an overwhelming majority. As a result, the state has demonstrated an unwillingness to fight corruption effectively and impartially, while European integration, as well as the trust and support of international partners, has been cast into doubt.

Immediately after the vote in Parliament, NABU and SAPO issued a statement calling on the President to veto Draft Law No. 12414. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives supports this statement and demands an urgent response from Zelenskyy. International partners have also unanimously expressed concern over Ukraine’s deviation from reform. It is likely that the Head of State will sign the law before this column is even published. Regrettably, we have not witnessed such speed even when it came to draft laws concerning the country’s defence capability.

The amendments to Draft Law No. 12414 formally concern the specifics of pre-trial investigation under martial law. However, their true scope extends far beyond these boundaries. Some provisions are being enshrined permanently, while others will remain in force for three years after martial law is lifted — that is, for an indefinitely long period.

According to Draft Law No. 12414, the Prosecutor General is granted virtually unlimited powers: to requisition any criminal proceeding, transfer it to another prosecutor, and issue binding written instructions. The principle of NABU’s ‘exclusive investigative jurisdiction’ is being abolished, and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is stripped of its independence. All of this — without competition, without checks and balances, without safeguards. These approaches are not new to Ukrainian history. They directly echo the model of the Prosecutor General’s Office during the Yanukovych era, when a single office could determine the fate of any case, and the prosecutorial hierarchy functioned as a tool of political influence rather than justice. 

Following 2014, the establishment of the independent anti-corruption bodies — NABU and SAPO — became a symbol of Ukraine’s European choice. They were created with the involvement of international partners, strict selection procedures, guarantees of independence, and a clear focus on specialisation. The cases they handle concern high-ranking officials — from heads of state-owned enterprises to ministers and judges. The same can be said about the prosecution reform — the powers of the Prosecutor General were significantly curtailed to ensure that the position would no longer be a subject of ‘political bargaining’.

Draft Law No. 12414 dismantles these guarantees. In particular:

• The Prosecutor General will be able to transfer NABU’s cases to other bodies — for instance, the National Police or the SBI;
• The head of SAPO will lose the exclusive authority to approve notices of suspicion for top officials and other exceptional procedural powers;
• The powers of case allocation and procedural oversight may be transferred to lower-ranking prosecutors — effectively under instruction.

This marks a return to a system where decisions are made for convenience rather than legality. And while anti-corruption reform was, until recently, one of the most successful aspects of Ukraine’s transformation, it is now being deliberately and systematically dismantled.

Can martial law justify changes to criminal procedure? Yes, a certain degree of flexibility is necessary. However, draft law No. 12414 is not limited to temporary regulation. It enshrines a prosecutorial hierarchy above the law and concentrates key powers in the hands of a single official. All safeguards against this — developed after the Revolution of Dignity, including through the creation of an ‘anti-corruption infrastructure’ — are being dismantled.

Of particular concern is the provision allowing special-status suspects (ministers, MPs, judges, etc.) to appeal directly to the Prosecutor General to have a case closed after it has been closed against any one of the other parties involved. This transforms the institution of pre-trial investigation into a tool for backroom deals — echoing practices that Europe has deemed incompatible with a democratic state.

The anti-corruption infrastructure has been — and remains — one of the key elements in negotiations with the European Union. The establishment of an independent NABU and SAPO was a precondition for visa liberalisation, macro-financial assistance, and candidate status. Therefore, the country cannot afford to backtrack at a time when European integration is no longer merely a political choice, but a strategic necessity.

Draft Law No. 12414 could result in both the suspension of accession talks with the EU and the discontinuation of financial aid. Moreover, it represents a point of no return — both for the prosecution reform and for the overall architecture of the rule of law in Ukraine. Today, the country has lost not only its anti-corruption institutions but also the trust it had so painstakingly built since 2014.

What will Zelenskyy choose? To return to models that once plunged the country into a deep political crisis — all to protect his allies, Mindich and Chernyshov. Or to veto Draft Law No. 12414 and continue building an independent anti-corruption infrastructure aligned with EU standards.

We hate to tempt fate, but it seems the next target will be the High Anti-Corruption Court.

The Committee on Law Enforcement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has received proposals for a substantial expansion of the content of Draft Law No. 12414, dated 16 January 2025. The primary objective of the proposed law is to establish special conditions for conducting pre-trial investigations that would allow for a prompt and effective response to reports of missing persons and ensure that applicants (victims) — close relatives and family members of the missing person — have access to legal mechanisms during wartime. The draft law merely seeks to simplify the procedure for determining the venue of pre-trial investigation to enhance the effectiveness of organising such investigations under martial law.

