In most European countries, the Government holds broad legislative powers and is the main initiator of draft laws due to the availability of resources and expert staff. In Ukraine, however, most draft laws come from Members of the Parliament, which are usually of poor quality due to non-compliance with the requirements of law-making techniques and the absence of any rational justification for the need for legal regulation.

The low quality of the draft laws submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is also indicated by the fact that a significant number of registered draft laws are related to amendments. The submission of a large number of draft laws of this type indicates insufficient and poor-quality preparation of the primary regulatory act and the continuation of the practice of “patching holes” instead of developing effective framework legislation based on the “from start to finish” principle.

The Report and Roadmap on the Reform of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine prepared in February 2016 contains recommendations for improving the work of the Parliament, which were subsequently adopted by a relevant Resolution. Among the recommendations related to the quality and quantity of draft laws initiated by MPs, the following are worth highlighting: 

1. Only draft laws that meet the requirements of the Verkhovna Rada’s Rules of Procedure and are accompanied by a reliable explanatory note and financial and economic justification can be registered (Recommendation 3).
2. The VRU Secretariat should thoroughly analyse each proposed draft law to avoid duplication (or contradiction) with existing national legislation. Registration should be denied if the draft law does not comply with the form and requirements set out in the Rules of Procedure (Recommendation 4).

According to the Rules of Procedure, a draft law registered and included in the agenda of a session must be sent for scientific examination in preparation for the first reading and for legal examination and editorial review to the relevant structural units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat in preparation for all subsequent readings.  

Thus, factors such as the large volume of draft laws submitted by MPs, their low quality, and the insufficient resource capacity of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat create “legislative spam”. Although the spam is “legislative”, however, legislative initiative is not limited to the submission of a draft law to the Parliament. The Rules of Procedure require the legislative initiators to submit other supporting documents, including an explanatory note. It is this document that should help MPs and the public become familiar with the main purpose of the draft law and its key provisions. The explanatory note itself can help solve the problem of “legislative spam”. According to the Rules of Procedure, the explanatory note should include:

1. Justification of the need to adopt the draft law, its goals, objectives and main provisions, and its place in the legislative system.
2. Justification of the expected socio-economic, legal and other consequences of the law after its adoption.
3. Other information necessary for the consideration of the draft law. 

According to established practice, the sections (parts) of this document are typically titled as such. However, the established requirements are often only met de jure, with just a few sentences used for justification, and the unit responsible for registering draft laws only conducts a formal check of the explanatory note or other supporting documentsAccording to Article 92 of the Rules, a draft law or other act must be rejected for registration if it is submitted in violation of the requirements.. Instead, the need to prepare explanatory notes in clear and understandable language, together with the need to align them with existing policies, will either reduce the number of submitted draft laws (as authors will be able to assess the priority of their own draft law at this stage) or enable the Secretariat of Verkhovna Rada to reasonably reject submitted draft laws on the grounds of non-compliance with the criteria. 

But what exactly should be included in a well-prepared explanatory note? Let’s look at the experience of other countries.

The experience of the Ukrainian parliament regarding the mandatory submission of explanatory notes is not unique. The requirements for submitting supporting documents to a draft law, including mandatory submission of explanatory notes (memoranda, explanations), are outlined in the rules of procedureAn internal document regulating the procedures of a foreign parliament may be called a ‘Standing Order’ or ‘Rules and Procedures’. Hereinafter, the more common term ‘regulations’ is used in reference to such documents. of many parliaments, for example, in:

1. Parliament of New Zealand (explanatory notes).
2. The Estonian Parliament (explanatory memorandum).
3. The Turkish Parliament (justification).
4. to the lower house of the Spanish parliament (explanatory memorandum).
5. German Bundestag (explanatory memorandum). 

A similar practice exists in the lower house of the Czech Republic. Thus, every draft law must be accompanied by an explanatory report analysing the current state of legal regulation and explaining the need for the new legislation in general and regarding its specific provisions. Each explanatory report must also include a description of all anticipated economic and financial consequences of the new legislation, especially those related to the state and regional budgets, as well as an assessment of the draft’s compliance with international treaties and the Czech constitutional order.

