The event focused on the need to improve human rights mechanisms in Ukraine, the impact of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings against Ukraine on the EU’s reform expectations, the government’s readiness to implement those rulings, and the role civil society can and must play in ensuring accountability in this process.

ALI contributed to the panel discussion titled “When Will Detentions Become European?” — a critical topic given that unlawful detention remains a serious issue in Ukraine. Over the past 18 months alone, the ECHR has ordered Ukraine to pay over €1.4 million in compensation for violations of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) — the right to liberty and security.

Yevhen Krapyvin noted that in just the first quarter of this year, the ECHR issued 17 rulings under Article 5, accounting for a third of all rulings. Key, recurring violations include: deprivation of liberty without a court order; detention orders lacking specified time limits; court rulings authorising pre-trial detention without proper justification; delays in releasing individuals from custody after court decisions; delays in drawing up arrest protocols; detention without legal basis prior to judicial review, etc. 

So, what’s the core problem? While the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine formally regulates the procedures for detention, application of preventive measures, and their extension, systemic issues persist in practice.

Separately, Yevhen noted the Custody Records system Custody Records systemA system of electronic recording of all actions taken with detained persons., which has been expanding significantly in recent years. However, it does not cover all the “grey zones” where investigative and operational units may attempt to extract information in an extralegal manner for further use. Such practices are often accompanied by isolation from legal assistance, failure to notify relatives, psychological pressure, and improper treatment. The system has been actively implemented in the National Police for over five years, yet there is still a lack of a comprehensive assessment of its effectiveness and overall impact on the problem. Therefore, conducting such an evaluation should be a priority for experts in this field — especially since this issue is increasingly raised in the context of European integration.

Undoubtedly, to achieve tangible progress in all aspects related to human rights, it is essential to comprehensively improve the mechanisms of the rule of law and law enforcement in Ukraine. Supporting and providing expert assistance to state institutions on this path is one of the core missions of the Agency, which is precisely why we have begun to engage more deeply with issues related to the prosecution service and public order.

The High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) — the main judicial body responsible for appointments — has now been working in its new composition for two years (half its term).

At present, it is conducting several important personnel procedures simultaneously: a competition for 550 vacant positions in appellate courts; selection for 1,800 positions in local courts; and a competition for 25 judicial positions in the High Anti-Corruption Court — in which, on the first attempt, only two winners were selected.

Two more competitions are approaching for new higher administrative courts that will hear cases against central executive authorities (replacing the now-defunct DACK).

Equally important is the qualification assessment of sitting judges to determine their fitness to remain in office. Yet in a year and a half, just over 300 out of 1,800 judges (20%) have undergone this assessment.

However, the Commission’s new composition has been plagued by various challenges and scandals throughout its term. In March of last year, HQCJ Head Roman Ihnatov resigned. While in March–April of this year, searches were carried out both at HQCJ’s premises and at the homes of some of its members.

HQCJ members called this pressure from the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and appealed to the High Council of Justice (HCJ) to protect their independence.

Will criminal proceedings hinder the successful completion of the qualification assessment of current judges and the selection of new ones? Who is trying to destabilise the process — and why? Most importantly, what has the HQCJ actually achieved over these two years? This article attempts to unpack the situation.

In May 2025, the HQCJ began interviews with candidates for positions in the appellate courts. It took one year and eight months for the HQCJ and the candidates to reach this stage — and Ukraine had to wait a full 11 years. The last appointments of new appellate judges took place back in the Yanukovych era without any open competitions or integrity checks.

An attempt to launch a competition for appellate courts was made in 2019. However, following the dissolution of the previous HQCJ by Parliament, this and other staffing processes were put on hold for four long years.

The result is not just a staffing shortage in the appellate courts — it’s a full-blown collapse. Of the 1,357 judicial positions in the appellate courts, 768 (56.6%) are vacant. For instance, in Sumy, only four judges are currently in office, while the competition is being held for 21 positions.

Over the past year and a half, candidates for the appellate courts have passed exams on legal knowledge and their chosen specialisation, undergone cognitive ability testing and completed a practical written task. For comparison, competitions for the Supreme Court in 2017–2019 took nine and seven months, respectively — and involved fewer vacancies.

This is not an example of slow work by the current HQCJ composition but rather the result of unsuccessful political decisions that halted all qualification procedures in the judiciary for nearly four years. Naturally, this is a story that must never be repeated: halting any institution without transferring its functions to another is a failure of state policy, poor governance, and ultimately harms the population — in this case, severely restricting citizens’ access to justice for years to come. The decision to dissolve the HQCJ in 2019 will only be rectified by 2027 (optimistic forecast) or even 2029 (pessimistic).

Currently, candidates for the appellate courts include judges, academics, and advocates. Of the 2,076 applicants, 41% have progressed to the interview stage.

During the interviews, candidates are assessed against criteria of integrity, professional ethics, and personal and social competencies. They are questioned about assets, trips to Russia, rulings made during the Revolution of Dignity, citations of Russian sources in dissertations, plagiarism, and so forth.

Within two weeks, five of the sixteen candidates interviewed were eliminated. Of the remaining eleven, nine received a negative opinion from the Public Integrity Council. This means their candidacies must be reviewed and confirmed by the HQCJ plenary (15 members), as interviews for candidates to administrative and commercial appellate courts are conducted by chambers (seven to eight members), while those for general courts are conducted by collegiums (three members).

This is quite an unusual situation, as it concerns a single competition. The inconsistency of approaches within the same competition is a serious mistake on the part of the HQCJ, which could lead to parts of the Commission’s decisions being overturned in court. The order in which interviews are conducted is equally problematic, since the most acute shortage of judges is in the general appellate courts — yet they were not prioritised.

There are also differences in how the court assignments for successful candidates are determined. Candidates for the general appellate courts immediately choose the court to which they are applying and are interviewed specifically for “their” court. By contrast, candidates for the appellate administrative and commercial courts first receive a score and ranking, and only then select a court in turn according to their place in the ranking.

There is no logical explanation for applying different approaches within the same competition.

However, this is not the first serious mistake by the HQCJ. The first was the failed competition for the High Anti-Corruption Court.

Unlike the competition for the appellate courts, where at the outset, there were about four candidates per vacant post, the competition for the HACC had 10.5 candidates per vacancy. However, in the end, only two winners were selected for the first instance, and no candidates succeeded in the competition for the HACC’s Appeals Chamber.

Why did this happen?

Primarily because candidates took cognitive tests that were not adapted for judicial competitions while facing an exceptionally high passing threshold of 75%, established by legislation based on proposals from certain international technical assistance (ITA) projects. At the same time, no relevant examples were provided from other countries where such tests had been used to screen judicial candidates.

Moreover, even those who passed the cognitive ability tests failed to correctly solve the practical task — delivering a judicial decision in a criminal case. Some members of the HQCJ, speaking anonymously, explained that the requirements for the practical assignment for the HACC Appeals Chamber were so high that “no one could have managed it”. When logically asked why such a high bar was set, the response was that the task had been developed by external experts engaged by specific ITA projects. The result: a failed competition, missed deadlines for Ukraine’s commitments under the Ukraine Facility and IMF Memoranda, an understaffed HACC, prolonged consideration of high-profile corruption cases, and the necessity to start the competition from scratch.

Last week, Parliament allowed candidates who were unsuccessful in the first competition for the HACC to reapply now, whereas previously, the law only permitted them to do so after a year. This draft law now awaits the president’s signature.

Under favourable circumstances, the HACC will see new judges only in 2026. And even if all 25 vacancies are eventually filled, it will be a Pyrrhic victory — one that could have been avoided if the HQCJ had managed to strike a better balance between the demands of certain donors and the interests of the judiciary. After all, it is the HQCJ’s responsibility to ensure that Ukrainian courts have judges.

