Law remains one of the most popular study programmes among applicants. The trend towards massive enrolment of law students (even despite the war, which has caused a noticeable outflow of students) continued in 2024. Specifically, during the 2024 admission campaign, applicants submitted more than 40,000 applications for the “Law” specialty. But does such a huge popularity of legal education necessarily correlate with its quality? 

The task of the university is not only to provide law students with formal education in the form of a thorough knowledge of legal texts. Often, people form the impression, based on American cinema, that lawyers memorize and can quote any article of the law or regulation. However, firstly, such “inflated” standards do not always correspond to reality (and this is normal, because a lawyer is not a robot programmed to memorise legal texts). Secondly, it is important not only to know the law, but also to understand it correctly to apply it properly in practice. While this “understanding” is sometimes not so easy. One of the reasons for this is that understanding the essence of law is based on the worldview of a lawyer, which is shaped over time by various factors. Studying at a higher education institution is only one component of this process. Therefore, the key role of legal education is to lay the “right” foundation for such an understanding, based on democratic values.

There are three key types of legal understandingThat is, understanding the essence of law in legal theory:

1. The natural law type, characterised by the principle of the rule of law and the recognition of the values of human rights, equality, freedom, and justice. 
2. The positivist type, which is based on the notion that any legal activity (although not only by lawyers) must strictly adhere to the requirements of the law.
3. The sociological type, according to which finding the right solution requires consideration of society’s needs in each specific case.

Ideally, students should be focused on ensuring that any decision they make embodies the idea of justice. If the situation requires, they should have the courage to deviate from the provisions of an unjust law (for example, as the judge did in a 2017 case when, as a punishment for the illegal sale of a pack of cigarettes, the court sentenced an elderly woman to a fine 100 times (!) a fine 100 times (!) smallerInstead of UAH 17,000, she received only UAH 170. The judge’s decision was based on the fact that the woman received a local pension of UAH 1,500, so she would have had to save up for years to pay the full amount of the fine. than stipulated by law). But do universities truly succeed in fulfilling their role of training specialists with such an understanding of the essence of legal phenomena?

To assess whether modern legal education really prepares future lawyers to face the challenges awaiting them in legal practice, ALI conducted a study on the role of universities in shaping students’ legal understanding. The results demonstrated that students do not always manage to make a fair decision, that go beyond “blind” adherence to the “letter” of the law. However, this does not mean that students reject the value of the rule of law. In fact, students have a fairly good understanding of how human rights should be ensured and protected (i.e., the ideas of natural law). However, unfortunately, the thoroughness of this knowledge is only manifested at the level of reproducing theoretical material. In practice, law students tend to act quite differently. The study led to an interesting conclusion that, when students reject the idea of the rule of law in real life, they do not necessarily take the side of strict compliance with the law, i.e. positivism, as might be expected. Instead, their decisions are primarily influenced by the specific circumstances of the case. This indicates that students prioritize the sociological concept in their approach to legal application.

Thus, the study highlighted the “gap” between students’ theoretical knowledge and their practical legal skills. This “gap” cannot be bridged during four years of undergraduate study. On the contrary, over time, the number of students who, despite their formal commitment to the unconditional protection of human rights at the level of theoretical knowledge, actually lean towards strict adherence to legal norms increases. This trend indicates that higher education institutions are “not doing enough” in terms of preparing students for the challenges they will face in the future legal practice. This refers to cases when, in difficult situations, a lawyer must critically assess the provisions of legal acts for their compliance with the rule of law and sometimes deviate from such norms in the pursuit of justice. As a result, the “overly theoretical” focus of legal education creates risks that, for some lawyers, upholding the principles of rule of law, values of equality and justice will become only a formal requirement, one that is not consistently applied when resolving practical situations.

In reality, four-year students who will graduate from universities in just a few months and start their practical work as lawyers, still have not learned how to apply their acquired knowledge in practice. This is hardly the level of preparation these students expected to receive when they enrolled in law school four years ago. Therefore, it turns out that the stated expectations regarding the quality of legal education have not been met. Thus, all this hype around legal education does not necessarily indicate the high quality of legal training (although, of course, the level of quality of the educational process varies depending on the university). 

To identify and address the shortcomings of the educational process, it is worth listening to the students themselves. As part of a survey conducted during the study, students generally rated the quality of legal education in Ukraine as “average”. 

Among the key “problematic” aspects of the educational process that require optimisation, students highlighted the following:

• In the educational process, the primary focus is on the studying theoretical concepts, so there is a demand for developing the skills to apply the acquired knowledge in practice.
• Lack of innovative approaches and formalism in teaching.
• The inclusion of mandatory disciplines in the curriculum that do not meet the interests of students.
• Lack of real opportunity to choose elective subjects.
• Difficulties caused by the remote learning format.

Of course, these issues affect different educational institutions to varying degrees – some face a greater combination of these problems, why other experience fewer. However, the question of how to improve the quality of legal education remains relevant for the entire system of higher education in Ukraine. 

To correct the identified shortcomings, students offer their perspective on solving the outlined problems. In their opinion, the way to improve the quality of the educational process should be based on the following steps:

1. Increase the number of lecture sessions across all years of study, starting from the first year, involving practicing lawyers.
2. Increase the number of lecturers with practical experience in the field of law.
3. Introduce specific training sessions in courts and law firms for students starting from the first year of study.

The idea that more emphasis should be placed on the practical aspect of teaching legal disciplines is also widely supported by government agencies, international institutions and the public sector. Therefore, to improve the quality of legal education and, consequently, the training of legal professionals, universities should start working on reorienting their approaches to teaching law in a more practical direction.   

Relevance of the report. In recent years, Law has been one of the most popular study programmes among applicants. In particular, during the 2024 admission campaign, more than 40,000 applications were submitted for this speciality. The degree of professionalism of a lawyer, which is based primarily on his or her understanding of the law, directly affects the quality of professional assistance provided and the ability to resolve complex legal cases, and thus the protection of inherent and inalienable human rights.

The research conducted by ALI has been primarily focused on the following area: how students perceive the law, what place law and legal education occupy in their lives, and what legal instruments they tend to use to solve practical situations. These aspects were assessed in the context of the role of legal education in this process.

• Is there a difference in the perception of law among first- and fourth-year students majoring in “081-Law”?
• What factors correlate with a certain type of legal understanding?
• Does the type of legal understanding influence the choice of a future legal profession?

The process of collecting the necessary information and processing it consisted of three stages, including a questionnaire survey of first- and fourth-year students of the speciality “081-Law”. The first and fourth year students of the following educational institutions took part in the questionnaire survey:

1. National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv);
2. Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv);
3. Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University (Kharkiv);
4. V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv);
5. National University of Ostroh Academy (Ostroh); 
6. I. I. Mechnikov Odesa National University (Odesa).