The rules of procedure of some countries set more detailed requirements for supporting documents and explanatory notes for government initiatives. For example, the Rules of Procedure of the Greek Parliament specify that every draft law must be accompanied by an explanatory note, which should contain the reasons and purpose of the proposed changes. Government proposals must also include an impact assessment report and a report on public consultations held. In certain cases, such as when the Government has declared the draft law urgent, a short evaluation report may replace the impact assessment and a public consultations report. The Rules of Procedure in Portugal also contain different requirements for government draft laws: a descriptive memorandum must be submitted detailing the social, economic, financial and political situations to which the project relates, information on the benefits and consequences of its adoption, and a list of current legislation in this area. Additionally, governmental draft laws must be accompanied by research, documents and conclusions with justifications, as well as the positions of the authorities consulted by the government during the adoption process.

In Bulgaria, a draft law submitted by a parliamentarian must also be accompanied by a document explaining the reasons for the need to adopt the draft law and a preliminary impact assessment, which must be conducted according to a methodology set out in a separate annex to the Rules of Procedure. The preliminary impact assessment must identify: the grounds for the legislative initiative, the stakeholders involved, cost-benefit analysis, expected changes in the structures of administrative bodies, information on the need to amend other regulatory acts, and details on how the draft will contribute to the principle of equality. 

An extensive list of requirements for an explanatory note is also set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament:

1. The reasons for the development of the draft, the tasks, and the objectives of the prepared draft.
2. Names/titles of the initiators of the draft law (institutions, individuals or representatives authorised by citizens) and individuals responsible for drafting the law.
3. The current legal framework governing the issues addressed in the draft law.
4. The proposed legal provisions and expected positive outcomes.
5. The results of the assessment of the expected impact on legal regulation (provided that such an assessment should be carried out during the development of the draft law and its results are not provided in a separate document), potential negative consequences of the adopted law, and measures to be taken to avoid these consequences.
6. Information on the impact of the adopted law on crime and corruption.
7. Information on the impact of the law’s implementation on business conditions and business development.
8. Information on the place of the law in the legal system, legal acts that must be adopted, and existing legal acts that must be amended or repealed after the adoption of the proposed draft.
9. Information on the compliance of the draft law with the requirements of the Law on the State Language, the Law on the Legislative System and the evaluation of the definitions used in the draft law and terms related to the definitions in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on the Terminology Bank and legal acts adopted to implement the Law.
10. Information on the compliance of the draft law with the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the documents of the European Union.
11. The names of the authorities that must adopt the legislative acts, if necessary for the implementation of the law, and the timeframe for their adoption.
12. The amount of funds from the state, municipal budgets and other state funds that will be spent or saved during the implementation of the law (estimates are provided for the next year and the following three years).
13. The assessment and conclusions of professionals obtained during the development of the draft law.
14. The keywords of the draft law necessary for inclusion in the information search system, including concepts and sections of the Eurovoc thesaurus.
15. Other justifications and explanations that the initiators consider necessary. 

1. A comparative version of the submitted draft amendments to the law or any other legal act to be adopted by the Seimas, which reflects the essence of the changes proposed by the draft, unless the submitted draft is a new version of the law or any other legal act to be adopted by the Seimas.
2. An itemised table of equivalence demonstrating the equivalence of the EU legal acts being implemented and the draft law, if this draft law implements the legal provisions of the EU acts.
3. The results of the assessment of the expected impact of the legal regulation, if such an assessment is to be carried out when drafting a law or any other legal act to be adopted by the Seimas and its results are not reflected in the explanatory note. 

The draft law, if necessary, is accompanied by a draft law on the procedure for implementing this law. The draft law is also accompanied by drafts of other legal acts that must be adopted by Seimas, which amend or repeal existing legal acts and must be adopted after the submitted draft law comes into force.

The Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of North Macedonia state that a draft law must be accompanied by an introduction and an elaboration. The introduction should contain an assessment of the state of the sector proposed to be regulated by the law and the reasons for the need to adopt the law, information about the goals, principles and main provisions of the draft law, an assessment of the financial impact of the draft law for the state budget, an assessment of the financial resources required to implement the law, and whether the law imposes material obligations on specific entities. In addition to these points, the submission may also include an overview of the rules of other legal systems and the compliance of the draft law with EU law, information on gender equality compliance, a list of other laws that need to be amended or adopted to implement the law, and an impact assessment. The explanation should contain an explanation of the content of the provisions of the draft law, their interconnection and the consequences of the proposed provisions.