Another major qualification procedure is the selection of 1,800 local court judge positions, which attracted over 9,000 applicants. Ukraine has never undertaken a staffing project of this scale before. The previous selection in 2017 was for 700 positions, with more than 5,000 applicants. Those successful candidates from that round joined the ranks of local court judges last year, preventing a collapse at the first instance level.

However, large-scale projects like this have a significant drawback — time. Last year, the Commission spent approximately four months conducting 430 interviews, averaging about 100 candidates per month.

For 1,800 interviews, it may take a year and a half. Adding ongoing parallel competitions for appellate and higher specialised courts, the process could take even longer.

Does Ukraine have that much time? The question is rhetorical. So, what can be done?

The fact is the HQCJ is primarily a qualification commission.

The legislator has established that for the selection of judges to the first instance courts, a qualification exam is conducted, followed by an interview on integrity with the competition winners. At the same time, for the selection of judges to appellate courts, higher specialised courts, and the Supreme Court, a different procedure is applied — qualification assessment, where candidates’ knowledge is first tested, then their integrity and ethics are checked, and only after that is the candidate’s status as a competition winner decided.

Meanwhile, the body responsible for forming a professional and ethical judicial corps is not the HQCJ but the High Council of Justice (HCJ). Therefore, it would be logical to transfer the function of conducting integrity interviews with candidates for local courts from the HQCJ to the HCJ, as this is precisely its authority.

This would, first of all, save at least a year (more likely a year and a half), but most importantly — align the functions of the two bodies with their legal nature and help avoid duplication, which is obviously important if Ukraine aims to move towards the EU quickly and efficiently. This is especially crucial in situations where these bodies operate with incomplete membership, often barely meeting quorum, and are also subject to interference from law enforcement agencies — whether lawful or not, that remains to be examined.

The morning of March 11 began at the HQCJ premises with searches. As later reported by the HQCJ, this investigative action was carried out based on a ruling by the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv dated March 10, within the framework of a criminal proceeding registered on July 25, 2024, under Part 1 of Article 376-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (illegal interference with the operation of automated systems in judicial bodies and institutions). This case dates back to last summer, when, during testing as part of the qualification assessment of judges for compliance with their position, the automated system malfunctioned and incorrectly generated sets of test questions. A crime report on this matter was then filed by some judges of the notorious DACK, who, let me remind, have been sabotaging the qualification assessment since 2018.

Why were searches related to the “malfunction” case from July only conducted in March of the following year?

That same week, the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) conducted searches at the home of the Deputy Head of the HQCJ, Oleksii Omelyan. However, this was in a different case unrelated to the Commission’s work — deception of the court or another authorised body (Article 384 of the CC of Ukraine). Oleksiy Omelyan himself described the SBI’s actions as “unlawful” and appealed to the High Council of Justice (HCJ), reporting interference with the work of an HQCJ member.

The Commission, in turn, appealed to the HCJ with a request to ensure guarantees of independence. At the time this article was prepared, the HCJ had not yet issued a decision on the matter.

The SBI is also conducting a criminal investigation regarding the reinstatement of the initial qualification assessment of Pechersky District Court judge O. Tsarevych (Part 1 of Article 182, Part 3 of Article 382 of the CC of Ukraine).

In April 2025, the NABU and the SAPO announced that HQCJ member Volodymyr Luhansky had been served with a notice of suspicion “for embezzlement of public funds in the amount of over UAH 576,000”. According to the investigation, while serving as a judge, Luhansky used a “Doctor of Philosophy” degree as grounds to receive a 15% salary and pension bonus. He obtained this degree in 2011 from the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management (IAPM) in violation of proper procedure since no Ukrainian university at that time had the legal authority to award such a degree. Luhansky’s actions have been qualified under Part 4 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Why, then, has only Luhansky been served with a suspicion so far? After all, he did not issue the diploma to himself — nor did he process the bonus payments on his own.

In June, the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) plans to independently assess the actions of Volodymyr Luhansky, which may result in his suspension from office. A similar scenario could unfold in the case of Oleksii Omelian.

This situation poses potentially serious consequences for both the HQCJ and the judiciary as a whole.

The matter is that the HQCJ must have at least six judges in its composition to be legally competent. Following the dismissal of Roman Ihnatov, only seven judges remain. If two more are suspended, the Commission will be left with five judges, which would automatically halt its operations under the law.

What is the status of appointing a new HQCJ member?

The Selection Commission has been working for over a year. During this time, it held a competition and submitted two finalists to the HCJ for appointment. However, the HCJ concluded that neither candidate met the standards required of an HQCJ member. This raises the question: where are better-qualified candidates supposed to come from, if this was the quality of the applicant pool?

The Selection Commission has launched a new competition. However, it was soon announced that all USAID projects — including the one providing technical, expert, and financial support to the Commission — would be suspended.

Later, members of the Selection Commission were able to secure alternative funding, which was provided by our Dutch partners (a substantial and invaluable contribution at this stage, for which we owe them sincere gratitude). However, two important nuances remain: first, the funding is channelled through the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), whose experts and contractors are expected to function as the Commission’s secretariat; and second, the term of the Selection Commission expires on June 1. Whether the Commission and its secretariat will have enough time — just two weeks — to review the candidates’ documents (first translating them into English, as half the Commission’s members are international representatives), conduct interviews, and select the winners remains an open question.

We reached out to the Head of the Selection Commission, Ivan Mishchenko, who stated: “At the moment, all Commission members are working around the clock to process the candidates’ documents. We are doing everything possible to meet the June 1 deadline. However, given that the Commission operates under specific rules and procedures, it is essential to strike a balance between those procedures and the compressed timeline so that speed does not come at the expense of the quality of candidates selected as winners of this competition”.

Given the circumstances, it would be reasonable to extend the mandate of the Selection Commission until the current competition is completed (in our estimate — essentially two to three additional weeks). However, this would require a vote in Parliament. And are there enough votes for that?

In truth, the issue is broader: the involvement of international experts is currently limited to the Commission’s first composition. But is Ukraine ready to forgo international experts in selection processes for high judicial positions today? Clearly, it is not. That, however, is a subject for deeper analysis in one of our upcoming pieces.

Summing up two years of work by the HQCJ, we can draw seven key conclusions:

1. Even the best-designed competition cannot guarantee the absence of future problems with its winners.
2. A prolonged suspension of the Commission’s activities resets all selection procedures by years, making it impossible to promptly resolve longstanding systemic issues — even if Commission members and the Secretariat work 24/7.
3. All procedures must be logical and consistent: divergent approaches within a single competition, or among similar competitions, can have damaging consequences that could have been avoided through unified rules and procedures.
4. Timing matters: duplication, added layers, or repeated procedures are harmful and should only be applied in exceptional cases — not as a norm.
5. “Not everything that comes from overseas is gold”. Procedures successful in other countries or sectors may not work within Ukraine’s justice system. Building domestic ownership is essential to Ukraine’s successful path toward EU membership.
6. Many actors — directly or indirectly — seek to influence judicial selection procedures. It is doubtful that the wave of criminal investigations is merely coincidental (a topic that also merits future examination). Judicial independence, regrettably, often remains just a principle in law, not in practice.
7. Most importantly: despite all challenges, nearly 9,000 legal professionals aspire to become judges. This is the human capital Ukraine must work with in the coming years — to join the EU and to build a strong, independent judiciary. Our collective task is not to waste this potential but to strike the right balance between independence (including adequate funding), accountability, and dignity. After all, only a truly independent and dignified judge can properly balance the scales of justice.

