The Anti-Corruption Strategy (ACS) defines the principles and priorities of state anti-corruption policy for the next five years. It is developed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU). The Strategy should be based on a systemic analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy.
Subsequently, to implement the ACS, the Government develops and approves a clear action plan for its implementation — the State Anti-Corruption Programme (SAP).
This is Ukraine’s third strategic anti-corruption policy document. The first strategy was approved on 14 October 2014 for the period until the end of 2017. The next strategy covered 2021–2025, but the relevant Law was adopted by Parliament only in June 2022. As a result, only three years in practice remained to achieve the expected results.
At present, three draft laws on the principles of state anti-corruption policy for 2026–2030 have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which is an unprecedented situation. Previously, Parliament adopted a government draft law, with certain amendments, while alternative drafts were not even submitted.
This time, the initiators are Anastasiia Radina, Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy (Draft Law No. 15230), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Draft Law No. 15230-1) and a group of MPs who are members of the European Solidarity faction (Draft Law No. 15230-2).
Given the volume of the documents and the relatively short timeframe for their consideration and adoption, since, according to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Strategy must be adopted no later than the second quarter of 2026, it is advisable to draw attention to both the positive provisions and the shortcomings of all three versions. This is particularly important in the most significant areas: countering corruption and corruption-related offences, the judiciary and the status of judges, the prosecution service, the Bar and law enforcement agencies.
Countering Corruption and Corruption-Related Offences
In this area, the identified problems concern disciplinary, administrative, criminal and civil-law liability for corruption and corruption-related offences. The annexes to all three draft laws contain identical provisions, which may indicate consensus among the subjects of legislative initiative as to these problems and the expected results of resolving them.
In particular, it is proposed to clarify the grounds for holding persons authorised to perform state or local self-government functions disciplinarily liable:
- for violating the requirements of anti-corruption legislation or rules of ethical conduct;
- where a court decision imposing an administrative penalty on a person for a corruption-related offence has entered into force;
- where a person has been released from administrative liability due to minor significance or the case has been closed because the time limit for imposing an administrative penalty expired.
These provisions have essentially been carried over from the ACS for 2021–2025. Since the defined results were not achieved, the necessary amendments were not introduced into legislation.
At the same time, the issue of holding public servants disciplinarily liable where an administrative offence case is closed because the time limit has expired should be approached carefully. As studies of case law show, when courts apply this ground for closing a case, they rarely establish the fact that the offence was committed and the guilt of the person concerned. Accordingly, imposing disciplinary liability on the basis of a court decision that has not found the person guilty will lead to such decisions being challenged. This leads to an obvious conclusion: the quality of court decisions needs to be improved.
In parallel, the draft ACS for 2026–2030 provides for increasing the time limits for imposing administrative penalties for corruption-related offences, which should reduce the number of cases closed by courts on this ground.
The provision of the draft ACS concerning the consolidation of Supreme Court (SC) case law in cases on corruption-related administrative offences appears somewhat questionable.
Under the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CUAO), the Supreme Court considers this category of cases where the ECtHR finds a violation of Convention rights during the consideration of the relevant case by a national court and, as a court of appeal, cases concerning offences under Article 185-3 of the Code (contempt of court). The CUAO does not provide for cassation review of cases, and the ruling of the appellate court is final and not subject to appeal (Article 294 of the CUAO).
Since it began operating in December 2017, the Supreme Court has considered eight cassation appeals against appellate court decisions in administrative offence cases. In all cases, the Court refused to open proceedings, referring to Article 294 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences. Therefore, achieving this strategic result is impossible, at least until legislation on a prejudicial request mechanism is adopted, which would enable the SC to express positions in cases not subject to cassation appeal and ensure consistency of case law in such cases.
A general analysis of all three draft ACSs shows that the problems of liability for corruption and corruption-related offences were largely not resolved during 2023–2025 and require further measures. At the same time, it is also important to analyse the reasons why similar expected results of the ACS for 2021–2025 were not achieved.