In the course of the analysis, ALI identified a number of processes that need to be the subject of systematic development:

• the study has shown that the role of higher education institutions in shaping the types of legal understanding is mainly traced only at the level of mastering theoretical material;
• the curriculum is not focused on developing the practical skills necessary for the profession;
• not all students recognise the importance of key professional values that have a direct impact on the formation of the type of legal understanding.

Read more about legal understanding and recommendations to address relevant challenges in this area in the new ALI report.

Last week, the European Commission adopted the annual Enlargement Package, which provides a detailed assessment of Ukraine’s current state and progress on its way to the EU. The assessments were accompanied by recommendations for priority reforms.

In the Ukraine Report, the European Commission noted that “despite the continuation of Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience and commitment to its European path.”

Brussels emphasises that “following the first Intergovernmental Conference in June 2024, the screening of the acquis is progressing smoothly. If Ukraine fulfils all the conditions, the Commission looks forward to opening negotiations on the clusters, starting with the Fundamentals, as early as possible in 2025.”

One of the key pillars of the Fundamentals cluster is the justice sector, which includes the EC’s screening of the Ukrainian judiciary, public prosecution service, bar, enforcement system and legal education. What does the European Commission recommend for Ukraine?

The first and one of the main recommendations of the EC is to develop and adopt a new medium-term strategic document for the justice system, which should cover optimisation of the court network, the judicial system and court management, strengthening of the Supreme Court and improvement of the procedure for selecting its judges, updating procedural codes, enforcement of court decisions, alternative dispute resolution, digitalisation, as well as reform of the bar, legal education and judicial training.

The Presidential Office is currently working on this document. Last week, Iryna Mudra, sectoral Deputy Head of the Presidential Office, spoke at the event “Ukraine’s path to the EU: key findings from the Shadow Report on Chapter 23 “Justice and Fundamental Rights” presented the key provisions of the draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice for 2025–2029.

In addition to adopting the Strategy, Mudra promises to develop an Action Plan with specific deadlines, responsible bodies, and KPIs. The main thing here is that the deadlines should be realistic and take into account the institutional capacity and the number of tasks already undertaken by the key bodies responsible for judicial reform, namely the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges.

It is also important that reforms in key areas are proposed with respect to the independence of the judiciary and the CCU and accepted by key stakeholders. In this case, the chances of reform success increase significantly.

In 2019, Ukraine already had a negative experience of judicial and prosecutorial “reforms” by Ruslan Riaboshapka. Our country cannot overcome the negative consequences of this “reform” even five years later.

A significant number of the EC’s recommendations concern the institutional capacity of the HCJ, the HQCJ, and the Public Integrity Council.

For example, the report states that the President (the competition is ongoing) and the congress of lawyers (the competition has not been announced for three years) should fill four vacancies in the High Council of Justice and one vacancy in the HQCJ (the winner of the competition will be announced by the end of the year).

Equally important for the European Commission is the launch of the HCJ Service of Disciplinary Inspectors. Interviews with candidates who have successfully passed the competition will commence at the HCJ already next week.

The EC Report also refers to increasing the institutional capacity of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) by appointing 25 new judges: 15 for the first instance and 10 for the appellate court.

Next week, candidates for HACC judges will start taking exams. On 6 November, the President signed a law extending the powers of the Public Council of International Experts, which, together with the HQCJ, will check the integrity of candidates for this court for 18 months.

The qualification assessment of judges, competitions to the courts of appeal and the aforementioned competition to the HACC have been going on for more than a year. Unfortunately, the results are rather modest. Over the year, about 170 judges completed the qualification assessment. This is only 10% of those who had to pass it as of the beginning of the resumption of this procedure.

However, notwithstanding the slow pace of the assessment, the EC notes that cooperation between the HQCJ and the PIC “is generally positive, despite some differences in the assessment of integrity.”

This is a good sign for Ukraine, as, after four years of suspension, it has finally made at least some progress in cleansing the judiciary.

At the same time, the European Commission notes that “the HQCJ should systematically ensure transparency and proper reasoning in its decision-making, and the HQCJ and the PIC should further improve cooperation.” There are certain problems with this, as there is currently an ongoing discussion between the Parliament, the HQCJ and the PIC regarding the latter’s access to judicial files.

This situation also has a historical component. NABU and the NACP provided the previous HQCJ and PIC with analytical information on judges in a way not prescribed by law.

This was effective, but it stopped at the beginning of this year due to the overload of these bodies with their own functions.

At the time, the HQCJ was not ready to collect and process such data on its own (and, accordingly, provide it to the PIC). Now, the situation has improved, but the system still fails from time to time. This has had a negative impact on the quality and pace of judge assessment until at least 2024. If the situation is not comprehensively corrected, it will also affect the pace of competition procedures, especially for candidates to courts of appeal.

The European Commission understands the problem, so it has made an interesting recommendation to solve it: “The NABU and NACP should increase analytical support to the HQCJ, and the latter should also develop its own capacities.”

In the Shadow Report on Chapter 23, “Justice and Fundamental Rights,” NGOs proposed an option for the HQCJ to develop its “own capacities” – to create a separate analytical unit within the HQCJ that would collect and process information on judges and judicial candidates from open and closed state registers for the purpose of competitions and qualification assessment for the HQCJ and the PIC. This means that analytical reports previously prepared by the NABU and NACP will be produced by the HQCJ itself.

This will require certain legislative changes, but the option proposed by the EC also requires them. Therefore, in the near future, we will have a broad expert and political discussion not only about the PIC’s access to judicial files but also about who should fill them in and how.

The European Commission also recommends “strengthening the capacity and effectiveness of the PIC, in particular by providing support staff and improving access to files.” In fact, the presence of a strong analytical unit within the HQCJ, which will provide PIC members with the same amount of analytical data as HQCJ members, will solve capacity issues for both bodies and even for the HCJ, which needs information from judicial and candidate files to perform its functions.

The EC also drew attention to the Supreme Court’s decision in Judge Usatyi’s case, in which the Grand Chamber deviated from its previous practice of qualification assessment, which threatened to disrupt it in relation to 180 judges. The author of this decision is Grand Chamber Judge Oleh Kryvenda. ZN.UA warned in its publications that he could not be elected as a judge of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court (GC SC) due to his questionable integrity. However, the Administrative Court of Cassation and its Chair, Mykhailo Smokovych, who is now running for election as a Constitutional Court judge, did not pay attention to Kryvenda’s low integrity.

As a result, Ukraine received far from a diplomatic warning from the EC for this decision, and the GC SC received another split among judges because, judging by the number of dissenting opinions, the decision in the Usatyi’s case was made with a minimal advantage, which gives a chance for common sense to prevail in other similar cases.

The integrity of judges of the Supreme Court and higher courts is also in Brussels’ sights. The EC report states that “to enhance the judiciary’s accountability and public trust in it, Ukraine should adopt legislation revising the system of judges’ declarations of integrity.”