The requirements listed above for explanatory notes should in no way be seen as a limitation of the constitutional right of parliamentarians to legislative initiative. All the norms mentioned earlier in the context of international experience were established by the parliament itself. That is, the established requirements do not restrict the legislative initiative, but, on the contrary, through self-regulation, the parliaments of these countries have simply defined the order and procedure for exercising this right.

Ukrainian Members of Parliament have also already established new rules for the preparation of draft laws and supporting documents (although they may not have realised it yet). For example, according to the Law of Ukraine “On Lawmaking” adopted in 2023, the results of the assessment of the draft law’s impact on social relations will become a mandatory part of the explanatory note to the legal act. In addition, some legal acts will need to develop concepts that will outline the basic principles of regulating social relations and reflect the results of analytical studies. These changes will come into effect one year after the termination or cancellation of martial law in Ukraine.

Such conditions for submitting draft laws will, firstly, help MPs, stakeholders, the media and citizens to understand the purpose and content of the proposed regulatory act. A well-prepared explanatory note with an impact assessment and evidence of the relevance of the problem, explaining the main provisions of the draft law in plain language, will greatly simplify the processing of the draft law by parliamentary departments and committees. Secondly, explanatory notes are already used to determine the purpose of regulation at the stage of law implementation, for example, when considering cases by courts of general jurisdiction and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Thirdly, if the implementation of the law involves expenditures from the state budget, the inclusion of a financial and economic justification in the content of the explanatory note will help the subjects of legislative initiative to comply with the principle of a balanced budget. 

Certainly, the mere existence of requirements for explanatory notes is not a sufficient safeguard against legislative spam. The unit of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat responsible for registering draft laws should have sufficient human and material resources to refuse to register draft laws in a timely and reasonable manner, including those with poor supporting documents. Such a unit should not be subject to political pressure, for example, to refuse to register draft laws authored by opposition factions or, conversely, to register draft acts of the coalition even if they do not meet the established requirements. If these conditions are met, then Ukraine will have a real chance to overcome “legislative spam”.

At the end of February, seven MPsVyacheslav Medyanyk, Maksym Buzhanskyi, Maksym Pavlyuk, Serhiy Kuzminykh, Oleksandr Bakumov, Serhiy Shvets, Volodymyr Zakharchenko. from the “Servant of the People” party registered draft law No 11031 in the Verkhovna Rada, which proposes to introduce a “unified system for video monitoring of public security” in Ukraine. The document is included in the agenda of the 12^th session of the IX convocation of the Parliament.

In this analysis, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives examines the draft law and why its adoption in the current version will not improve the security situation in the country, but rather create additional obstacles to public safety.

According to the text of the draft law, its goal is to enhance public and state security, introduce a single centralised video surveillance system that will operate at different levels and integrate all existing systems currently in use. 

The MPs believe that this will bring Ukraine’s video surveillance systems up to the standards of the United States, the United Kingdom, or the EU countries. This is how they justify the need to adopt the document, as the current state of video surveillance systems does not meet the requirements of law enforcement in ensuring public and national security. 

At the beginning of this year, the government announced that it would start working on the introduction of video surveillance systems. After the document was included in the parliamentary agenda, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs held a meeting with members of the relevant parliamentary committee to discuss the need to pass the draft law.

However, despite the obvious need to improve public safety in Ukraine, several issues may arise during this process. They relate to the advanced video surveillance system itself, the potential violation of citizens’ rights, and its ability to withstand cyber threats, especially given instances of using Russian or Chinese software.

Another concern is the unclear wording of the draft law and the motivation behind its adoption, as the objectives and methods for achieving them are outlined only in general terms.

Should we fear the prospects of the state sliding towards authoritarianism, or should we be concerned about the security of our personal data, and why is the proposed document unlikely to be a solution to the problem? Let’s delve deeper.

The draft law provides for the development of unified functional and technical standards for the system, with their approval delegated to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. At the same time, at the request of the security and defence forces, the placement of video surveillance systems may be restricted either temporarily or permanently.