The first panel discussion focused on the regulation of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union. It also addressed a recently proposed approach that would allow candidate countries to gradually participate in EU institutions, policies, and programmes even before obtaining full membership.

Vsevolod Chentsov, Representative of Ukraine to the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, commented on Ukraine’s European integration process:

Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine — Minister of Justice of Ukraine, spoke about mutual strengthening and Ukraine’s readiness for the negotiation process:

Just last week, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine reviewed and approved Reform Roadmaps in the areas of the rule of law, public administration reform, and the functioning of democratic institutions. Representatives of civil society were involved in developing these roadmaps – the Agency for Legislative Initiatives provided expert support in their preparation.

During the discussion panel “The Impact of the Rule of Law in Ukraine”, Karyna Aslanyan, Rule of Law Lead at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, spoke about the progress and challenges faced by the judiciary on Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. In particular, she reminded the audience that in 2024, a coalition of civil society organisations led by ALI prepared the first Shadow Report under Chapter 23, “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights”. The coalition is now working on the second Shadow Report, which will cover both Chapter 23, “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights,” and Chapter 24 “, Justice, Freedom and Security.”

However, challenges in the area of the rule of law remain substantial: issues with quorum in the High Council of Justice and especially in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which has been non-operational since January; the Prosecutor General’s position remains vacant; there are ongoing problems with interference in the activities of judges and members of judicial governance bodies. The issue of uneven workload among judges remains relevant, as does the insufficient funding of the judiciary. Although there has been some positive momentum in the selection of judges for local courts (around 400 new judges were appointed last year), there is still a critical shortage of judges in appellate courts (particularly in criminal specialisation).

This includes the strategic development of a new judicial map, the unification of procedures for selecting judges and members of judicial governance bodies, and the revision of the model for the functioning of the Public Integrity Council — including ensuring its proper funding and technical support — as well as the gradual reform of judicial education. 

It also encompasses the digitalisation of judicial proceedings, including remote hearings in frontline regions, adequate funding for the judiciary, and the immediate appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

This panel discussion also featured the participation of Oleksii Omelian, Deputy Head of the HQCJ, and Vitalii Hatseliuk, a member of the HQCJ.

Oleksii Omelian spoke about the current situation and the challenges facing the Commission — namely, the shortage of judicial personnel, outdated material and technical infrastructure, and the consequences of the war. At the same time, he highlighted the ongoing work of the Commission: the completion of competitions for positions in local courts and the High Anti-Corruption Court, the renewal of the composition of the Public Integrity Council and the Public Council of International Experts. In addition, a competition for appellate courts is currently underway, a new competition for the Appeals Chamber of the High Anti-Corruption Court has been announced, and the largest judicial selection process in Ukraine’s history is in progress — the Commission has begun selecting candidates for 1,800 positions in local courts. Over 8,500 individuals have applied for these posts, and nearly 600 current judges have submitted applications for transfer.

Vitalii Hatseliuk emphasised that the HQCJ continues to focus on ensuring functional sustainability, building public trust by involving civil society in the selection processes, and coordinating with international partners. However, he noted that successful implementation of these efforts requires improvements in legislation, optimisation of the processing of personal data for candidates and judges, and an overall strengthening of the Commission’s institutional capacity. 

He also stressed the importance of forming resilient institutions grounded in the rule of law.

Thus, it is crucial for Ukraine today to focus on all aspects that support and develop independent and effective judicial institutions — institutions capable not only of consolidating their achievements and results but also of responding to current challenges.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives joined the visit of Transparency International Ukraine at the invitation of Transparency International EU. Together with representatives of civil society from Georgia, Moldova and the Western Balkans, the participants discussed anti-corruption challenges and news, exchanged experiences and achievements on the European integration path, which each country is going through in its own context and with its own obstacles.

The main topics of the panel discussions included pressure on civil society, malign interference and corruption. ALI also joined working meetings with representatives of DG ENEST (Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood), EEAS (European External Action Service), COELA / COWEB, as well as a meeting in the European Parliament chaired by MEP Daniel Freund. 

Delegations from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Transparency International Ukraine spoke about the challenges and threats Ukraine has faced in recent years, the work of Ukrainian democratic institutions and the role of the judiciary in the fight against corruption.

Over the years, the organisations have monitored many external and internal factors that affect the implementation of reforms. However, by far the first and greatest challenge for us, which affects all state processes, is the war that has been going on in Ukraine since 2014.

Only strong and capable institutions, whose development civil society has been promoting and supporting for years, will help to withstand this pressure at all levels and dispel attempts to undermine the credibility of Ukrainian state institutions not only in the eyes of the Ukrainian audience but also the international one.

But what if this capacity, including in terms of the rule of law, is affected by both systematic malign interference from russia and internal factors related to staff shortages, difficulties in conducting competitive selections, and complicated procedures for recruiting to the judiciary at all levels?

As a reminder, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, in coalition with other CSOs, including Transparency International Ukraine, prepared a Shadow Report on Chapter 23 “Justice and Fundamental Rights” of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine in 2023. Currently, the CSO Coalition has launched a new cycle of monitoring and evaluation of Ukraine’s progress in the field of European integration — under Chapters 23 “Justice and Fundamental Rights” and 24 “Justice, Freedom and Security”.

The working visit took place within the framework of the annual meeting of the Transparency International movement. The presentations of national regional chapters of Transparency International and NGOs from Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and the Western Balkans were devoted to the analysis of the “Fundamentals” Cluster, the first and key cluster of the EU in its enlargement process. In particular, the visit focused on the key challenges and opportunities of each country in terms of their enlargement prospects.

The results of monitoring and assessing Ukraine’s progress under both Chapters will be presented in the 2025 Shadow Report. This report will contain:

• an analysis of the progress made by Ukraine under Chapters 23 and 24, starting from the publication of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine in 2024 for each area, and for Chapter 23 – also concerning the recommendations provided in the 2024 Shadow Report;
• a detailed analysis of the problems that have arisen in the reform process for each area of ​​both Chapters;
• description of the current state of affairs in the areas of state policy under Chapter 24 in general and in some areas under Chapter 23 (which were not the focus of the previous monitoring) from the perspective of civil society.

In addition, the report will focus on the following issues:

• what has been done in each area during the monitoring period; 
• to what extent has what been done allows the achievement of the set goals;
• to what extent does it meet the expectations of society.

Particular attention of the coalition members, within the framework of monitoring and assessing Ukraine’s progress, will be paid to the analysis of the state of:

1. Ukraine’s implementation of the recommendations provided by the European Commission in the reports on Ukraine in 2023–2024 and the first screening report of Cluster 1, “Fundamentals of the EU accession process”;
2. taking into account by the state authorities responsible for the implementation of relevant state policies, the recommendations of the public set out in the Shadow Report to Chapter 23 “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine in 2023.

The Shadow Report within the framework of the project will be prepared by the end of September 2025.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is a leading independent Ukrainian think tank whose activities are aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Parliament and Government, continuing European and Euro-Atlantic integration, supporting the stabilisation and reconstruction of Ukraine to overcome the aftermaths of the Russian Federation’s aggression, monitoring and backing reforms in justice and security, political and civic awareness-raising.

Transparency International Ukraine (TI Ukraine) is an accredited chapter of the global movement Transparency International. The organisation takes a comprehensive approach to implementing changes to reduce corruption in specific areas: it helped to create and subsequently transferred to the state of Prozorro, Prozorro.Sale, eHealth and ProZvit systems. TI Ukraine has also implemented the City Transparency and Accountability Rankings, built the DOZORRO community to monitor public procurement, and co-founded the RISE Ukraine coalition to promote the principles of integrity and efficiency in reconstruction.