“An upgraded system should include, for judges of the highest courts, a temporary but meaningful verification procedure that involves independent experts” – this is, in fact, a clear requirement of the European Commission, for which the judges of the Supreme Court and higher courts should thank not only Vsevolod Kniazev, who has already been dismissed from the Supreme Court for corruption but also those judges of the GC SC and especially judge Kryvenda who voted for the decision in the case of Usatyi.

The European Commission explicitly states that “corruption risks in the Supreme Court still need to be adequately addressed, in particular through the use of improved integrity declarations and verifications by the HQCJ, as well as asset declaration checks and lifestyle monitoring by the NACP, and an improved selection of Supreme Court Judges on the basis of the new legislative framework and unified criteria for evaluating the integrity of judges, approved by the HCJ.”

So, on the obvious side, Brussels is proposing stricter requirements for the integrity checks of judges of the Supreme Court and higher courts. What is not obvious is that it is unclear how they should differ.

Following the abolition of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) in 2022, cases against central authorities (except for the president and parliament) are temporarily heard by the Kyiv District Administrative Court. The European Commission understands that this cannot continue and strongly recommends that a new court be created for this purpose “with the involvement of independent experts and a credible integrity and professionalism check of candidates.” They also strongly recommend completing the qualification evaluation of former DACK judges.

This year, the European Commission is also focusing on judicial training. The EC officials are good diplomats, and when they insist on the need for institutional reforms at the National School of Judges “to strengthen managerial and operational capacities” and “modernise training curricula and teaching methods”, this can only mean one thing: Ukraine needs a deep reform of the judicial education system.

In the Shadow Report, the civil society sector also drew attention to the low-quality and outdated education methods currently provided by the NSJU.

Therefore, in the short run, Ukraine will need to decide whether to rebuild the structure of the National School of Judges and change its management (which has not changed since the Yanukovych – Portnov era) or even eliminate it and build a modern Training Centre almost from scratch. This is not about changing the signboard but about changing approaches to managing the School and training judges. For this purpose, comprehensive functional, HR and financial audits of the NSJU should be conducted, and decisions should be made based on their results.

The report contains many other recommendations, such as reforming the bar, ensuring the uniformity of judicial practice, strengthening prosecutorial self-government, and improving the enforcement of court decisions.

Ukraine will receive the next report on its progress in a year’s time.

Working groups are currently working on the Fundamentals cluster to develop roadmaps for each of the cluster’s areas. The European Union will measure Ukraine according to them.

As stated in this year’s EC report, “democracy, the rule of law and fundamental values will continue to be the cornerstones of the EU’s Enlargement Policy. EU membership remains a strategic choice.”

The last sentence of this quote may well become a national idea for the next five years because the path to the EU and the speed of its passage depend on our own choices and shared responsibility.

On 14 April 2022, Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland Tomasz Grodzki, for the first time as a representative of the international community, stated:

This statement was the first time a foreign official used the term “crime of genocide” to describe the nature of Russia’s crimes against Ukraine. Tomasz Grodzki’s words not only marked the beginning of a trend of states recognising the genocidal nature of the Russian invasion but also highlighted the politicisation of the crime of genocide as a special phenomenon in world politics.

According to international lawArticle 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courtу, four categories of international crimes are currently enshrined: 

• The crime of genocide that is construed as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.”
• Crimes against humanity, meaning “any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”
• War crimes, which are violations of international humanitarian law, i.e., violations of the rules and laws of war. As of May 2024, more than 133,000 war crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine have been documented in Ukraine, and this figure is constantly growing.
• The crime of aggression, which is defined as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by a person […] of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations […].”

In its assessments, the international community tends to refer to two categories of crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine: 1) war crimes; 2) crimes against humanity.

The peculiarity of all four categories is that they are independent, autonomous and, most importantly, equal. International crimes (four categories mentioned above) do not have an internal hierarchy that would make a particular category more important than another. From a legal standpoint, all categories are equal as they relate to different types of crimes and acts. In the context of the Ukrainian case, it is important to consider all of these categories with equal vigilance, with particular attention being paid to the qualification of Russia’s crimes as genocide.

First, it concerns the competence of the global judicial architecture. Who has the right to consider and address issues related to massive violations of international law?

The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over all four categories of crimes. In the context of Ukraine’s case, the Court can consider three categories: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. However, there are two caveats:

• The crime of aggression does not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC (in the case of Ukraine, due to the history of the ratification of the Rome Statute), so this issue is being dealt with by an expert group that is initiating the creation of a special international tribunal to consider the crime of aggression.
• Out of 32 cases pending before the ICC, only one has been charged with the crime of genocide. However, this case is at the pre-trial stage (Sudan), which is why there is a risk that the ICC’s examination will not provide the desired results for Ukraine.

As early as 5 April 2022, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union criticised the current criminal legislation of Ukraine, noting that “war crimes are so poorly formulated that it is almost impossible to apply this qualification in practice.” Sometimes the lack of professional practices and sometimes irrelevant legislative formulations inherited from the traditions of Soviet law perception hinder not only the initial qualification of crimes but, most importantly, their further investigation and the nature of the sentence.

This creates significant challenges, as Russia’s crimes may remain outside the scope of judicial proceedings.

The third explanation is the challenges associated with the use of the term “genocide” itself. In the socio-political discourse, there is a belief that the concept of genocide is a serious violation of international law and applies only to the Holocaust, as all modern cases of the crime do not reach the same scale and, accordingly, the number of victims. However, what is the quantitative indicator – does the number of victims have to reach one million for the international community to define this crime as genocide? The question is rather rhetorical.

An equally important challenge is the politicisation of the problem. Leading states in the international arena do not dare to publicly discuss the genocidal nature of the Russian attack because they have their own interests and often close economic and political ties with Russia. This kind of fear limits their political will and the unity of the international community, which, following the domino principle, demonstrates a certain passivity due to the lack of clear steps by influential states.

From the very beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine immediately reacted to the events and adopted a statement on the crime of genocide committed by Russia against Ukraine. Thus, the main legislative body, on behalf of the Ukrainian people, recognised Russia’s actions as genocidal.

The crime of genocide is the only category of international crimes that indicates the aggressor state’s special intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. In Ukraine’s testimony, this is a key point, as the qualification of Russia’s crimes against the Ukrainian people as a crime of genocide will illustrate that the aggressor state’s violations of international law are due to its main goal, which is to destroy Ukrainians.

A number of legal instruments can be used to understand how the crime of genocide is interpreted and qualified in practice. In this context, we appeal to the experience of the ICTR and the ICTY.