Judiciary and the Status of Judges (Including the HACC)
In the judicial sphere, the draft ACSs focus on discretion in the formation of judicial governance bodies: the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as on ensuring their continuous operation. The latter is a significant step forward in the state’s understanding of one of the basic principles of good governance: the work of a body cannot be suspended without transferring its powers to other bodies. The history of judicial reform over the past 12 years shows that Parliament has twice suspended the work of the HQCJ and the HCJ, which led to a significant shortage of judges in courts and, consequently, worsened public access to justice. The differences in wording between the three draft laws are not substantial, so they should be supported by Parliament in any version.
The difference between Draft Laws No. 15230, No. 15230-1 and No. 15230-2 on the formation of judicial governance bodies lies in their approaches to granting a decisive vote to independent experts delegated by international partners within competition commissions selecting members of the HCJ and the HQCJ. The first two draft laws preserve this right for them for the next period, while the initiators of Draft Law No. 15230-2 believe that such experts should have voting rights equal to those of Ukrainian members of the competition commissions.
Although the idea of equal weight for the votes of international and national experts in Ukrainian competitions is correct, at this stage Ukraine is not yet fully ready to abandon the decisive vote of experts delegated by international partners. This is primarily because Ukrainian appointing entities require further reform and currently do not enjoy public trust, which is what led to the need to apply the formula involving international experts with a decisive vote.
The initiators also differ somewhat in their views on the specifics of electing the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU). The ACS in the versions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 proposes introducing electronic voting by all judges for the new composition of the CJU, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 provides for voting by all judges but does not specify the method of voting. Given that Ukraine is facing a full-scale war unleashed by the Russian Federation and that Ukraine’s movement towards the EU envisages full digitalisation of the judiciary as one element of an effective court free from corruption, electing new compositions of the CJU through electronic voting appears more appropriate.
At the same time, the provisions of Draft Law No. 15230-2 aimed at minimising corruption risks in the activities of the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) and expanding additional mechanisms to ensure trust in judicial career procedures, primarily through rotation in administrative positions in courts, deserve support. These provisions are much more detailed than those in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. Implementing the relevant provisions is extremely important for fulfilling European integration commitments, particularly in view of the critical TAIEX report on the functioning of the NSJU and the Prosecutors’ Training Centre, which was recently provided to Ukraine.
The need for rotation of judges in administrative positions has long been discussed, but there is no consensus. At the same time, hundreds of court presidents and their deputies continue to hold their positions beyond the six-year term provided by law, successfully manipulating gaps in legislation.
Draft Law No. 15230-2 adds an expected strategic result concerning the role of the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which is absent from the other versions of the ACS for 2026–2030. It provides that: ‘the Public Integrity Council, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), should be legally embedded in the system of mutual balance between civil society and the state in judicial selection, where civil society strengthens transparency but does not replace the institutional decision of the judiciary’. This addition also deserves the support of MPs during consideration of the draft laws.
The problems of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in the draft ACSs are included in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’ and do not contain fundamental differences.
Prosecution Service (Including SAPO)
The problems identified in the prosecution service, and the expected strategic results for addressing them, concern procedures for selecting prosecutors, material support, internal management processes within prosecution bodies, issues of procedural guidance by groups of prosecutors, criteria for determining the optimal staffing level of prosecution bodies and other matters.
All three draft ACSs differ to some extent in this part.
Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not contain the problem of risks of informal or political influence on the procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, nor the corresponding expected strategic results. Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 contain such provisions, although with different levels of detail.
While the main draft has a clear focus on selecting candidates for the position of Prosecutor General with the involvement of a competition commission, the second alternative draft uses the general and evaluative concept of ‘best European practices’ and refers to the Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka. This wording makes the expected strategic result less measurable and less achievable.
In different European countries, the status of the Prosecutor General, their role in the system of state bodies and their level of political weight vary depending on the institutional model of the prosecution service. Accordingly, it is rather difficult to determine which practices are the best.