The proposals to amend the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine submitted to the Committee include:

1. A significant strengthening of the role of the Prosecutor General (primarily through amendments to paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the CPC of Ukraine) — the Prosecutor General would be granted the authority to request any criminal proceeding for the purpose of verifying compliance with the law, including the ability to transfer such proceedings to other prosecutors for review. This step threatens the procedural independence of prosecutors who exercise procedural control in these cases, blocks further investigation, and enables manual control over all high-profile proceedings. In practice, this would implement the doctrinal notion that ‘the Prosecutor General is superior to any prosecutor’, which contradicts the will of the legislator, who for the past ten years has consistently granted the Head of the SAPO a high level of procedural independence and the SAPO itself — as a specialised prosecution office — institutional autonomy.
2. Abolition of the so-called ‘exclusive investigative jurisdiction’ in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of NABU and SAPO. Currently, a prosecutor of the relevant level has the right to transfer a case from one pre-trial investigation body to another in cases of investigative ineffectiveness (paragraph 5, Article 36 of the CPC of Ukraine). However, an exception exists for NABU — such proceedings cannot be reassigned to, for example, the National Police of Ukraine or the State Bureau of Investigation. This is one of the key guarantees of the agency’s independence. The proposed amendments would eliminate this safeguard entirely — the Prosecutor General would be authorised to reassign any proceedings in any direction. Moreover, the Prosecutor General would gain the power to issue binding written instructions in NABU-led criminal proceedings. Such instructions could either harm the overall logic of criminal prosecution or simply ‘block’ proceedings by issuing meaningless directives that would require considerable time and resources to implement.
3. Elimination of most provisions granting SAPO procedural independence in high-level corruption cases to ensure impartial and effective investigations. For example, the proposed amendments would revoke any exclusive procedural powers, such as approving notices of suspicion for special subjects, resolving disputes over investigative jurisdiction, and making changes to appellate and cassation appeals. In addition, the powers of the Deputy Prosecutor General — Head of SAPO could be delegated to other prosecutors (as proposed in the amendment to Article 37 of the CPC of Ukraine). In effect, the role of the Head of SAPO would become ‘transitional’ and would be determined within the general framework of duty allocation among the Deputy Prosecutors General.
4. ⁠The closure of criminal proceedings against a suspect (for example, following an announced audit of proceedings) may become a matter of ‘negotiation’ in relation to other individuals involved. Currently, a prosecutor’s decision to close a criminal proceeding against a suspect does not preclude the continuation of the pre-trial investigation into the respective criminal offence (Part 5 of Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine). The proposed amendments would allow a suspect who is a special subject — such as an official in Category ‘A’, an MP, a judge, or the head of a major enterprise with a significant share of state or municipal ownership — to file a motion for the closure of proceedings in relation to themselves. However, such a motion would go directly to the Prosecutor General. In practice, this would mean the suspect would simply need to ‘come to an agreement’ with the Prosecutor General, as it is the latter who would now decide the fate of top-level corruption cases — and all others — from initiation to completion.
5. Extension of all additional instruments provided for in Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine (special procedures for investigation under martial law) for a period of three years after the termination or repeal of martial law. In light of the evolving practice of pre-trial investigation, there is a possibility that currently ‘dormant’ provisions allowing prosecutors to conduct searches or extend preventive measures without applying to an investigating judge, who, in certain territories, is objectively unable to exercise their powers, may be applied in practice.

The draft also proposes amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ to simplify the procedure for transferring prosecutors from lower-level prosecutors’ offices to the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) without a competitive selection process during the period of martial law. It would also allow for the appointment of individuals from outside the prosecution system. In addition, it proposes resolving the issue of prosecutors placed ‘out of staff’ due to decisions by the leadership concerning liquidation, reorganisation, restructuring, or changes in staffing levels within the prosecution service.

The likely aim of these provisions is to enable the transfer of prosecutors from district and regional offices, as significant resources are needed to conduct audits of NABU proceedings. However, this approach runs counter to the merit-based principles of appointment and transfer within the prosecution service and continues the flawed policy of addressing staffing issues outside the framework developed by the previous PGO leadership along the European integration track.

General Conclusion. The expansion of the Prosecutor General’s powers through the repeal of most provisions ensuring the procedural independence and autonomy of NABU and SAPO is inconsistent with the state’s anti-corruption policy pursued since the Revolution of Dignity. The prohibition against transferring NABU and SAPO proceedings to other investigative bodies, along with the special procedure for approving procedural decisions by the Head of SAPO, was introduced to minimise pressure on high-level corruption cases involving senior public officials, ministers, presidents, judges, and others. The effectiveness of this approach has been repeatedly emphasised by Ukraine’s international partners, particularly within the framework of European integration and the anti-corruption component of Chapter 23 of EU acquis.