The practice of the ICTR and the ICTY shows how the subjective category of “intent” can be interpreted to prove that the actions of the Russian Federation are genocidal in nature. For example, the ICTY’s evidentiary practice offers a list of circumstantial grounds that simplify the proof of the criminal’s special intent. One of these grounds can be considered the fact of the intentional and systematic destruction of persons because they are part of a particular group, while the destruction of members of other groups is excluded. In this context, there is evidence that Russian soldiers and armed groups have killed and tortured civilians precisely because they belong to the Ukrainian national group, for their bold self-identification and for using the Ukrainian language.

However, the problem is not the lack of evidence but rather the absence of effective tools that would have a real ability to monitor, classify and recognise the actions of the Russian Federation as genocidal already today.

So what are the alternatives? Should we convene a special tribunal for Russia’s crimes, following the example of the ICTR and the ICTY? How can we ensure real guarantees that the crime of genocide does not go unpunished?

During the event, the heads of judicial and anti-corruption bodies shared their vision of the current state and next steps in Ukraine’s integration into the EU in terms of justice, fighting corruption and ensuring fundamental rights, and discussed it together with representatives of the civil sector and international partners.

Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine – Minister of Justice of Ukraine, stressed that cooperation with civil society was the basis of reforms bringing Ukraine closer to EU membership.

For her part, Katarina Mathernova, Ambassador of the European Union to Ukraine, noted the uniqueness of discussions on Chapter 23’s fundamental issues in the context of Ukraine’s existential war. Ms Mathernova thanked the study’s authors and the organisations that had performed extensive work on drawing up this Report and stressed its role in Ukraine’s European integration process.

Svitlana Matviienko, Executive Director at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, noted that the ALI and its Coalition partners had done everything to ensure that the bilateral meetings were successful and that everyone had analytical and objective information collected with the involvement of a wide range of experts.

The discussion under the Justice pillar focused on the Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Judiciary, capacity building of key judicial institutions, and cooperation between civil society organisations and governmental authorities to successfully implement the EU integration roadmap. The discussion panel was moderated by Karina Aslanian, Head of the Rule of Law at ALI, and Rasim Babanly, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Court.

The speakers of this panel were Stanislav Kravchenko, President of the Supreme Court; Dmytro Lukianov, Deputy Chair of the High Council of Justice; Andrii Pasichnyk, Chair of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine; Viktor Horodovenko, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine; Iryna Mudra, Deputy Head of the Presidential Office; and Viktoriia Litvinova, Deputy Prosecutor General.

Rasim Babanly spoke about the September EU-Ukraine bilateral session, which was dedicated to negotiating Chapter 23 in Brussels as part of the screening of Ukrainian legislation for compliance with EU legal norms.

Iryna Mudra emphasised the importance of cooperation between civil society and authorities in moving towards a common goal – the European future of Ukraine. She also highlighted the key points of the draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice, which was developed based on an analysis of the current state of the judiciary and the justice system as a whole. Iryna Mudra also noted that the Strategy contained measures to address many of the issues highlighted in the Shadow Report.

Stanislav Kravchenko spoke about the readiness of Ukrainian judicial practice to harmonise with European legislation and practice, the role of the Supreme Court in this, and generally about the stage at which Ukraine is in this process.

Dmytro Lukianov shared his experience in the EU-Ukraine negotiation process and spoke about further risks faced by the High Council of Justice in its work.

Andrii Pasichnyk spoke about the results of the selection procedure carried out by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine to solve the judiciary’s staffing problems and the progress made in fulfilling international obligations in the process of European integration.

Viktor Horodovenko shared his vision of the role of the Constitutional Court in the process of European integration. In particular, he spoke about the challenges related to the Court’s institutional capacity in the context of a full-scale invasion.

Viktoriia Litvinova highlighted the progress and challenges of the current stage of reforming the public prosecution service and the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of European integration. In particular, she emphasised the important role of sustainable transformation of the law enforcement sector and prosecution authorities in bringing Ukraine closer to full EU membership.

Yevhen Krapyvin, an expert of the Tomorrow’s Lawyer NGO, shared his vision of prosecution reform. Daria Pysarenko, Executive Director at Tomorrow’s Lawyer NGO, also spoke about the need for systemic reform of the bar.

In addition, during the thematic panel, a Q&A session was held with the participants of the event, namely representatives of organisations from the Coalition of NGOs that drew up the Shadow Report, the expert community and representatives of relevant judicial institutions. The questions covered the following aspects:

• Development and support of prosecutorial self-government;
• Accountability of the bar and bar self-government bodies to the lawyers themselves and to the public;
• Institutional capacity of the judiciary, in particular, the functioning of advisory bodies – the Ethics Council and the Selection Commission for Selecting Members of the HQCJ;
• News on the Unified Judicial Information and Telecommunication System (UJITS).

For reference. The Shadow Report prepared by experts from relevant NGOs led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives includes the following sections:

• Judicial reform (Agency for Legislative Initiatives);
• Combating corruption (Transparency International Ukraine);
• Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms (ZMINA Human Rights Centre);
• Reform of the public prosecution service (Tomorrow’s Lawyer);
• Reform of the bar (Tomorrow’s Lawyer);
• Legal education reform (Ukrainian Bar Association).

The Shadow Report was monitored, analysed and prepared in February – August 2024.

The report has been prepared with the financial support of the European Union within the EU-funded Project Pravo-Justice. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and other NGOs and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

On 17–19 September, a bilateral EU-Ukraine session will be held in Brussels as part of the screening of Ukrainian legislation for compliance with EU legal norms, which will focus on the negotiated Chapter 23 “Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.”

Approximately 300 representatives of state institutions from the Ukrainian side will attend the meeting, but more than 85% will participate online.

The Ukrainian team is already in Brussels. The team includes Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine – Minister of Justice of Ukraine, representatives of the Supreme and Constitutional courts, members of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualifications Commission of Judges of Ukraine, officers of the Ministry of Justice and other state institutions. “It is important that members of the Ukrainian delegation do not just represent their respective bodies, the Ukrainian delegation acts as a single team representing Ukraine’s position,” says HQCJ member Vitalii Hatseliuk, commenting on the situation from Brussels.

The official screening procedure is based on 33 negotiating titles (chapters), which are grouped into six clusters (thematic units). The procedure includes two stages, namely explanatory sessions and bilateral meetings. The Ministry of Justice is the main coordinator for negotiating Chapter 23, “Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,” and 24, “Justice, Freedom and Security,” of the Fundamentals cluster.

Chapter 23 encompasses EU law and policies in the areas of independent and effective judiciary; preventing and combating corruption as a threat to the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law; fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: children’s rights, protection of persons reporting violations of EU law, personal data protection, procedural rights and guarantees, rights of victims of crime, combating racism and xenophobia, freedom of expression, non-discrimination, protection of Roma rights, gender equality, rights of persons with disabilities and rights of citizens of EU member states.

In essence, Chapter 23 deals with complex topics such as courts, prosecution authorities, the bar, legal education, the fight against corruption, and fundamental human rights and freedoms.