The MoIA will own the system, which is proposed to be divided into central, regional/local, and departmental levels, all designed to interact with each other.

The draft law stipulates that cameras will be installed in all public places, will be able to record sound and process the data using AI technologies.

The proposed new system will have access to data from state registersIn particular: the Unified State Demographic Registe, the Unified Information and Analytical Migration Process Management System, National System of Biometric Verification and Identification of Ukrainian Citizens, Foreigners and Stateless Persons, Unified State Register of Vehicles, the State Register of Taxpayers., and it is thanks to AI processing that the Ministry of Internal Affairs will have a large amount of information about citizens, including name, gender, place and date of birth, as well as place of residence (stay) and digitised image of the person’s face, tax data, etc. At the same time, the MPs do not explain how the “digitised face” came to be at the disposal of the state. Although the Ministry itself denies the risks of “total surveillance”.

The draft law proposes to grant citizens the right to access the information stored in the system, but without the ability to request its removal. Article 13 of the draft law also stipulates that collected information may be retained for 15 years, but the same article grants the MoIA the authority to set different data retention periods.

Article 12 of the draft law also refers to Convention 108+Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data is a framework document that defines the general principles of processing, storing and exchanging personal data. for the protection of personal data, but there is no specifics on how this process will be implemented. Notably, Ukraine has ratified only the original text of the Convention and not its subsequent amendments.

In the explanatory note, the parliamentarians specifically claim that the new law could improve national and state security, yet they do not provide a clear explanation of how video surveillance systems will contribute to achieving this objective.

The text of the draft law does not provide more specific details of all these processes, limiting itself at this stage to general wording. Similarly, the document does not clearly explain how the adoption of the law could affect security in the context of Russian aggression. Let’s examine the issues with Draft Law No 11031.

Despite the stated intentions to technologically improve and elevate security standards in Ukraine, strengthen the ability of law enforcement and special services to investigate or even prevent crimes, and bring Ukrainian legislation closer to the EU standards, this is not entirely true.

To address this, attention should be given to some of the main documents regulating the collection and processing of personal data and AI systems in the EU. First of all, these include the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Artificial Intelligence Act adopted by the European Parliament.

The purpose of the GDPR is to protect the personal data of EU citizens and to establish rules and regulations by which organisations and institutions must collect and protect personal data. 

Its key provisions include the minimization of data collection and processing, a clearly defined and limited data retention period, a specifically stated purpose for processing, and the ability for individuals to correct and delete information collected during observation. This is in stark contrast to what is proposed in Draft Law No 11031.

The VRU Committee on Digital Transformation, for example, pointed out that the text of the draft law refers to the compliance with GDPR standards, but the regulation itselfHowever, Ukraine’s implementation of the GDPR is ongoing, with draft law No. 8153 on personal data protection registered in Parliament. has not yet been implemented by Ukraine. It also highlighted the absence of any description in the text of the purpose for storing, processing and deleting the data obtained.

Meanwhile, the Artificial Intelligence Act is the world’s first comprehensive lawWhich applies to the territory of EU member states. regulating AI, aimed at minimising risks associated with its use. Its primary goal is to regulate AI technology based on its potential risks. One key provision of the Act, which is absent in the Ukrainian draft law, is the prohibition on the use of AI for the collection and processing of personal data. 

The Parliament’s European Integration Committee added that although the draft law falls withinArticle 15 of the Agreement provides that the parties will work to improve the protection of personal data. the scope of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the document currently does not meet several criteria and contradicts the objectives of the agreement and the European integration process. The biggest risks are associated with the process of personal identification: from the use of AI technologies to the collection of biometric data.

In its opinion, the Main Scientific and Expert Department of the Parliament also highlighted the risks of excessive state interference in the video surveillance system, and described conceptual inaccuracies in the legislative initiative.

In some cases, the legislators fail to provide clear definitions for the terminology used in the document, or terms that are entirely absent from related legislation. There are also no explanations of how the system should be implemented, what infrastructure should be involved, and what costs will be incurred by the state budget.

The need to improve the security monitoring system in Ukraine, especially against the backdrop of Russian aggression, is a pressing issue that requires resolution.