Unlike prosecutors of the Prosecutor General’s Office, SAPO prosecutors underwent rigorous selection procedures involving international partners, and the Head of SAPO was appointed through an open competition. Public scandals in recent years, linked to the ‘blocking’ of proceedings by investigative bodies and the PGO, have demonstrated the intent to exercise ‘manual control’ over criminal cases, which undermines the principle of accountability in high-level corruption investigations. Recent efforts to discredit NABU and SAPO in the media space only reinforce this concern.

Appointments to administrative (managerial) positions in the prosecution service are made by the Prosecutor General or by the head of a regional or local prosecution office, depending on the level of the post. Currently, no competitive selection procedure is held for such appointments.

Only appointments to the posts of First Deputy and Deputy Prosecutor General, Head of a Regional Prosecutor’s Office (and their First Deputy and Deputies), and Head of a Local Prosecutor’s Office are subject to recommendation by the prosecutorial self-governance body — the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine (CPU)P. 4 of Article 49 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office”.. When considering whether to issue a recommendation for appointment to an administrative post, the CPU considersP. 5 of Article 39 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office”. the candidate’s professional and ethical qualities, as well as their managerial and organisational abilities and professional experience. However, this does not amount to an open competition — candidates are effectively chosen from within existing networks rather than through a public announcement of vacancies and an open invitation to all prosecutors to apply.

In the Screening Report (January 2025), the European Commission stated that “the selection of management-level prosecutors still needs to be improved, by introducing clear selection criteria based on integrity and professional competence and a transparent and meritocratic selection procedure, including a credible integrity and professionalism check and by strengthening the institutional capacities and powers of the involved entities.” (P. 52)

According to the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Rule of Law Reform Roadmap, legislation ensuring a transparent and merit-based selection of prosecutors for leadership positions must enter into force in the first quarter of 2026. This legislation will include clear assessment criteria, including professional competence and integrity/ethics; a transparent, competitive, and merit-based selection procedure, which incorporates professional competence and integrity checks; enhanced institutional capacity and authority of the Prosecutor’s General Office (PGO) and prosecutorial self-governance bodies, particularly the CPU, in the selection of candidates for leadership roles.

These reforms were developed by a working group established by the Prosecutor General on 25 June 2024, focusing on strengthening the institutional capacity of the Qualifications and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP), improving the disciplinary procedure for prosecutors, and enhancing the work of prosecutorial self-governance bodies. It is known that at the end of May, the PGO also sent a letter to prosecution offices at all levels requesting proposals regarding the content of the draft law.

However, at the end of 2024, a pilot project was launched to conduct competitive selection for leadership positions in the prosecution service — the personnel reserve. On 22 October 2024, the Prosecutor General established the Commission for the Selection of Candidates for Inclusion in the Personnel Reserve to fill administrative positions in the prosecution bodies (the Selection Commission). The Commission consists of three prosecutors (one of whom is the Deputy Chair of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine) and three representatives of partner organisations that provide international technical assistance (ITA) to the prosecution service.

The Selection Commission acts as an advisory body to the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, which, based on the personnel reserve list, submits recommendations for appointments to the Prosecutor General. This approach aims to minimise nepotism, the appointment of unqualified individuals, integrity-related risks, and other factors that negatively affect the quality of leadership personnel within the prosecution service.

The procedure for selecting candidates to be included in the personnel reserve for administrative positions in the prosecution service is defined byRegulation on the Procedure for Selection of Candidates for Inclusion in the Personnel Reserve for Administrative Positions in the Prosecution Service of Ukraine: Order of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine No. 236 of 14.10.2024 and Methodology for Selection and Evaluation of Candidates for Inclusion in the Personnel Reserve for Administrative Positions in the Prosecution Service of Ukraine. Annexe to the Regulation on the Procedure for Selection of Candidates for Inclusion in the Personnel Reserve for Administrative Positions in the Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, approved by Order of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine No. 236 of 14.10.2024. the Regulation and its accompanying Methodology. The competition involves: assessing the candidate’s vision for developing the prosecution bodies of the relevant level (in the form of a presentation), completing practical tasks, and participating in an interviewThe interview also assesses the candidate’s integrity and moral and business qualities. with the Selection Commission. The personnel reserve was formed for a two-year term and was intended to give the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General the opportunity to appoint the best prosecutors who had expressed their interest in taking on leadership positions at the regional and local levels.

The idea behind the personnel reserve was that it would serve as a pilot project for introducing a mandatory competitive selection process for leadership positions in the prosecution service, as stipulated by a number of EU integration commitments. At the same time, the procedure for filling leadership positions applied only to future appointments, while prosecutors currently holding such positions would remain in office (they would be offered reappointment).