ZMINA Human Rights Centre – The Centre is engaged in information, educational, monitoring, analytical, and advocacy activities in human rights. It protects human rights defenders and civil society activists in Ukraine, including those in occupied Crimea. Following the onset of large-scale Russian aggression, ZMINA, together with 38 other CSOs, created the “Ukraine 5 AM” Coalition, which documents war crimes and aims to protect the victims of Russia’s armed aggression in Ukraine and bring to justice the top leadership of the Russian Federation as well as the direct perpetrators of these war crimes.

Tomorrow’s Lawyer is a non-governmental organisation that promotes the institutional development of justice to strengthen the rule of law and protect human rights. Since 2016, the NGO has been researching state policy and the state of affairs in the justice sector while also developing recommendations for their improvement and advancement. A key priority of the organisation is the professional development of the legal community.

The Ukrainian Bar Association (UBA) is an all-Ukrainian non-governmental organisation founded in 2002. It currently unites more than 8,000 lawyers. The Association’s activities include promoting the development of the legal profession, improving legislation, implementing ethical standards, and protecting the professional rights of its members and human rights in general.

European Pravda is an independent Ukrainian media outlet specialising in covering news on European issues and Ukraine’s European integration.

The EU Project Pravo-Justice is a technical assistance project implemented by Expertise France with the financial support of the European Union.

After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, the EU Project Pravo-Justice became one of the drivers in promoting the rule of law in Ukraine, bringing the country’s legislative framework into line with European standards, developing a strategic vision for reforms, judicial reform, proper enforcement of court decisions, etc.

In January 2025, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the main constitutional body of judicial governance responsible for appointing and dismissing judges, bringing them to disciplinary responsibility, and, most importantly, ensuring the independence of the judiciary, was left without its head.

The two-year term of office of Hryhorii Usyk, HCJ Chair, has come to an end, and an attempt to elect a new chair on 27 January was unsuccessful. Hryhorii Usyk received nine votes, while HCJ member Oleksandr Sasevych, who also ran for the position, received six votes out of the minimum required 11. Two HCJ members did not support any candidate.

Currently, the body is temporarily headed by HCJ Deputy Chair Dmytro Lukianov, but his term of office will expire at the end of February. In mid-March, the four-year term of office of two HCJ members under the quota of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, namely Inna Plakhtii and Vitalii Salikhov, will expire.

In this article, we will try to clarify what is happening inside the High Council of Justice, how it affects the HCJ and the judiciary, when new members may be elected, and whether there is a chance to elect a new chair on 20 February, as scheduled in the agenda.

The High Council of Justice must consist of 21 members – 10 under the quota of the Congress of Judges and two members each from lawyers, prosecutors, scholars, the President and the Parliament. The Head of the Supreme Court is an ex officio member of the HCJ but, for objective reasons, does not work there every day. The HCJ quorum (and, accordingly, its powers) varies for different issues. It is at least 14 members, for example, for the appointment of judges.

In 2022, the HCJ did not work for almost a year, as there were three to six members in office at that time. Some of its functions were not performed at all, and some were transferred to the Head of the Supreme Court (for example, temporary secondment of judges and changes in court jurisdiction). Everyone saw how Vsevolod Kniazev’s excessive, almost imperial powers ended up in a year. We should not have any more such dangerous experiments not only in the judiciary but also in any other body because, as we know, “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

At present, the HCJ has only 17 members (including Supreme Court President Stanislav Kravchenko). This is because the President has not appointed members according to his quota for almost two years. The third “presidential” competition for these positions is currently underway, as the winners of previous competitions did not satisfy the President and his competition commission.

The Ukrainian Bar Congress has not even started competitions under its quota for more than three years. This has long been a cause for serious concern within the country and for reaction from our European partners, who strongly advise us to prevent prolonged non-appointment of HCJ members. That is why the draft Rule of Law Roadmap (Titles 23 and 24 of the Fundamentals cluster) envisages holding an online bar congress as one of the measures on Ukraine’s path to EU accession. This will ensure that the election of judicial governance bodies or the re-election of bar self-government bodies does not take years.

The powers of two HCJ members will expire in three weeks. Only 15 members will remain in the HCJ. Formally, there is a quorum. However, some of the HCJ’s disciplinary functions will be blocked even with this number.

According to the law, the HCJ panel reviews decisions of disciplinary chambers to bring judges to disciplinary responsibility, but members of the disciplinary chamber that made the decision to discipline a judge do not participate in such meetings.

Thus, with only 15 HCJ members, the review of decisions of the disciplinary chambers will be blocked. Since these chambers each have five HCJ members, and 11 members are required for the plenary to be competent, it will be impossible to dismiss traitorous judges, corrupt officials, and all those who have decisions of chambers in which five HCJ members participated. This excludes recusals, illnesses, business trips, holidays, etc.

Of course, the most logical solution in such circumstances would be for the Congress of Judges to elect two of its representatives as soon as possible and for the President to appoint two HCJ members according to his quota.

However, the vetting of candidates who have expressed a desire to be elected to these positions is still ongoing. For example, on 14 February, Bohdan Monich, Head of the Council of Judges of Ukraine, informed that the Congress of Judges would convene “immediately after the Ethics Council presents candidates for the position of HCJ members.” However, the deadline for completing the vetting by the Ethics Council is unknown.

So, it appears that the instrument of preliminary vetting of candidates is quite correct in order to prevent the appointment of dishonest persons as HCJ members. However, this is the second “vetting commission” that has failed to provide candidates in time, and therefore, the work of the constitutional body is suspended or partially suspended (we recall that since the end of January, there has been no quorum in the Grand Chamber of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, as the Advisory Group of Experts failed to vet candidates for CCU judges in time).

However, unlike the Law “On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine,” the Law “On the High Council of Justice” contains the following provision: “If the High Council of Justice may become incompetent due to the expiration of the term of office of an HCJ member, such HCJ member shall continue to exercise their powers until the day of electing (appointing) another person to their position, but in any case no more than three months upon the expiration of the term for which such member of the High Council of Justice was elected (appointed).”

There are two problems here at once. First, is there any reason to apply this provision now since the HCJ will not become fully incompetent in March but only in one of its functions? Second, this rule has never been applied before, so there is no working mechanism for its application, even if the HCJ interprets it in such a way that there are grounds for extending the powers of HCJ members Salikhov and Plakhtii.

We would like to remind that all this is happening amid the absence of a head of the High Council of Justice and the end of the term of office of HCJ Deputy Chair Dmytro Lukianov at the end of February (and, accordingly, the need to hold election for this position as well).

The re-election of the HCJ Chair is scheduled for 20 February, but there are several interesting nuances.

Back in January 2025, on the eve of the first election of the HCJ Chair, its members agreed that they would elect the Chair only if all HCJ members, including the President of the Supreme Court, were present at such a meeting.

On 27 January, these agreements were respected, but no one got the required 11 votes. At the same time, our sources in the HCJ say that one of the candidates was even campaigned for by the Presidential Office and the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Policy.

It remains a mystery how to implement the Rule of Law Roadmap, which envisages strengthening judicial independence. What kind of independence can we discuss if the political authorities try to influence the election of the HCJ Chair and some HCJ members “vote on command”?

However, commands do not end with the political authorities: Heads of some appellate courts also actively interfere with the election of the HCJ Chair. These are the ones who have been working in their positions for years, successfully bypassing the ban on third, fourth and fifth terms in office. By the way, the European Commission also requires that we deal with these stories, as reflected in the Rule of Law Roadmap. You can only imagine the internal resistance to its approval if it contains real measures to depoliticise and combat corruption and mutual cover-ups.