However, excessive data accumulation, unclear objectives and methods of implementing the draft law will open the way to unnecessary interference by law enforcement agencies in the lives of citizens. The proposed draft law may not solve the problems as intended, but only further provoke several legislative conflicts and push Ukraine away from the declared technological and legal standards of the EU.

Overall, the current version of the draft law requires revision to provide clear justification for its adoption, define which practical steps should be taken, and demonstrate whether it will indeed improve the security situation.

In the summer, the Verkhovna Rada passed two draft laws on military justice in the first reading. In June, the parliament voted for a draft law on the Military Police (MP), and in July, a draft law on exemption from criminal liability under certain conditions in case of unauthorised abandonment of the unit (UAU) by military personnel.

The establishment of the Military Police was also publicly supported by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) also pointed to this need in a Green Paper we prepared for the VRU Committee on Law Enforcement.

After the commencement of the full-scale Russian invasion, the restoration of a full-fledged military justice system in Ukraine became urgent. Over the past ten years, the number of military personnel has increased from 166,000 in 2013 to 880,000 people in February 2024. 

In addition, the number of offences committed in the armed forces has increased significantly over this period: from 2013 to 2023, it increased by 78 times, and the number of convicted servicepersons increased by 14 times. The legislation also introduced new types of administrative offences, and the number of penalties imposed has increased 6.5 times since 2015.

The new military realities have also increased the need for investigators, prosecutors, judges, and lawyers with the required competence.

There is currently no military justice system in Ukraine. The law enforcement function in the military sector is performed by several state bodies, depending on their powers: separate units of the SBI, NPU, NABU, SSU, ESB, and others.

Each of these bodies operates separately in the military sector – different cases, depending on the offence, are handled by different law enforcement agencies and with due regard to the differences in their functions.

A special law enforcement unit, the Military Law Enforcement Service (MLES), has been operating within the AFU since 2002. Although the MLES operates within the AFU, it extends a number of its powers by law to military personnel of other units, persons liable for military service, and reservists.

The Green Paper on military justice prepared by the ALI outlines the main shortcomings of the current system:

• the existence of a special law enforcement unit within the AFU leads to the AFU being tasked with law enforcement functions which are inappropriate for them;
• The MLES is subordinate to the military command, is funded by the AFU, and MLES officials are appointed by the military command, which makes the MLES dependent on such a command, which may try to bring it under its control;
• most of MLES’s tasks and functions are not law enforcement by nature but are aimed at supporting the activities of the AFU.

Back in autumn 2021, the Presidential Decree approved the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine, which included the reform of the MLES into the Military Police, which will be responsible for maintaining law and order in the Ministry of Defence. This process was to be completed by the end of 2025.

The draft law 6569-d voted in June is a revised version of draft laws 6569 and 6569-1. 

The draft law’s adoption is justified by the fact that the current MLES does not have any powers to date to perform operational and investigative measures and bring perpetrators to legal liability, and it is limited in its ability to assist pre-trial investigation bodies and prosecutors.

In addition, it is necessary to bridge the existing gaps in the legislation, which, given the specific structure of the AFU and other military units in Ukraine, indicate the need for a comprehensive system of military justice in the country.

Among the arguments of the draft law are the inefficiency and slowness of the investigation into numerous military offences and the fact that SBI investigators do not fully ensure the fulfilment of their tasks due to limited powers and imperfect legislation. 

In addition, the workload of the SBI has increased many times since 2022. For example, 85.5% of the registered criminal proceedings against military personnel in 2023 were concerned with violations of the rules of service, which obviously affected the quality and speed of solving crimes.

The draft law proposes to create a new military unit with law enforcement functions, namely the Military Police. Its task should be to ensure law and order and military discipline in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the AFU and the State Special Transport Service.

One of the significant changes envisaged by the draft law is that Military Police officers will be empowered to carry out operational and search activities and, in some cases, even to conduct investigative (search) and covert investigative (search) actions. Previously, the MLES only assisted special agencies in performing such activities.

The newly created body will be financed by redistributing costs in the state budget spending and expenditures on those bodies whose functions will be partially taken over by the Military Police. According to the document text, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will coordinate the work of the Military Police through the Minister of Defence, while during martial law, the AFU Commander-in-Chief will provide overall leadership and coordination.