As regards improving the procedure for expressing a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General, Draft Law No. 15230 proposes defining the grounds for this, as well as the body that would have the authority to dismiss the Prosecutor General from an administrative position through disciplinary proceedings. Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains no reference to the relevant bodies, which is a significant shortcoming given the existing practice of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP).
By its decision No. 97dp-18 of 28 February 2018, following consideration of disciplinary proceedings concerning Prosecutor General Y. Lutsenko, the QDCP established that there was no legislative mechanism for implementing a disciplinary sanction against the Prosecutor General. This made it impossible to hold him liable for a disciplinary offence. The absence of clear mechanisms and procedures effectively nullifies the institution of disciplinary liability of the Prosecutor General and lowers the level of control over performance in this position.
Therefore, on issues concerning the improvement of procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, the ACS in the version of Draft Law No. 15230 best corresponds to the principles of strategic planning.
The other provisions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 do not differ on these issues. Draft Law No. 15230-2, however, contains a clarification regarding the consequences of the new system for assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work: it proposes that, based on such an assessment, not only staffing and management decisions, as well as decisions on bonuses, but also decisions on disciplinary sanctions, may be taken. This approach is flawed and creates additional corruption risks. Issues of disciplinary liability and assessment cannot be mixed within one procedure.
Assessing the quality of a prosecutor’s work concerns the effectiveness of their performance, which should be taken into account in promotion, informing the prosecutor’s professional profile, influencing bonuses and similar incentives. However, it cannot in any way be used as an instrument of punishment for poor work results, since this would essentially amount to a return to the quota-driven ‘stick system’ of assessment, where the dynamics of statistical indicators automatically leads to punishment if they are negative. This system has de facto existed since Soviet times, and its harmful effects have been minimised only in isolated cases.
The subject of disciplinary liability is a specific disciplinary offence, namely culpable non-performance or improper performance by a prosecutor of their duties. The list of disciplinary offences and the grounds and procedure for holding prosecutors disciplinarily liable are defined by law and provide for such liability for a specific case.
Assessment of the quality of work is a procedure that helps determine how effectively a prosecutor performs the official duties assigned to them over a certain period. Under the current assessment procedure, this period is one year. It is therefore more of an incentive-based tool and serves as motivation for professional development. It helps the manager form a more objective understanding of the team’s potential, form a staff reserve and make decisions on bonuses or other incentives more transparent.
Accordingly, if the results of assessing the quality of work can be used to impose disciplinary liability, this may turn into an instrument of administrative influence over prosecutors and undermine their procedural independence.
Improving the activities of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is addressed in all three draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’. However, it would be advisable to consider it as one of the specialised prosecutors’ offices within the unified system of prosecution bodies.
Both alternative draft laws exclude the provisions of the ACS for 2026–2030 that would grant the Head of SAPO the right independently to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPTI) on the possible commission of a criminal offence by an MP of Ukraine and to approve motions considered by an investigating judge.
At present, this is the exclusive power of the Prosecutor General. It is the result of a political compromise reached in 2019, when parliamentary immunity, meaning immunity from criminal prosecution without the consent of the VRU, was replaced by a special procedure for bringing MPs to criminal liability under the exceptional procedural control of the Prosecutor General. For the Government and MPs, the existence of this political compromise, reached by parliamentarians of the same IX convocation that must consider the ACS for 2026–2030, is a key argument against changing it.
It should be noted that, under the new procedure for bringing MPs to liability, more than 40 MPs have been notified of suspicion, and the number of criminal proceedings may be higher. The Head of SAPO has not stated that there is a direct conflict with the Prosecutor General over problems with entering information into the URPTI and approving motions, from which it may be concluded that the practical problem is rather potential in nature.