“The European Commission pays special attention to preparations for the negotiations under Chapter 23. The Commission has already received from us and analysed the necessary information that our team has carefully developed,” said Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, following the final meeting of the Ukrainian delegation.

The preparatory process lasted several months and consisted of preparing written responses to the European Commission’s questions (according to our information, more than 700 pages of text were prepared in response to the European Commission’s questions) and oral presentations, which will be presented in Brussels on Tuesday.

During the negotiations, representatives of the judiciary presented the Ukrainian side’s vision of the real state of affairs in Ukraine’s judicial system. We spoke to representatives of the HCJ and HQCJ about their presentations.

Deputy Head of the High Council of Justice Dmytro Lukianov will discuss the work of the HCJ and HQCJ after their functions’ resumption, the state of the judiciary’s independence, the more than 30% staff shortage in the courts, the appointment of new judges and disciplinary action against judges, the formation of the HCJ Disciplinary Inspectors Service, and other issues.

Ensuring the institutional continuity of the High Council of Justice is also important. As of today, no representatives of the President (two members) have been appointed to the HCJ, and no representatives of the Bar Congress (two members) have been elected. While competitions under the presidential quota at least take place, the Bar Congress, which will be the starting point for the competition, has not been announced since 2022.

“The complexity of the system of electing HCJ members is aimed at ensuring its independence but creates risks for its formation and capacity,” says HCJ Deputy Chair Dmytro Lukianov. “In March 2025, the tenure of two HCJ members who are judges will expire, leaving the HCJ with a minimum quorum of 15 members. This poses a threat of a repeat of the situation of 2022 when the HCJ lost its powers and did not perform constitutional functions for a year. Such a situation can occur both due to a combination of circumstances, especially in times of war, and be the result of a deliberate policy of certain actors.”

The HCJ believes that the problem can be solved based on recommendations of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and the Venice Commission. The CCJE recommended introducing the following rule into the legislation: “powers of a member of the Council shall be terminated solely as a result of the lawful election of a new member, which will ensure the continuity of the Council’s activities, even if the parliament (or other entity) fails to vote for new members” (paragraph 36 of CCJE Opinion No. 24 (2021). This is how this problem is solved in many European countries, such as Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal.

A separate unit in the negotiations is the work of the judiciary during the war. Today, there are 596 courts in Ukraine, including 561 general local/specialised courts and 35 courts of appeal. Since the beginning of the war, 142 premises of 120 judicial institutions have been destroyed or damaged. Fifty-four judges and 389 court staff members joined the Ukrainian armed forces. Four judges and 14 court staff members were killed.

HQCJ member Vitalii Hatseliuk will discuss issues such as regular appraisal of judges, including plans to adopt relevant documents; the functioning of the Public Integrity Council, issues of financing the justice system and issues related to judicial education – the state of affairs of the National School of Judges of Ukraine, its international cooperation, plans for 2025, specific measures to be developed and implemented to meet the challenges facing Ukraine in the framework of European integration. This includes adapting judicial training to the requirements of European integration, i.e., introducing such blocks as the fundamentals of European law and the status of the EU Court of Justice, paying due attention to issues such as the protection of vulnerable populations, and considering cases related to the consequences of armed aggression against Ukraine, among others.

Vitali Hatseliuk emphasises that the European Commission has a good understanding of the situation; it asks questions, the answers to which are very useful for the further development of Ukrainian statehood. “The process itself is also very important. It helps coordinate the direction of further legal reform. I did not see any irrelevant questions from those the European Commission wants to hear answers to. Overall, this is a very useful tool for Ukraine. It is an opportunity to look at ourselves from the outside and plan further actions. Specific deadlines, indicators and measurement tools are required from Ukraine. All this is often used in project management or policy-making, where it is very clear what result we are going to achieve in a particular aspect and when this result is planned.”

A week before the start of the negotiations, a coalition of civil society organisations, namely the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer and the Ukrainian Bar Association presented their report on the state of play under Chapter 23.

This is the first report that Ukraine’s civil society sector has prepared for the European Commission since Ukraine became an EU candidate. Similar shadow (in fact, alternative) reports are prepared annually in all countries on their path to the EU.

“This Shadow Report offers a more holistic and transparent view of the reform process in Ukraine. It is an important tool for preparing for the EU accession negotiations, both for the Ukrainian side and for the EU,” says Oksana Tsymbrivska, Head of the EU Project Pravo-Justice.

The report covers all areas of Chapter 23, and, in addition to information on the state of play, it also contains a description of key progress and challenges in each area, as well as about 350 recommendations. The Shadow Report was monitored, analysed and prepared in February – August 2024.

Representatives of the European Commission highly appreciated the level of preparation of the Shadow Report, noting that its findings would be used.

“I have never seen such a serious report prepared by civil society in any country I have worked in before. We will use this report to formulate our recommendations for the screening report and consider the draft roadmap of the rule of law reforms that Ukraine will need to prepare to move forward on its EU accession path. And, of course, these materials will be used to set benchmarks for the accession negotiations. Therefore, the report is very timely in terms of our work with Ukraine,” said Manfredas Limantas, Sector Manager for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption with the EU Delegation to Ukraine, during the presentation of the report.

Tomorrow, Ukraine will open a new page in Brussels on our path to the EU and on the path to reforming (or rather, properly streamlining) key areas of the Fundamentals cluster. While there have already been significant achievements in such areas as courts, prosecution and the fight against corruption, as the key requirements for them are mostly known, although, of course, there is still a long and difficult way ahead, the list of requirements for the bar and legal education, which first appeared in the EC’s 2023 report, will be drawn up as a result of negotiations and, probably, the civil society Shadow Report.

It is also time for all representatives of the Fundamentals cluster to assess their professional relevance to the tasks facing Ukraine and consider whether they are ready for fundamental reforms and clear implementation of the roadmap. Failure to comply with the requirements will be immediately recorded by the public sector and will become a stumbling block during further monitoring by the European Commission.

A coalition of CSOs — Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, Human Rights Center ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer Program and Ukrainian Bar Association — presented the Shadow Report to the European Commission on Chapter 23, “Justice and Fundamental Rights” of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine in 2023.

This is the first report that Ukraine’s civil society sector has prepared for the European Commission since Ukraine became an EU candidate. The Shadow Report highlights the views of Ukrainian civil society, representatives of the legal community and experts active in the field of justice. The report analyses the progress made in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, identifies weaknesses and gaps, and provides recommendations on what needs to be done on the Ukrainian side.

Representatives of the European Commission praised the level of preparation of the Shadow Report, noting that its findings would definitely be used.

In its part of the report, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives emphasised the need to adopt a judicial reform strategy. Today, unfortunately, Ukraine does not have it as a single approved document. The reform is being implemented under pressure from the public and international partners. Only now, the Presidential Office of Ukraine has developed and sent a draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice for 2024-2029 to the main judicial bodies and some representatives of the non-governmental sector for suggestions and comments. This draft Strategy needs to be substantially revised, and the ALI is already preparing its proposals.