The Military Police is to be formed from active servicepersons of the AFU. According to the draft law, the total number of its members may not exceed 1.5% of the total number of the AFU.

Draft law No. 6569-d, adopted in the first reading, is an important step towards addressing the challenges faced by military justice in Ukraine.

Moreover, it is positive that parliamentarians adopted a revised draft law in the first reading rather than the documents registered shortly before the start of the full-scale invasion. Moreover, unlike previous legislative initiatives, MPs abandoned the idea of giving the Military Police financial control over the AFU and other military units this time. 

Nevertheless, before introducing changes to the legislation, it is worth considering the risks that may accompany the process. Establishing a new institution always requires additional financial, material and organisational resources, which is difficult in times of war.

In terms of financing, the draft law initiators emphasise that its implementation will not require additional budgetary expenditures and can be accomplished by reforming the MLES and reducing the burden on other law enforcement agencies. However, it is difficult to agree (or disagree) with this without the calculations at hand.

There are doubts that the Military Police will start performing its tasks immediately after its establishment, given the lack of staffing and the lack of sufficient knowledge and skills of its officers in terms of operational and search activities and other tasks.

It is debatable that the independence of the Military Police in terms of its law enforcement functions is not directly defined as a principle of its activity.

The Military Police is also somewhat dependent on the decisions of the Minister of Defence or the AFU Commander-in-Chief, including in terms of financing its activities. The Central Scientific Experts Office of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also commented in this regard in its opinion.

Independent military justice bodies should support Ukraine and its Armed Forces’ declared goal of moving towards NATO membership and implementing NATO standards in practice.

The draft law provides for the coordination of the Military Police by the Cabinet of Ministers, which does not meet the standards of NATO member states where these bodies operate within the defence ministries.

On the other hand, the wording of the law as made public may lead to the risk of interference by the Military Police as a military unit in the activities of the executive body, which is the Ministry of Defence, as experts of the VRU Secretariat have pointed out. This, although indirectly, contradicts the provision of Article 17(4) of the Constitution of Ukraine, according to which no one can use military units to restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens or to obstruct the activities of the governmental authorities. 

One of the most problematic issues that needs to be clarified in preparing the draft law for the second reading is whether and to what extent the pre-trial investigation function should be transferred to the Military Police. Also, the investigation under which articles should be transferred to it and how should it interact with other authorised bodies during such activities?

This winter, we wrote about the heavy fate of the draft Code of Ethics for MPs, which could have become a tool for strengthening the subjectivity of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine (through the introduction of effective self-regulatory mechanisms) and increasing the level of trust in the single legislative body (by strengthening the requirements for MPs behaviour and introducing effective sanctions and control mechanisms).

At that time, we could only talk about semi-public debates around this Draft Law (No. 8327 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Rules of Ethical Behaviour of MPs of Ukraine (Code of Ethics)”), as well as the attempts of the Standing Committee to propose its own version with much less potential — in keeping with the tradition of “Ukrainian-style reforms with no real changes”. However, at the end of January, the opinion of the MSED (Main Scientific and Expert Department) was released. Many of the comments made by the experts of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat somehow echo the arguments against the provisions of Draft Law No. 8327, which the Chairperson of the Standing Committee voiced at various venues throughout the year (meetings of the Working Group on the Reform of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, political meetings of the representatives of factions and groups in the Jean Monnet Dialogues format).

We cannot but take this opportunity to provide comprehensive responses and counter-arguments to the criticisms, which we believe are mostly politically motivated. We will further provide a step-by-step summary of the comments and our responses thereto. The full text of the MSED’s opinion is available here.

Article 10 (Part 2) of the Law “On Lawmaking” defines the forms in which a law is adopted. If to use this classification, then Draft Law No. 8327 falls under the definition of a “law on amendments” (as indicated in the title of Draft Law No. 8327), and not a “code of Ukraine”.