If there are political obstacles to MPs supporting the ACS for 2026–2030, this provision may be removed from the draft at this stage, provided that it is revisited later: either when there is a real set of cases in which the Prosecutor General ignores substantiated materials from the NABU and SAPO or if a new convocation of the VRU does not consider itself ‘burdened’ by the political compromise previously reached.
The Bar
The inclusion of the Bar in the ACS for 2026–2030 is due to the relevance of this issue in the context of European integration: development of the Bar is covered by the Rule of Law Roadmap. Although the Bar is an independent self-governing institution, the advocate’s profession is subject to state regulation. Given the corruption risks that exist within the Bar, such as obtaining an advocate’s certificate and non-transparent budgets, as well as systemic problems including the continued tenure of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies) since 2022, the failure to delegate two members to the HCJ and one member to the QDCP and other issues, the Bar has become part of state policy in the field of European integration. At present, it is also a matter of anti-corruption policy and justice policy.
Corruption risks in the justice sector are systemic and are not limited to courts and the prosecution service. No matter how much courts and the prosecution service are reformed, ignoring the Bar in state anti-corruption policy means reproducing corrupt practices at the level of the entire system. Even from a formal perspective, under Chapter VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Bar is part of the justice system alongside courts and the prosecution service, which means that including the Bar in the ACS is a logical and necessary step.
For the first time, the Bar appears in the Anti-Corruption Strategy as a separate substantive subsection alongside courts and the prosecution service. This makes it possible to align anti-corruption policy with the Constitution, the logic of justice system reform and Ukraine’s commitments to the EU.
The problems of the Bar identified by the NACP and the corresponding expected results are included unchanged in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. At the same time, Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains certain changes that do not affect the substance of the proposed state policy measures. They concern clarification of the wording of certain problems, detailing their consequences and similar refinements.
For example, the problem concerning the formation of BSG bodies is supplemented, in addition to the issues already listed above, by ‘the absence of real electoral competition, effective appeal mechanisms, representation of alternative professional groups, the formation of informal stable centres of influence and a lack of leadership rotation’, as well as the corresponding consequence: complicating access to the profession and limiting the ability to ensure disciplinary control and high professional standards.
Certain details that do not affect the substance are also clarified. For example, the wording is not simply ‘online voting’ but ‘secure online voting’, although, in substance, any online voting should have an appropriate level of protection against interference and guarantee data security. Another example is the addition of the word ‘periodic’ to ‘electoral cycle’, although a cycle, by definition, implies periodicity.
Therefore, all three documents contain the initial concept of the drafters of the ACS for 2026–2030, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes certain stylistic amendments and clarified wording that may be discussed as amendments at the stage when the ACS is finalised in the lead Committee.
Law Enforcement Agencies (Including the NABU)
All draft ACSs for 2026–2030 identify problems in the activities of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).
The version of the ACS appended to Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not address the problem of legal regulation of selection procedures for the heads of the NPU and the SBI, as well as the corresponding expected strategic results, although the need to introduce transparent merit-based competitions for these positions has been repeatedly noted by national experts and international partners.
Given that the subjects submitting Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 are MPs, it can be hoped that these provisions will be preserved in full during parliamentary discussions.
Draft Law No. 15230-2 additionally contains problems relating to the institutional independence of the SBI and the absence of clear criteria for determining the investigative jurisdiction of this body. It states that resolving these problems would allow the following strategic results to be achieved:
- introduction of a mechanism for a comprehensive staffing and institutional reset of the SBI, including an open competition for the position of Director with the involvement of independent experts with a decisive vote, as well as mandatory periodic attestation of Bureau employees;
- ensuring a clear focus for the SBI on its original mission: combating torture, unlawful detention and other criminal offences committed in office in the justice sector, as well as introducing a system of periodic external independent audits of the Bureau’s activities, where a negative conclusion would constitute grounds for early dismissal of its leadership;
- developing the analytical capacity of the SBI to shift towards strategic prioritisation of its activities based on verified data, using European tools such as SOCTA, which would help avoid selective application of the law and pressure on other state bodies.