In his turn, Manfredas Limantas expressed hope that the recommendations of civil society would be taken into account by the Presidential Office of Ukraine to improve the Strategy.

Yevhen Krapyvin, an Expert of Tomorrow’s Lawyer Program and the Center for Political and Legal Reforms, focused on problems and recommendations for solving them in Ukraine’s prosecution system. The speaker emphasised the need for the prosecutor’s office and the Prosecutor General to be independent, particularly from political influence, and the development of institutions that should ensure this independence.

Daria Pysarenko, Director of the Tomorrow’s Lawyer Program, presented the main conclusions, problems and recommendations to the section on the Bar reform. In particular, she covered the issues of the legal status of the Bar, bar self-government, disciplinary liability — all aspects that characterise the current structure of the Bar.

A full-fledged reform of the justice system is impossible without addressing the problems with legal education in Ukraine. Every year, Ukrainian universities graduate thousands of lawyers, but the quality of this education does not meet European standards. Ivan Gorodissky, Vice President of the Ukrainian Bar Association, presented civil society’s recommendations on the necessary changes in education.

Kateryna Ryzhenko, Deputy Executive Director for Legal Affairs of TI Ukraine, presenting the section on anti-corruption, stressed the need to improve anti-corruption legislation and the urgent need to take into account the shortcomings of the previous State Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme in the process of developing new documents, as this process will begin very soon. As part of her presentation, Kateryna also mentioned the importance of fully restoring e-declaration and reporting by political parties.

Tetiana Pechonchyk, Head of the Human Rights Center ZMINA, spoke about the main challenges to the observance of a wide range of human rights in Ukraine, which Ukraine will have to overcome on its way to the EU.

Tetiana Pechonchyk also drew attention to negative trends in the field of human rights protection, in particular, the intention to restrict access to information and decisions of the Unified State Register of Court Decisions through the draft law No. 7033d, which, despite the criticism of human rights activists, was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada as a basis.

The monitoring, analysis and preparation of the Shadow Report were carried out in February-August 2024. The full text of the report has already been published in Ukrainian and English.

The report has been prepared with the financial support of the European Union within the framework of the EU Project “Pravo-Justice”. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and other civil society organisations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

The final report in Ukrainian includes an update for August 2024. In addition, the Shadow Report is now available in English. 

Context. This is the first report submitted by Ukraine’s civil society sector to the European Commission since the country became a candidate for EU membership. The period covered by the experts is June 2023–August 2024. The Report provides an analysis of the current state of affairs, progress made by Ukraine, and ongoing issues in the areas of the rule of law (courts, prosecution, Bar, legal education), the fight against corruption and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Report also contains approximately 350 recommendations to address the urgent challenges of the current stage of reforms in these areas.

The Shadow Report, prepared by experts from specialized NGOs led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, includes the following sections:

Judicial Reform (Agency for Legislative Initiatives). The section contains a detailed analysis of the judicial reform: its current state, issues and prospects; issues of institutional capacity and competitive selection to the main institutions of the judiciary; the state of independence of the judiciary; financing of the judiciary; digitalization of justice, fighting corruption in the judiciary, and enforcement of court decisions.

Fighting Corruption (Transparency International Ukraine). This section covers such topics as the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme; specialized institutions; the resumption of e-declaration and verification of declarations; the resumption of reporting by political parties; and corruption risk management. It also presents the results of the independent external assessment of the NACP’s performance; analyzes issues related to the legislative regulation of the excessive influence of oligarchs and lobbying, and other aspects of the anti-corruption sphere.

Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (ZMINA). The section includes analysis of such topics as the fight against torture and cruel and degrading treatment; freedom of expression; combating discrimination and hate crimes; and other areas of human rights protection. A separate block analyses issues directly related to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, namely the protection of the rights of victims of armed aggression; responsibility for the most serious international crimes committed in the context of Russian armed aggression; legal guarantees for the implementation of human rights in the process of reintegration of the liberated territories; etc.

Reform of the Prosecutor’s Office, (Tomorrow’s Lawyer). The section is devoted to the analysis of issues related to the legal status of the prosecutor and guarantees of his/her independence; activities of the prosecutorial self-government bodies; selection of prosecutors, their certification and disciplinary liability; improvement of the procedure for appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General; institutional support for the training of prosecutors; introduction of electronic criminal proceedings and the system of distribution of cases between prosecutors, as well as a human-centered approach in the prosecution; national system of prosecution for international crimes and, in particular, the specifics of international cooperation in this area.

Reform of the Bar (Tomorrow’s Lawyer). The section provides a detailed examination of the  legal status of the Bar; advocacy; Bar self-government; advocates in the temporarily occupied territories; Bar finances; access to the profession; disciplinary liability; and continuous professional development. In particular, the article analyzes corruption risks in the practice of law and in the activities of Bar self-government bodies, as well as issues related to mandatory declaration and mediation.

Reform of Legal Education (Ukrainian Bar Association). This section deals with the following issues: standards of legal education and modernization of educational programmes; institutional separation of legal education and training of law enforcement personnel; accreditation of law schools; financing of legal education from the state budget; fight against corruption and plagiarism in legal education.

The monitoring, analysis and preparation of the Shadow Report were carried out from February to August 2024.

This report was prepared with the financial assistance of the European Union within the framework of the EU Pravo-Justice Project. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and other civil society organizations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

This is the first report submitted by Ukraine’s civil society sector to the European Commission since the country became a candidate for EU membership. The report covers the period from June 2023 to August 2024.

The report provides an analysis of the current state of affairs, progress made by Ukraine, and existing challenges in the areas of the rule of law (courts, prosecution, Bar, legal education), the fight against corruption, and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The experts who prepared the Shadow Report also provided approximately 350 recommendations to address the urgent challenges of the current stage of reforms in these areas.

The Shadow Report, prepared by experts from specialised CSOs and led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, includes the following sections:

• Judicial Reform (Agency for Legislative Initiatives);
• Fighting Corruption (Transparency International Ukraine);
• Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (ZMINA);
• Reform of the Prosecutor’s Office (Tomorrow’s Lawyer);
• Reform of the Bar (Tomorrow’s Lawyer);
• Reform of Legal Education (Ukrainian Bar Association).

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is a leading independent Ukrainian think tank whose activities are aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Parliament and Government, continuing European and Euro-Atlantic integration, supporting the stabilisation and reconstruction of Ukraine to overcome the aftermaths of the Russian Federation’s aggression, monitoring and backing reforms in justice and security, political and civic awareness-raising.