However, the logic behind this Draft Law title is that the development and adoption of a Code of Ethics (or Code of Conduct) for MPs is a specific recommendation of several international organisations (OSCE/ODIHR, Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), Council of Europe, European Parliament’s Assessment Mission). Such a document exists in many countries (including those where codes “are a collection of rules contained within a single instrument and regulating a homogeneous sphere of social relations”, and is called exactly that. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian case is that the implementation of this recommendation (following many rounds of discussions) is possible only through amending a number of existing instruments, and not by adopting one holistic, completely new one. At the same time, it is quite standard and even common practice for Ukrainian legislators to add the following bracketed wording at the end of the standard formula: “on amending certain legislative acts of Ukraine regarding”. For example, a number of currently effective acts contain the clarification — (COVID-2019) — in their titles.

At the same time, the presence of the phrase “Code of Ethics” in the title of the Draft Law is not crucially important, so the Draft Law title can be changed at the stage of its finalisation before the second reading.

This comment would be justified if the current parliamentary law instruments did not already provide for special rules for a committee creation that differ from the general procedure for the committees’ formation. However, Article 33-2 of the Law of Ukraine “On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”already contains such rules. The title of the article literally indicates this: “Powers and peculiarities of formation of the membership of a committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, scope of which includes the issue of ensuring the control functions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine over the activities of special purpose bodies with law enforcement functions, special purpose law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies”.

Moreover, the Main Legal Department (MLD) in its opinion on the Draft Law that created Article 33-2 notes that the provisions on the peculiarities of formation of the membership of one of the committees should be set out in Article 6 of this Law, thus confirming the very possibility of introducing special rules for the formation of the membership of a separate committee.

We can also consider a broader context. The parliamentary reform in Ukraine envisages, among other things, the regulation of the status of the opposition. And one of the main issues of regulating the status of the opposition is the distribution of some committees (and/or positions in these committees) between the coalition and the opposition. In other words, parliamentary reform in this regard can only be implemented if rules for the formation of certain committees that differ from the general procedure are established.

Draft Law No. 8327 provides for the establishment of a Committee responsible for monitoring compliance with discipline and standards of deputies’ ethics (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). Indeed, this Committee will be functionally integrated into the general system of committees. This Committee, as well as other committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is subject to the provisions of Articles 1 and 11–14 of the Law of Ukraine “On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”, which define the status, tasks and functions of committees, i. e. drafting, organisational and controlling ones. Nothing in Draft Law No. 8327 restricts this Committee from performing legislative work, as well as preparing and preliminary consideration of issues within the VRU’s authority. Both the legislation drafting and control functions of this Committee will be performed in accordance with the scope of its competence. The Draft Law itself does not set out the scope of competence of this Committee. They must be established by adopting a relevant resolution. In other words, the content of Draft Law No. 8327, in the context of the Committee’s establishment, stipulates that the Standing Committee will not deal with issues of deputy ethics, but a separate sectoral committee will be established for this purpose.

It should be added that Article 33-2 (regarding the committee responsible for ensuring the control functions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine over the activities of special purpose bodies with law enforcement functions, special purpose law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies), despite their existence in the Law of Ukraine “On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” for more than three years, have not yet been challenged by anyone in the Constitutional Court. Moreover, these provisions were adopted by the ninth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and it is the current Parliament that is responsible for implementing such provisions in Ukrainian legislation.

Finally, the Verkhovna Rada already de facto has at least one committee with a priority controlling function. The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech is, in fact, a controlling committee. Since the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation started its work in September 2019, until May 2022, not a single draft law has been assigned to the Committee on Freedom of Speech as a main committee. As of February 2024, only 3 (three) draft laws were assigned to this Committee as the main committee. That is, the Committee on Freedom of Speech received its first assigned draft law in the third year of its existence, and in five years, there have been three such draft laws, which is less than 1 per year. Instead, the Committee on Freedom of Speech dealt with issues of censorship, attacks on journalists, false information, etc. In other words, it performed a controlling function.

Currently, the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine already has such powers. Article 33 (Part 5) of the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of the Member of Parliament of Ukraine” provides that the reimbursement of a member of parliament expenses related to his/her performance of parliamentary powers shall be terminated by the order of the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is issued based on a decision of the committee responsible for the MPs ethics. Such powers of the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada are in line with the powers defined in Article 88 of the Constitution, according to which the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine […] organises the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and coordinates the activities of its bodies.