As for the announced date of the HCJ Chair election on 20 February, according to available information, HCJ members Usyk and Sasevych are planning to run for this position again. However, some members are scheduled to take leave during this period. Therefore, it will not be easy to fulfil the internal agreements on voting with all the existing members (unless they are recalled from their leaves).

Another interesting point is that on the same day, the consideration of the complaint of Pavlo Vovk, who is the former President of the Kyiv District Administrative Court, against the decision of the Third Disciplinary Chamber of the HCJ to bring him to justice in the form of dismissal is also scheduled. Usyk is the speaker in this case.

We would like to remind that during the consideration of Pavlo Vovk’s disciplinary case in the Disciplinary Chamber, there were such stories as mining of the HCJ building, failure of the voting system, power outages, change of courtrooms due to failing computer equipment, numerous motions, recusals, etc. It is an open question whether something similar will happen on the day of the HCJ Chair election. However, bearing in mind that this function of the HCJ may be blocked from March until new members are appointed to the High Council of Justice, there is no time to postpone this issue either.

So, either the HCJ will have a royal flush on Thursday or another postponement of important issues for an indefinite period. The HCJ Chair has a lot of tasks.

For example, special attention needs to be paid to establishing interaction between the HCJ members and the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), which was launched at the end of last year.

According to HCJ member Oksana Kvasha (scholars’ quota), “The High Council of Justice has not found it easier due to the fact that the review of disciplinary complaints is now the function of disciplinary inspectors. The situation has become even worse for the HCJ, as there are problems with proper communication between the HCJ and the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors.”

International technical assistance (ITA) projects promised to help improve the work of the SDI. However, it is known that USAID projects have been suspended for at least three months. And the activities of some projects (such as IDLO) are of serious concern.

For example, from 14 to 16 February, the IDLO project funded SDI trainings in Zakarpattia, where disciplinary inspectors were taught about gender equality and social inclusion during the first session. These topics may be important, but how do they affect the way inspectors analyse disciplinary complaints about whether or not a judge has committed a disciplinary offence?

And during the second session, disciplinary inspectors studied the material on sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. Of course, there may be such complaints against judges (the HCJ recently considered a case of mobbing), but what is their percentage in the total number? One in ten thousand? And that one was closed due to lack of evidence.

Why the IDLO project teaches disciplinary inspectors, such a strange programme seems to be a rhetorical question. Perhaps because some ITA projects live by their own rules: they sell what they can raise funding for. Regulating this properly is also one of the HCJ’s tasks.

An equally important task is to hold a competition for the position of the Head of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine. This issue has not been resolved for more than a year, and the main financial body of the judiciary has been functioning without a permanent head for a year and a half.

In fact, the main task of the HCJ Chair, regardless of the name that will or will not appear on Thursday, should be to work on the real independence of the judiciary – in terms of interaction with other branches of government and within the judiciary, consideration of disciplinary complaints, protection of the authority of justice in the event of interference with the activities of a particular judge, and provision of financial guarantees for the independence of judges, etc. Of course, not independently, but at the level of the entire body: as the first among equals.

This can only be done by a person who is equidistant from all players in the political power, has no “debts” for their appointment, is not afraid to take responsibility for unpopular decisions, does not want to be convenient for everyone and is respected within the HCJ.

The High Council of Justice is the main constitutional body of judicial governance. The development (and successful reform) of the judiciary depends on its systemic work. We can only hope that all HCJ members fully understand this and are ready to take personal responsibility for it.

On 9 January, the parliament adopted as a basis draft law No. 12368-1, authored by Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc MP Serhii Vlasenko, on amending the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” and some other legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the establishment and functioning of the Kyiv City District Administrative Court (KCDAC) and the Kyiv City Administrative Court of Appeal (KCACA). As stated in the explanatory note to the draft law, its main objectives are to “ensure the efficiency and transparency of the administrative proceedings, eliminate conflicts of interest and minimise possible corruption risks in the courts,” etc. It sounds like a mockery if you look into the details.

Thus, it is proposed that the KCDAC should consider cases against central executive authorities (the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries and the Antimonopoly Committee), review decisions of competition commissions regarding competitions for the positions of heads of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, National Anti-Corruption Bureau, National Agency on Corruption Prevention, etc., as well as casesCases against the President, Parliament, High Council of Justice, High Qualification Commission of Judges, etc. that are currently under consideration by the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, and the KCACA should be an appeal against the decisions of the “district administrative court.”

At the same time, “the competition for the positions of KCDAC and KCACA judges is held in accordance with the procedure established for local courts by the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges.” Isn’t it logical to select judges for the appellate courts according to the rules for selecting judges of local courts? For those who do not understand that this is sarcasm, we explain: no, this is not the case.

The jurisdiction of cases involves the most complex, important and/or high-profile administrative cases in the country. The selection of judges for both instances, as for an ordinary district or raion court, is done without the involvement of public or international experts, and in violation of the rules for selecting judges of appellate courts.

After voting for the draft law in the first reading, the public and the media have already referred to this court structure as “DACK-2,” although this monster is much worse in reality.

It is also worth adding here that this court structure does not comply with Ukraine’s international obligations and, therefore, will not be accepted by our European and American partners. It also violates the general logic of the judicial reform, whereby “simple” administrative casesPensions, taxes, etc. of Kyivans should be heard by a district court in Kyiv, and cases involving central executive authorities should be heard by a high specialised court, as is the case with corruption cases, where petty corruption is heard by general courts and grand corruption is heard by the High Anti-Corruption Court.

After the vote, some MPs shared on Facebook that this was only the first reading and the draft law would be “significantly revised” for the second reading.

So who is to blame? How did we get at least a draft-level DACK-2 instead of the High Administrative Court? Most importantly, what should we do to fix it? Let’s find out in this article.

In December 2022, the District Administrative Court of Kyiv was liquidated. This happened as a result of numerous scandalous DACK decisions, the release of the so-called DACK tapes by the NABU, criminal cases against some of the court’s judges, and even the imposition of personal sanctions against DACK President Pavlo Vovk by the United States.

At the same time, the Kyiv City District Administrative Court was established “on paper,” while DACK cases were “temporarily” transferred to the Kyiv District Administrative Court. Most of them remained in boxes and bags for two years until the parliament decided to redistribute them among other district administrative courts according to their workload so that the consideration of these cases could at least start moving.

However, despite the existence of the “court on paper,” nothing actually happened for some time.

International partners included the need to create a new court in Ukraine’s reform commitments, while the government did everything behind the scenes and slowly.

So, the Ukraine Facility Plan and agreements with the International Monetary Fund provide for the creation of a court that will hear cases involving central executive authorities instead of the liquidated DACK. The judges of such a court should be properly vetted for professional competence and integrity with the involvement of independent experts and “following similar selection procedures for anti-corruption judges.” The deadline for the establishment of this court under the Ukraine Facility, for example, is the third quarter of 2025. At the same time, the competition for positions of judges of this court should be completed by the end of the third quarter of this year. This means that there is virtually no time left.

Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers has been working on a draft law for a year, but almost no one has seen it. When the deadline for passing the draft law was almost over, draft law No. 12206 was submitted to Parliament. MPs from the Servant of the People faction introduced it, but it was actually the work of the Presidential Office. It was followed by an alternative draft law from the Cabinet of Ministers and another draft law authored by the head of the relevant committee, Maslov, which received the committee’s support.

The Parliament rejected all of them in December. In January, another draft law from the Cabinet of Ministers (No. 12368) appeared, which was presented personally in the session hall by Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Minister of Justice. It also failed, and the alternative draft law No. 12368-1, authored by Vlasenko, was voted in the first reading, which is the worst of all five versions, but it is on its basis that the final version of the draft law should now be built.