Transparency International Ukraine (TI Ukraine) is an accredited chapter of the global movement Transparency International. The organisation takes a comprehensive approach to implementing changes to reduce corruption in certain areas: it helped to create and subsequently transferred to the state the Prozorro, Prozorro.Sale, eHealth and ProZvit systems. TI Ukraine has also implemented the City Transparency and Accountability Rankings, built the DOZORRO community to monitor public procurement, and co-founded the RISE Ukraine coalition to promote the principles of integrity and efficiency in reconstruction.

ZMINA Human Rights Centre – The Centre is engaged in information, educational, monitoring, analytical, and advocacy activities in the field of human rights. It protects human rights defenders and civil society activists in Ukraine, including those in occupied Crimea. Following the onset of large-scale Russian aggression, ZMINA, together with 38 other CSOs, created the “Ukraine 5 AM” Coalition, which documents war crimes and aims to protect the victims of Russia’s armed aggression in Ukraine and bring to justice the top leadership of the Russian Federation as well as the direct perpetrators of these war crimes.

Tomorrow’s Lawyer is a non-governmental organization that promotes the institutional development of justice to strengthen the rule of law and protect human rights. Since 2016, the NGO has been conducting research on state policy and the state of affairs in the justice sector while also developing recommendations for their improvement and advancement. A key priority of the organization is the professional development of the legal community.

The Ukrainian Bar Association (UBA) is an all-Ukrainian non-governmental organisation founded in 2002 and currently uniting more than 8000 lawyers. The Association’s activities include promoting the development of the legal profession, improving legislation, implementing ethical standards, and protecting the professional rights of its members and human rights in general.

This report was prepared with the financial assistance of the European Union within the framework of the EU Pravo-Justice Project. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives  and other civil society organisations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

For the first time since the beginning of the Great War, 248 new judges took the oath to the Ukrainian people to “independently, fairly, and professionally exercise justice on behalf of Ukraine” on 5 July in the Ukrainian House. The day before, President Zelenskyy appointed 214 judges to local courts and one judge to the Supreme Court. Another 114 judges were appointed in May, waiting to take the oath for almost two months (while receiving a judicial remuneration).

During the oath, Zelenskyy wished the judges that “each “decision in the name of Ukraine” strengthened respect for the courts and Ukraine on the whole.” Ruslan Sydorovych, Deputy Chair of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, which held the competition for local courts, noted that “248 judges account for 5% of the judiciary of Ukraine.” He also expressed hope that this “will have a significant positive impact on citizens’ access to justice throughout the territory of Ukraine.”

We described competitions in detail in the previous article. Now, we are going to consider what generally happens in local courts and courts of appeal during the war and how they perceive the judicial reform, which, at this stage, mostly concerns them.

Spoiler: it is perceived differently and often resisted.

As of 24 June, there are 3,592 judges working in local courts (out of the fixed number of 5,035 positions). 650 judges are working in the courts of appeal (out of the fixed number of 1,357 positions).

To recall, the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) has recently completed the competition for 560 positions of judges of local courts. However, only 390 candidates received recommendations. HQCJ also launched a competition for 550 positions of judges for courts of appeal. By the end of the year, it promises to announce another competition for local courts for the record number of 1,000+ judge positions.

It is considered that although competitions (most likely) will be taking place for about two years, in 2027, personnel shortages in the courts will be largely overcome, and most vacancies will be filled. At the same time, the system will receive a certain number of outside experts: lawyers and scientists in appellate courts and lawyers and attorneys in first-instance courts. Is that really so?

To answer this question, we need to know how many courts and judges Ukraine needs.

The war changed everything, in particular in courts: some of them had to be closed (70+ courts), and judges had to be sent to administer justice in other courts (500+ persons); new categories of court cases appeared in all instances, and jurisdictions (war crimes, military crimes, compensation for lost property, social security of military personnel, etc.); many premises were ruined or partially damaged (15 and 116 premises, respectively).

Over the past two and a half years, there has been a large population migration between regions. In addition, many Ukrainians moved outside the country. Taking this into account, no one can clearly say the number of courts and judges we actually need and in which regions. Unfortunately, there is no detailed analysis of these processes either.

The situation worsened because, before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine failed to develop and approve a new judicial map corresponding to the new administrative and territorial system effective since December 2020. So, currently, even the functioning courts do not correspond to their districts, and the names of more than 50 courts are still Soviet. “Leninskyi District Court of Kirovohrad City” sounds like mockery.

You might think, how is it possible during the eleventh year of the war? But it is: the 2017 reform of local courts, which stipulated their expansion (and discarding Soviet names) and should have been implemented in 2019–2020, stayed a reform on paper. And no new actual map has been approved for four years.

Although there is some progress, during the war, even in Zakarpattia Oblast, which is the farthest from the front line, the launch of a pilot project for court expansion developed with the help of our European partners has failed. They say they are unaware of how many people will live there after the war.

This is a clear argument, but it preserves the situation indefinitely and slows down the “main reform of the country.” After all, it directs new competitions to local courts in the wrong way: if judges are appointed to “old” local courts in 2026–2027, then procedures for transferring these judges to new ones may continue for several more years.

The Supreme Court insists on developing and approving a new judicial map as soon as possible, stressing that even if the courts are expanded now “on paper,” without the actual relocation of judges between the premises, this will still be a step forward because it will significantly reduce the number of procedural transfer of court cases between small courts. The number of judges can also be regulated after the victory, and new premises can be built in districts with a shortage of existing ones.

There is also a significant problem with the substantially uneven workload that judges have in different courts. Sometimes, it varies by more than ten times, and then each judge of such a court works for three, five, or even seven judges while receiving the same salary and having the same number of assistants and court hearing secretaries.

The judicial system generally considers 4.5 million cases and case files annually (information for 2023). When it is done by 4.5 thousand judges, not everyone can withstand such a load. Just last week, ten people were dismissed: eight resigned, and two more were fired due to low qualifications and dishonest behaviour within the framework of judicial lustration procedures.

Another important issue is the feasibility of courts considering all cases currently assigned to their jurisdiction. Shall cases concerning the sale of milk or apples at the market without appropriate permission be considered by courts?

Without regulating the jurisdiction issues and the number of courts and judges, it will be impossible to address the matter of workload and, therefore, the quality of justice because an excessive number of cases affects both the terms of their consideration and the quality of court decisions.

Today, the Council of Judges of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal Policy take care of issues related to the new map. However, after amendments were made to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2016 (and taking into account recommendations of the Venice Commission regarding these amendments), “the court shall be set up, reorganised, and liquidated by law,” the draft of which is submitted to the Parliament by the President of Ukraine.

So, the ball is definitely on the presidential office’s side, which will decide when to take this step: whether to approve a new map now, at least for regions where hostilities are not taking place or to leave everything for “after the war.”

However, the matter is not only on the judicial map. The actions of many presidents of local and appellate courts also inhibit the reform.