These proposals reflect urgent problems in the activities of the SBI that have been highlighted by experts and international partners. During 2025–2026, the SBI was repeatedly used as an instrument of political pressure and inter-agency confrontation, diverting the Bureau’s resources away from its core tasks and undermining trust in it. Developing the analytical capacities of the SBI corresponds to European integration changes under which national law enforcement agencies must be integrated into the European system for countering crime.
In addition, the text of Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes that, within 30 days after the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030’ enters into force, the Verkhovna Rada should hear the report of the Director of the SBI on the Bureau’s performance in 2025 and, if its work is found unsatisfactory, the President should dismiss the Director of the Bureau. This proposal is fully consistent with the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation’.
Although, in general, we agree that these issues are relevant, it should be noted that the problems in the activities of the SBI are more complex and require a balanced and well-considered solution.
At present, in accordance with the Rule of Law Roadmap, a comprehensive study is being conducted that should determine the need and feasibility of further reforming the SBI in line with best European practices and should lead to the preparation, adoption and implementation of a law taking into account the necessary recommendations.
The Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka notes that a draft law on SBI reform will be presented by December 2026 based on the results of the study. In preparing such a law, broad discussions involving experts and civil society must also be held.
As in the current ACS for 2021–2025, the drafts do not examine problems in the activities of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) that have a corruption-related nature. While the current ACS has a different structure, the draft ACSs for 2026–2030 should pay attention to the institutional independence and capacity of the Bureau as one of the law enforcement agencies.
In particular, the work of the ESBU internal control units needs to be strengthened, since the integrity and transparency of the Bureau depend to a certain extent on their effectiveness. Attention has also repeatedly been drawn to the uncompetitive level of remuneration of ESBU employees, which prevents the Bureau from attracting the best specialists and creates corruption risks in its activities.
Issues related to the functioning of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine are included in the draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’.
The versions of all three draft ACSs largely share a common view of the problem of the institutional resilience and independence of the NABU, except for certain targeted changes proposed in Draft Law No. 15230-2. It states that one way to ensure the Bureau’s resilience and independence is to build a highly professional, integrity-driven team through open, transparent competitions, and to communicate the NABU’s activities effectively through the Public Oversight Council.
Both proposals appear questionable. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’, the Public Oversight Council at the NABU is an instrument for ensuring transparency and civilian oversight of the Bureau’s activities. As stated in the Report on the Results of the External Independent Evaluation (Audit) of the Effectiveness of the NABU’s Activities, conducted from March 2023 to November 2024, the members of the Public Oversight Council themselves noted a fairly high level of interaction between the Bureau and the Council. Such interaction takes the form of involving Council members in competition and disciplinary procedures, providing information and semi-annual reports on NABU activities, assessing the amount of public information disclosed by the Bureau and other measures. This indicates a considerable level of transparency of the body.
The openness of competitions for NABU positions is ensured both by involving representatives of civil society in competition commissions, namely persons selected by the Public Oversight Council, and by regularly publishing announcements on the NABU website, which allows any candidate who meets the requirements to take part in the competition.
Conclusions
All three draft ACSs for 2026–2030 contain sound proposals but also leave important issues unaddressed. Compared with previous anti-corruption strategies, before voting in the plenary composition of the Verkhovna Rada, these draft laws must be considered by all parliamentary committees, whereas previous ACS drafts were examined by only five committees.
The Anti-Corruption Strategy is not only a requirement of anti-corruption legislation and a prerequisite for stable and progressive anti-corruption policy. It is also Ukraine’s commitment to international partners, reflected in the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Rule of Law Roadmap. The Joint Statement by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Taras Kachka of 11 December 2025 states that the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme for its implementation is one of the priorities for 2026 that should demonstrate Ukraine’s determination to strengthen its institutions, achieve substantial progress in reforms under the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster of the EU accession process and continue moving forward on its European path.