Olha Stefanishyna later complained more than once that she had “spent three days in parliament and had zero results.” She can be understood because international partners will ask her questions about implementing the Ukraine Facility.

Some MPs, on condition of anonymity, said that “they did not go deep into the details of the draft laws on courts but voted as agreed.” Can you guess right away which party’s MPs we are talking about here?

So why do the political authorities and the pro-government majority need Vlasenko’s draft law if Ukraine’s receipt of the next tranches of money depends on fulfilling the Memorandum with the IMF and the Ukraine Facility Plan? If it was necessary to vote for at least some version in the first reading, why did they not vote for the Cabinet of Ministers’ version?

Since Vlasenko’s version is obviously unsuitable, and Ukraine has committed to establishing a court similar to the HACC, the court should be created as a high specialised administrative court.

To verify the integrity of candidates, all four draft laws provide for establishing an Expert Council, three members of which should be appointed based on proposals from international partners and three based on proposals from the Council of Judges of Ukraine. This is, in fact, the eighth option of competition in the judicial system and another experiment.

It does not comply with Ukraine’s international obligations, according to which future judges should be vetted “following similar selection procedures for anti-corruption judges”, i.e., with the participation of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) per se, which is currently involved in the vetting of candidates to the HACC.

Yes, the political authorities have given some very strange explanations for why it is allegedly impossible to constantly demand that international partners delegate their representatives. However, when the international partners signed, for example, the Memorandum with the IMF, did they understand their obligations to delegate representatives to the PCIE for the purposes of the competition for HACC judges and for the purposes of establishing the new court? Until they hear a clear message that the three-for-three arrangement is okay, imposing on them something they did not sign up for looks like some kind of petty (or not so petty) fraud. A country that wants to become part of the EU and continue to receive international financial support should not play with marked cards.

If the commitments imply the PCIE’s involvement in selecting judges for the High Administrative Court (HAC), then it should be the PCIE.

The draft laws on the high administrative court expand the list of persons eligible to apply for the position of judge and establish an additional category: persons who have worked for at least seven years in category A and B civil service positions in governmental authorities whose powers extend over the entire territory of Ukraine.

It should be noted here that the 2016 amendmentsRegarding justice. to the Constitution of Ukraine and the reform of approaches to the selection of judges opened up opportunities for representatives of independent legal professionsLawyers, academics, etc. to participate in competitions to the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and high specialised courts.

This approach has been used to increase the independence of the judiciary, mitigate corruption risks, reduce political influence and break down power verticals.

If civil servants are now allowed to participate in the competition, this will significantly offset the achievements of the judicial reform of previous years, as government officers are not representatives of independent legal professions. On the contrary, such lawyers are used to working under strict governmental verticals and acting exclusively in accordance with the requirements of their superiors, which, if such persons are appointed to judicial positions, may negatively affect the independence of not only an individual judge but also the entire court and the judiciary as a whole.

In this case, it is simply necessary to appoint civil servants who are liked by the Presidential Office without any competition and complicated structures. After all, it is obvious that such rules are written with an understanding of what names will be submitted to the competition.

First, Ukraine should establish a High Administrative Court to hear cases involving central executive authorities as soon as possible, launch a competition for judges of this court and, in parallel, a competition for judges of the Kyiv City District Administrative Court, which will hear administrative casesAfter all, it is Kyiv residents who are currently deprived of proper access to justice. of Kyivans. It is important to clearly delineate the jurisdiction between the HAC, KCDAC and the Supreme Court. The real capacities of the HQCJ to conduct competitions should also be taken into account since each competition does not take place in a vacuum but in parallel with many other personnel procedures in the judiciary, of which we already have five.

Second, the PCIE should vet the integrity of future judges of the High Administrative Court, which will assist the HQCJ in this important matter, especially since its powers were extended for 18 months in the autumn of 2024. It is also important that the PCIE has veto power over dishonest candidates, which can only be overridden by joint votes of the HQCJ and the PCIE, with at least three votes coming from international experts.

Third, it is crucial to prevent the HAC from being declared unconstitutionalThrough the use of regular ad hoc procedures, which is essentially what the Expert Council is. in the future. Therefore, the requirements for judges, their formation, and other aspects should be in line with the overall framework of judicial reform, competitions, and so on.

And the last point for today. It is always very noticeable when the central political authorities try to sabotage the creation of an independent court. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening now.

The sooner the Presidential Office and the Parliament realise that Ukraine does not need a pocket court like the DACK (and that it will be impossible to create one), the sooner Ukraine will be able to put a fat plus point on its record in fulfilling not only the requirements of international partners but, above all, in creating a truly independent court that is actually needed by both the government and the opposition, but first and foremost, by Ukrainian society.

The meeting focused on how Ukraine, with the support of Germany and its EU partners, can promote the rule of law and safeguard fundamental values in a time of war. Issues such as electoral democracy, migration challenges, and the implementation of judicial reform were the main topics of discussion.

The discussion “Advancing judicial reform in Ukraine: modernisation and strengthening accountability” began with a report by ALI on the state of the rule of law in Ukraine. Karyna Aslanyan, Judicial Reform Project Lead at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, spoke about Ukraine’s progress in 2024, risks, challenges, and necessary steps in the context of the Shadow Report to Chapter 23 “Justice and Fundamental Rights” of the European Commission’s 2023 Report on Ukraine, prepared by ALI in coalition with NGOs.

The discussion brought together a wide range of leading experts to address one of the most pressing issues on Ukraine’s path towards integration with the EU. The discussion was moderated by Johannes Uhl, Implementation Manager, 3*E4U Project, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). He noted that the judiciary, and in particular judicial reform, is currently the cornerstone of this process, as Ukraine’s accession to the EU makes European law a full-fledged body of law to be applied.

The Ministry of Justice is coordinating the development of the Rule of Law Roadmap in Ukraine, the draft of which was submitted to the European side in December 2024, and the process of consultations with the European Commission is currently ongoing, said Liudmyla Suhak, Deputy Minister of Justice of Ukraine for European Integration. The main areas of focus in the justice sector are judicial and prosecutorial reform, including ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the constitutional judiciary, ensuring judicial accountability, improving the quality and efficiency of the judiciary, and strengthening the independence and institutional capacity of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

Polina LI, Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, Minister of Justice of Ukraine, emphasised that Ukraine should be responsible for the selection procedures for judicial bodies before EU accession — and should strengthen its own capacity rather than being dependent on international assistance in these processes. The challenges for the Ukrainian side associated with the transition period, when the mandates of the relevant selection commissions will expire, were particularly highlighted.

The main priorities of the current phase of judicial reform were highlighted by John Morin, Lead Legal Expert, 3*E4U Project, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Priority should be given to the implementation of the EU standard requirements for the judiciary’s independence and to the judiciary’s institutional architecture. He stressed that it is very important to see this as a shared responsibility, as the independence of the judiciary is not the responsibility of the judges, the politicians, or the society alone.

Angelika Nußberger, Vice-President of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Professor at the University of Cologne stressed the importance of increasing public trust in the judiciary as a key element of the country’s judicial model. According to the speaker, an equally important trend that requires a proactive approach is the problem of the “shortage of human resources.” The process of change is being significantly slowed down by the conditions and consequences of the war, which are leading to a constant exodus of qualified professionals. This phenomenon, according to the expert, hampers the sustainability and success of justice sector reforms.

Oleksii Melian, Deputy Chairman, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, noted that there is currently a personnel crisis in the rule of law in Ukraine and that there is a need for more than just judges. Therefore, the HQCJ selects honest and professional legal professionals as the personnel agency of the Ukrainian judiciary. An important aspect of the Commission’s work is an extraordinary procedure — an assessment of qualifications for the position to be filled.