Within the 2014–2018 reform framework, new rules were established for the term of office of court presidents. Since 2016, a judge can hold the position for no more than six consecutive years (two three-year terms). This was done, particularly within the framework of fighting corruption in courts, reducing the influence of court presidents on judges and office employees, and reducing the risks of corruption from such influence.

New rules did not satisfy most court presidents because they had been used to rule the courts for decades. Therefore, several ways were invented almost immediately to circumvent these rules, which most court presidents apply quite successfully. This component of judicial reform slowed down.

This way, Yaroslav Holovachov, President of the Kyiv Court of Appeal (the court where four judges were arrested for corruption six months ago), prematurely resigned three months before the expiration of the term of office. Another judge was elected as the court president for two weeks, two weeks after Holovachov returned to his position and started a new six-year term.

Are Kyiv Court of Appeal judges not aware of the fact that these are additional corruption risks? They are perfectly aware of it. Moreover, in court, judges sometimes bring bribes to each other in the middle of the day, wrapped in a package of coffee or hidden in a bottle of cognac.

Why are they doing this? Perhaps it is because Yaroslav Holovachov is a talented leader and an excellent manager. Or maybe because he allows them to bring each other “coffee” and “chocolates.”

The story of the “third term” also occurred in the Halytskyi District Court of Lviv, but there, a judge (Kateryna Kotelva) posted her story on Facebook: “The meeting of judges has just elected the president of Halytskyi District Court in Lviv – Iryna Romanivna Volosko for the third term in a row. I voted ‘against’ the approval of the meeting’s decision.”

Another similar story is the election of the head of Krasnoarmiiskyi City District Court of Donetsk Oblast for a third term. However, there is a catch: the court has been closed for some time, but its president is the same person (Olena Fil) as before the temporary closure. Some judges were against such an appointment, but who cares about the opinion of the minority?

A case that was not less outstanding took place in the Economic Court of Chernivtsi Oblast. According to the judges of this court, Oleh Proskurniak, the court president, received the position in exchange for dismissing the pregnant head of the office. Courts of three instances and two jurisdictions have been dealing with this story for a year because the dismissed head of the office is trying not only to return to her position but also to recognize one of the judges of this court (Volodymyr Baitaliuk) as the father of her child. That is, the meeting of judges allowed the court president to keep his position because he “cleaned up the dirt” after one of the judges. It looks like the Middle Ages and the times of the Inquisition rather than a country trying to become part of the EU and NATO.

A few years ago, the Council of Judges of Ukraine even “played along” with court presidents and actually legalized all their schemes. The Supreme Court, on the contrary, believes that there cannot be any third terms. Stanislav Kravchenko, the Supreme Court President, responded to our request to comment on the “third term of court presidents” and said: “The Supreme Court does not accept and does not tolerate such actions of court presidents and meetings of judges. If we strive to develop the judiciary, the rotation of persons holding administrative positions shall take place in compliance with the general logic of judicial reform.”

At the same time, the Supreme Court adds that the problem has another component. Sometimes, there is no one to replace the court president, whose second term is ending because a good judge and a good manager are not identical concepts.

It is evident that the existing situation requires immediate interference of the legislator and a clearer definition in the law of the rules for court president rotation. If the majority of judges in Ukraine still do not realize that the law is not a manual in a post office that says “Do this, don’t do that,” then it will be necessary to supplement the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” with a clear norm regarding the number of years of tenure in administrative positions and the number of years of “rest” from them, taking into account the previous years of court management.

The issue of leadership in the judiciary and appropriate training also requires attention (we will devote a separate article to these issues because the judicial reform almost did not affect the National School of Judges of Ukraine).

Analysis of the functioning of local courts and courts of appeal would be incomplete without describing the working conditions of courts in the front-line regions. In 2022, the jurisdiction of cases of some courts was changed, and judges were transferred to all corners of Ukraine. Currently, some courts in Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv Oblasts operate near the line of contact.

The most complicated is the situation in Donetsk Oblast. The premises of some of the working courts have been ruined, so the judges have moved to the “neighbours.” This way, judges from Dymytrovsky City Court of Donetsk Oblast also work in the premises of the already mentioned Krasnoarmiiskyi court.

Several courts work remotely. At the same time, no criteria establish when a court should change its jurisdiction and when it should continue working remotely or in the usual mode.

The situation is made even more complicated by the lack of not only electricity but also water. In Pokrovsk, Selydovo, and Kurakhovo, water is available only two days per week, moreover, by hours. No one knows how the courts should survive the winter under such conditions.

Judges are trying to get transferred to other, calmer regions. However, in most cases, the HQCJ refuses to transfer them, referring to the Supreme Court’s request “not to touch these judges.”

We asked the Supreme Court what is the reason for such a request. Don’t the judges from the frontline regions deserve better living and working conditions? The Supreme Court explains that they are regularly asked by prosecutors, representatives of law enforcement agencies, and lawyers not to close frontline courts.

So, judges have the same status, salaries, and conditions. Of course, this affects the desire of people from these regions to work in their positions.

Regulating the work of courts in frontline regions is long overdue. There were attempts to do this as early as 2022, but the Verkhovna Rada refuses to vote for the remote operation of courts, motivating this by the fact that the parliament does not work online. However, we are discussing the territories close to the contact line. One cannot see that the parliament holds its meetings in those regions.

It also requires attention that judges and employees of court offices from frontline regions do not receive additional payments for working in hard conditions. At the same time, some representatives of other state bodies get such allowances.

Currently, Ukraine is in the active phase of reforming the courts of first and appellate instances. The appeal section has not been replenished with new personnel for more than ten years, the first instance section has not yet reached its critical level of renewal that would not permit it to roll back. That is why resistance to reforming at these levels is currently the highest, and corruption cases are, unfortunately, not rare.

The HQCJ started the competition to courts of appeal last year, and it should end next year with the appointment of 500+ new judges. The competition to local courts, which the HQCJ plans to announce at the end of this year, will probably end in 2026–2027 with the appointment of 1,000+ new judges.

They will certainly change the shape of Ukrainian justice. However, new judges will come to courts where the “old” presidents have been ruling for years (with all existing schemes, extra-procedural communication with the parties to cases (the case of the president of the Poltava Court of Appeal, Serhiy Halonkin), the “telephone right” and other attributes of the “old” system).

Therefore, we may not see a new quality of the judiciary, a new outlook, and a significant reduction in corruption risks, even with the appearance of new judges in courts, who will follow the old rules and will not be able to change anything for at least another five years.

This already poses a very important task for Ukraine: to resolve the issue of the reign of the “old” court presidents and to get rid of monopolies at the level of all courts of appeal, which are actively resisting new rules and trying to cement the situation for years. This, of course, also prevents an effective fight against corruption in the judiciary.

Therefore, judicial reform will be completed in Ukraine only when the judges, who understand the laws best of all, are the first to follow them and use their powers to serve society, not the political authorities, oligarchs, or their selfish interests. But until then, more than one war will have to be won within the judiciary.