Moreover, the appointment of a prosecutor to an administrative position — such as the head of a regional or district prosecutor’s office — is made for a term of five yearsOn the Public Prosecutor’s Office: Law of Ukraine of 14.10.2014 No. 1697-VII, part 4, article 39.. During the most recent reform of the prosecution service, triggered by the adoption ofOn Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Priority Measures for the Reform of the Public Prosecutor’s Office: Law of Ukraine of 19.09.2019 No. 113-IX. Law No. 113-IX in 2019, the structure of the prosecution bodies was changed, and prosecutors underwent recertification. The current regional prosecutor’s offices began functioning on 11 September 2020, and the district ones on 15 March 2021. At that time, appointments to the relevant leadership positions took place. This means that the terms of office of the current heads of these prosecutors’ offices will expire in 2025 and 2026, respectively. The intent was that they would be replaced by current leaders who consented to reappointment or by individuals selected from the personnel reserve list.

On 15 November 2024, the Selection Commission announced the start of the selection process. At this stage, candidates expressed their interest in taking leadership positions and submitted presentations outlining their vision for the development of the prosecution service at the corresponding level. From 8 to 10 April 2025, the second stage — written practical assignments — took place, involving over 450 prosecutors. The third stage, which consisted of interviews with the Commission, was conducted throughout May and June. Around 400 candidates out of 460 admitted to the final stage were evaluated. The Commission was scheduled to complete its work by 3 July and form the final list (the reserve).

Thus, the talent pool was an effective step toward a gradual transition from the current model to the appointment of heads of prosecutors’ offices based on competitive procedures. At the same time, it was limited only to those positions for which appointments are made upon the recommendation of the CPU — therefore, the talent pool had a recommendatory nature for the CPU and was established strictly within the bounds of current legislation (without requiring amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office”). There was always a risk that the Regulation, as a subordinate legal act, could be changed or revoked at any time by the Prosecutor General, which is exactly what happened in practice.

According to Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the “Law and Order” Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, the matter concerns prosecutors who wished to advance their careers through an open competitive selection process. Unfortunately, they were deprived of that opportunity because, by cancelling the Regulation, the Prosecutor General effectively returned the system to its previous state, where anyone can be appointed to key positions at the discretion of the Council of Prosecutors and the Prosecutor General. At the same time, the role of the Council is formal mainly since — despite all efforts to develop prosecutorial self-governance — it remains institutionally weak. As for other leadership positions, such as heads of departments within the PGO, appointments are made exclusively by the decision of the Prosecutor General.

The ALI expert has been teaching this topic in various formats at the Training Centre for the third consecutive year. During the sessions, trainees explore general approaches to defining the professional ethics of legal practitioners, the relationship between moral and ethical categories and legal norms, and the concepts of “ethics”, “integrity”, and related issues. The training also focuses on current practices of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors and prospects for the development of prosecutorial self-governance in light of these lecture topics.

On June 4, 2025, by Decision No. 175 dk-25, the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors approved the results of the competition for appointment as trainee prosecutors at the district prosecutor’s offices (the competition was held from July 2024).

On June 16, 55 trainee prosecutors began their preparation, which will last two months. This will be followed by an internship, and upon successful completion, prosecutors will be appointed to positions of the corresponding level.

The discussion focused on challenges in the adjudication of criminal offences related to corruption, particularly regarding legislative support and enforcement practices, as well as addressing the abuse of procedural rights by parties to criminal proceedings.

One of the thematic discussions of the Kyiv Polylogue — dedicated to ensuring the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings — was moderated by Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the “Law and Order” Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The need to counter the abuse of procedural rights has been widely acknowledged within the professional community for some time. Back in 2017, this legal concept was introduced into the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine, and the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine — yet it still remains absent in criminal proceedings. Of course, there are differing views on whether this should be considered a general principle of law or a sector-specific one; on which actions should be classified as abusive and which should not; and on what types of sanctions ought to be applied in response. However, all participants in the legal process agree on one fundamental point — such abuses do exist, and this kind of bad-faith behaviour must result in procedural, disciplinary, or even financial consequences.

At the same time, criminal proceedings are often plagued by practices such as so-called “scattergun” motions aimed at having cases heard by a “favourable” judge; unjustified absences of participants; repeated postponements due to constant changes of defence counsel, even when multiple lawyers are already engaged; motions submitted on issues not subject to review at that stage of proceedings; or simply filing motions with identical content. An ALI expert noted that these problems are especially apparent in cases before the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine, where the defence side often has the most resources at its disposal. However, abuse of procedural rights is not solely a defence issue — it also concerns prosecutors.

Yevhen Krapyvin emphasised that the format of the polylogue demonstrates support for such a step from various participants in the criminal justice process, as these discussions encompass the views of judges, prosecutors, representatives of the legislative branch, as well as the legal and academic communities. A consolidated position should serve as a catalyst for important decisions to be made by the Government and Parliament.