Ruslan Sydorovych, a member of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, spoke about the risks associated with the current situation in the Ukrainian judiciary: a significant shortage of judges in various instances, the difficulty of holding competitions for new judges, and the need to complete competitions for appellate courts this year, despite all the procedural difficulties. He also underlined the need to work on the issue of public trust in the judiciary, in particular in the key bodies that are involved in the reform of this sector.

The conference was organised as part of the project Strengthening Ukraine’s EU Accession in the Rule of Law in cooperation with the civil network OPORA and with the support of GIZ Ukraine, Auswärtiges Amt and Institut für Europäische Politik.

In early December 2024, the necessary draft laws for the implementation of the Rome Statute were also adopted: No. 11538 on criminal liability for international crimesThe grounds and limits of criminal liability for international crimes, the list of crimes that are considered international, etc., and No. 11539 amending the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in connection with the adoption of the Law on Criminal Liability for International Crimes. In fact, as of 1 January 2025, Ukraine became a full member of the IIC, becoming the 125^th  state party to the Rome Statute.

The issue of ratification had been raised regularly at all levels of government with calls to reconsider Ukraine’s position and take the step that will finally bring it closer to civilised and developed states that recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC and adhere to international law norms. 

What is the Rome Statute? What does its ratification give Ukraine? Why has it taken so long to ratify it? We explain further. 

The Rome Statute is the international treaty that established the ICC. This statute is currently the key international legal document that defines four categories of international crimes: 1) war crimes, 2) crimes against humanity, 3) genocide, and 4) crimes of aggression. By defining these categories of crimes, the ICC is the only international judicial institution with jurisdiction to prosecute and qualify these crimes on the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 

The ICC operates on the principle of complementarity, i.e. the case is referred to the Court, and the ICC Prosecutor opens an investigation only in circumstances where the state is either objectively unable to carry out the investigation and justice or unwilling to do soRefuses to consider cases in court and bring criminals to justice.. Therefore, if crimes are properly investigated at the national level, the ICC will not initiate its own investigation and trial. For international crimes to be referred to the ICC, it is necessary to ratify the Rome Statute, granting the Court the necessary jurisdiction and authority. 

Ukraine signed the Rome Statute back in 2000, but as early as 2001, at the request of President Leonid Kuchma, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine considered the constitutionality of the ratification of the document and, referring to the preamble and Article 1 of the Constitution, ruled that the ratification of the Rome Statute was unconstitutional, as such a judicial body is not foreseen by the Constitution. 

Further real attempts to ratify the Rome Statute resumed only in 2014 after the start of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. However, even these steps resulted only in the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of declarations of recognition of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which granted the Court limited jurisdiction to investigate crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine. 

The next step was the adoption of amendments to the Constitution in 2016 when the wording of Article 124 of the Constitution was revised. Thus, in the new version, Article 124 provides for the possibility of Ukraine to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC under the conditions defined in the Rome Statute. However, even after that, the Rome Statute was not immediately ratified, as the new constitutional provision was to enter into force on 30 June 2019.

On 3 May 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law regulating the cooperation of Ukrainian competent authorities with the ICC. This was done to ensure that the Prosecutor could effectively investigate crimes committed since 2014 within the framework of the accepted applications for recognition of the ICC’s jurisdiction.

However, even during the full-scale war, the ratification of the Rome Statute was delayed, allegedly out of concerns that it might become a basis for holding Ukrainian citizens — Ukrainian military personnel — accountable for committing war crimes in the context of the war with Russia. The final ratification took place on 21 August 2024. 

The obvious advantages of ratifying the Rome Statute include recognition of the ICC’s jurisdiction with the reservation in Article 124 of the Rome Statute, discussed further in this article, full recognition of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which will allow for a full investigation of international crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine, fulfilment of the requirements of the Association Agreement with the EU, and a significant enhancement of Ukraine’s image in the international arena as a state that respects and adheres to international law. 

Less obvious advantages include: 1) Ukraine gaining the status of a full member of the ICC with all the rights and obligations provided for by the Rome Statute, 2) the right to participate in the work of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 3) the possibility to submit candidates for the election of judges and prosecutors of the ICC, 4) access to the special trust fund of the Court established to allocate funds for the benefit of victims. 

In addition, ratification is an important step towards shaping the legal consciousness of Ukrainians and setting clear priorities and guidelines aimed at complying with international law, following the example of EU member states, conducting quality investigations of international crimes, holding criminals accountable, and achieving justice, as well as preventing the commission of similar crimes in the future.

It should be noted that despite the ratification of the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression remains outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. This situation is caused by the fact that, according to the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression only if the attacking state (aggressor state) ratifies the Statute or if the UN Security Council refers the situation to the ICC. Accordingly, to investigate the crime of aggression, Ukraine will need to continue working towards the creation of a special international tribunal that will have the necessary jurisdiction. 

The main myth about the Rome Statute was that, if ratified, the Ukrainian military would be held accountable for war crimes committed during the Ukrainian-Russian war. But does this hold true? 

Firstly, given the complementary nature of the ICC, the Court would not investigate cases against the Ukrainian military if these cases were properly investigated at the national level. At the same time, such an investigation is a necessary, albeit painful, as Ukraine must investigate and recognise not only crimes committed by Russia but also crimes committed by the Ukrainian military. Otherwise, appeals to international humanitarian law and the need to adhere to general international law, as well as the principle of a rule-of-law democratic state, would be completely unfounded and one-sided. For justice to be established and the consequences of the war to be overcome, it is necessary to properly investigate crimes and demonstrate the readiness of the state to bear responsibility for violations of international law, in contrast to the aggressor state. 

Secondly, Ukraine has ratified the Rome Statute with a declaration under Article 124 of the Statute, which means that the ICC will not have jurisdiction under the war crimes category over Ukrainian citizens for 7 years after ratification. Therefore, Ukraine has seven years to properly investigate the crimes at the national level, which will help to avoid the need to refer cases to the ICC. 

In the context of the declaration under Article 124 of the Rome Statute, it should be understood that over the previous 10 years of Ukraine’s cooperation with the ICC, the Court has not indicated the need to bring the Ukrainian military to justice for war crimes.

The next step is to bring national legislation in line with the Rome Statute and to expect a huge amount of work for the Ukrainian law enforcement system, particularly the prosecutor’s office, as the ratification of the Statute may lead to reclassification and review of those cases that can now be qualified under different articles. 

A positive conclusion is that the ratification of the Rome Statute is clearly a progressive and long overdue step by Ukraine, which aligns with its declared goals and principles of development towards European integration.

Bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility is a crucial mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of the judiciary. In autumn 2023, after more than a two-year break, the Verkhovna Rada reinstated the High Council of Justice’s (HCJ) authority to consider disciplinary cases against judges.

The current composition of the HCJ was established between 2022 and 2024 following a shift in the approach to selecting its members: all candidates are vetted by the Ethics Council, which consists of six members, three of whom are Ukrainian judges and three are international experts who have a casting vote in case of a tie. These changes are integral to the judicial reform.

Any person has the right to file a disciplinary complaint. Citizens may exercise this right personally or through an advocate, legal entities – through an advocate, public authorities and local self-government bodies – through their managers or representatives.

According to the HCJ press service, since 1 November 2023, when the HCJ resumed the automatic distribution of accumulated complaints among its members, the Council distributed 20,800 complaints by 31 October 2024. Of these, 14,400 complaints were carried over from the previous HCJ, having been received from 5 August 2021 till 31 December 2023, while 6,796 complaints were received during the first ten months of 2024.

The new HCJ considered 10,466 complaints and brought 132 judges to disciplinary responsibility. Proceedings against 27 of them resulted in dismissal. A brief analysis of refusals to open disciplinary cases against judges (or refusals to bring a judge to justice) shows that most complaints against judges are due to the complainant’s disagreement with a court decision. While disciplinary liability of a judge serves a mechanism to address dishonest or unethical behaviour, whether in or outside the courtroom, as well as neglect of their judicial duties.

Thus, the HCJ dismisses judges for treason, corruption, drunken driving, fleeing abroad, etc.

For example, Volodymyr Kupin, a judge of the Balakliia District Court of Kharkiv Region, Nataliia Sharko, a judge of the Genichesk District Court of Kherson Region, and Iryna Ukhaniova, the Head of the Vovchansk District Court of Kharkiv Region, are suspected of collaborating with the Russians.

Ms Sharko, in particular, continued working after the occupation in the so-called ‘Genichesk District Court of Kherson Region’ and later assumed the role of ‘First Deputy Head of the Genichesk Military and Civil Administration of Kherson Region’. According to law enforcement agencies, Ms Ukhaniova persuaded judges to collaborate with the occupation authorities, and encouraged court staff to obtain Russian passports.

Another ‘position’ in the occupation authorities was offered to Volodymyr Kupin, the Head of the Balakliia District Court of Kharkiv Region. According to the HCJ’s decision on his dismissal, after the occupation, he relocated from Balakliia to Kupiansk and became the ‘acting deputy head of the department – head of the legal support department of the temporary civil administration of Kharkiv region’.

The only person detained in government-controlled territory of Ukraine and personally charged with treason was Larysa Bohomolova, a judge of the Berdiansk City District Court of Zaporizhzhia Region. After relocating to government-controlled territory, she was seconded to the Poltava District Court of Poltava Region, where she was immediately appointed head by a decision of the judges’ meeting.

On 10 May 2023, the Security Service of Ukraine released audio recordings of conversations between Ms Bohomolova and a representative of the Russian FSB, which revealed that she had ‘leaked’ the information to the enemy about the movement of three Azov fighters from Mariupol to the Mangush area, and had prepared a list of Berdiansk judges as ‘ardent opponents of all this’.

The details of her case are closed. Her explanations were neither broadcast during the HCJ meeting nor included in the decisions. However, the HCJ’s decision to dismiss her states that the disciplinary chamber was critical of the explanations provided by Bohomolova, as after leaving for the government-controlled territory, she did not report to the relevant law enforcement agencies and the HCJ about the alleged recruitment by the Russian FSB, interference in her activities, influence or other illegal actions.

Some of the dismissed judges remained in the occupied territories or subsequently moved to Russia, but did not apply for resignation and have either ceased communication or lost contact entirely.

For example, Kyrylo Soloviov, a judge of the Economic Court of Kherson Region, initially justified his stay in the occupied territory as a threat to his life if he attempted to leave, but even after the de-occupation of the region and his secondment to the Economic Court of Odesa Region, he failed to assume his duties. Therefore, the HCJ decided that in this way he refused to administer justice in the name of Ukraine, thereby undermining the authority of the judiciary.

Vitalii Koliadov, a judge of the Starobilsk District Court of Luhansk Region, claimed that he had attempted to leave Luhansk region five times ‘in the required direction’. All attempts were unsuccessful because active hostilities were ongoing on the contact line, posing a direct threat to his life and health. Subsequently, he ceased communication. At the same time, according to the State Border Guard Service, from 2018 to 2020, he visited the occupied territory of Luhansk region 11 times, staying there for a total of 132 days, and therefore probably has strong social ties there.

Judge Serhii Varniak of the Kherson District Administrative Court was seconded to the Odesa District Administrative Court after the occupation of the region, but never took up his duties there. He explained that he could not take his sick mother out of the occupied territory. However, it was later revealed that his mother had already passed away by the time of the decision to dismiss him, he had a taxpayer identification number as a Russian citizen, and  had filed a lawsuit in Crimea seeking a recalculation of his pension under Russian law, based on his experience as a Ukrainian judge.

Another group of dismissed judges comprises those suspected or accused of corruption offences. This includes Vsevolod Kniazev, a judge and former Head of the Supreme Court, Viacheslav Dziubin, a judge of the Kyiv Court of Appeal (three other judges of this court – Yurii Slyva, Viktor Hlynianyi, and Ihor Palenyk – are awaiting consideration of their disciplinary cases); Volodymyr Honchar, a judge of the Kropyvnytskyi Court of Appeal, Volodymyr Serdynskyi, a judge of the Brovary City District Court of Kyiv Region, and Serhii Galionkin, the Head of the Poltava Court of Appeal.

According to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, in particular, Galionkin gathered advocates and judges of Poltava to coordinate with them the resolution of cases.

During the investigation of the corruption crime against Serdynskyi, it was revealed that in March 2023, he was on a business trip to Vienna for 18 days, allegedly to participate in a conference on assistance to displaced persons, families with children and orphans from Ukraine. However, during this time, he travelled with his common-law wife on a cruise ship to the island of Martinique.

At the end of May 2023, a judge Oleksii Tandyr of the Makariv District Court of Kyiv Region was returning home to the capital from work at around midnight, when he ran over National Guard officer Vadym Bondarenko, who was installing fencing blocks and a road sign at a checkpoint as the curfew was starting. The judge was found to have exceeded the speed limit and also refused to take a breathalyser test. The HCJ confirmed that he had committed a significant disciplinary offence and dismissed him.

The HCJ dismissed Alla Demydovska, a judge of Solomianskyi District Court of Kyiv, who was dismissed by the Verkhovna Rada in January 2016 but was reinstated due to procedural violations during the parliamentary consideration of her case.

During the Revolution of Dignity, the judge arrested activist Vladyslav Tsilytskyi on charges of rioting and disobedience to police. Despite he was severely beaten during the hearing, Tsilytskyi was brought to court directly from an ambulance. He was not provided with medical care.

Ms Demydovska and her advocate referred to the fact that more than ten years had passed since the disciplinary offence was committed, while disciplinary action against a judge may only be applied within three years of the date of the offence. Furthermore, they claimed that her dismissal would once again violate the principle of the prohibition of double jeopardy for the same act.

Instead, the HCJ noted in its decision that by considering this issue it was not attempting to hold the judge accountable for the second time, but was resuming the procedure for deciding on her dismissal based on the decision of the High Council of Justice of 3 December 2015. Eventually, the HCJ dismissed the judge in accordance with paragraph 3 of Part 6 of Article 126 of the Constitution of Ukraine (commission of a disciplinary offence).

The HCJ also dismissed Olena Volkova, a judge of the Yuzhnoukrainsk City Court of Mykolaiv Region, who, according to the prosecutor’s office, returned indictments to the prosecution in eight court cases without substantiation, allowed two cases to be delayed, violated the rules of judicial ethics during the consideration of four criminal proceedings by allowing incorrect statements against the public prosecutor, etc.

Svitlana Kozina, a judge of the Rzhyshchiv City Court of Kyiv Region, was complained about by the executive committee of the Rzhyshchiv City Council of Kyiv Region, and later the Second Disciplinary Chamber found numerous violations committed by her in 38 of her decisions.

When considering the complaint, the HCJ concluded that the judge had repeatedly established the facts of people’s birth on the territory of Ukraine on the basis of false documents or their absence. The Council believes that the judge was aware that her court decisions would be used to obtain citizenship status, and therefore found a gross disciplinary violation and dismissed her.

Overall, over the course of the year, the HCJ brought 132 judges to disciplinary responsibility, dismissing 27 of them. Certainly, to stabilise the situation with disciplinary complaints that have accumulated in recent years, the HCJ will need to improve not only the quality of its reviews, but also their speed.