The rules on granting the Chairperson of the VRU such powers (to stop reimbursement of expenses…) were adopted already in the ninth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. The opinions of the MSED and the Standing Committee on the draft law introducing such provisions do not contain any comments on the unconstitutionality of granting the Chairperson of the VRU the relevant powers. Moreover, the Standing Committee of the ninth convocation not only did not make such comments but also directly called for support for the proposal of the authors of the Draft Law to adopt it as a basis and thus supporting the granting of the power to terminate payments to the MPs to the Chairperson of the VRU.

The introduction of the rules on the relevance of inquiries and appeals to the public interest by Draft Law No. 8327 is due to the frequent use of such tools for the personal benefits of the MPs.

The use of the member of parliament’s mandate in the public interest follows from many provisions of the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine. The text of the member of parliament’s oath of allegiance to Ukraine, as set out in Article 79 of the Constitution, clearly demonstrates the importance of the public interest: “I swear allegiance to Ukraine. I commit myself with all my deeds to protect the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, to provide for the good of the Motherland and for the welfare of the Ukrainian people. I swear to abide by the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine, to carry out my duties in the interests of all compatriots”. At the level of the law, e. g., Article 1 (Part 1) of the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of the Member of Parliament of Ukraine” stipulates that a member of parliament is a representative of the Ukrainian people.

Concerns about the estimative nature of the public interest, raised by the MSED, are based on the fact that the relevant provisions will be used to punish political opponents. Draft Law No. 8327 provides that this problem should be resolved by the relevant Committee, which is formed on a parity basis, and therefore requires a consensus of the opposition and coalition representatives to establish the absence or presence of public interest in requests or appeals, which turns a value judgement into a consensus opinion. The problems of inconsistency with Articles 15 and 16 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of the Member of Parliament of Ukraine” can be resolved by amending these articles at the second reading stage. For example, by supplementing these articles with relevant requirements.

These comments may well be taken into account at the stage of preparing the Draft Law for the second reading. For instance, these provisions could be amended so that the procedure for considering complaints and the procedure for appealing decisions on liability are determined by the Verkhovna Rada or the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada. In addition, such provisions could be set out in the Regulation on the Committee’s Secretariat, which is approved by the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada.

At the same time, the grounds for abuse and subjectivity in the Committee’s activities should be eliminated by ensuring parity of representation of the opposition and the coalition.

The above-mentioned provisions of Parts 1 and 2 of Article 51 of the Rules of Procedure are essentially declarative or “dead” norms. MPs, both representatives of the coalition and the opposition, constantly bring into the parliamentary chamber objects that are not intended to support legislative activity, often, these are posters, which are explicitly prohibited in Article 51 (as seen in the materials of Unian, LB and Glavkom). MPs also often shout, applaud, stand up, and talk on mobile phones in the parliamentary chamber. Among the recent events, we can mention the events of 10 January 2024, when the Chairperson of the VRU terminated the session early due to shouting and noise in the chamber (as seen in the transcript and video). In general, it is difficult for a regular viewer of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine sessions to imagine the work of the MPs without shouting and applause during the presentation or perception of a speech, although this behaviour is recognised as unacceptable by the current Rules of Procedure. All of these actions have long been part of parliamentary behaviour and do not result in sanctions against violators. Therefore, their exclusion from the Rules of Procedure is unlikely to change the actual behaviour of the MPs.

The rules proposed by Draft Law No. 8327 to replace the existing but ineffective ones, such as non-use of physical force, respect for colleagues, non-use of obscene words, etc., are more general rules that aim to ensure the same goal (maintaining order during the work of the MPs), but in combination with other logically related rules of the Draft Law (in particular, the system of sanctions and the mechanism for bringing violators to justice), they seem to be a much more effective tool.

In other words, the Draft Law replaces the existing but ineffective rules with a new holistic system of rules and mechanisms for their implementation, which, in essence, corresponds to the meaning of the “code” concept, although it is implemented in the form of amendments to a number of acts.

The procedure may contain a detailed appeal procedure, while the Draft Law contains only general rules and principles thereof. As noted above, such a procedure may be approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. In any case, such things may be finalised at the stage of preparing the Draft Law for the second reading.

This MSED’s comment seems to be based on an incorrect interpretation of the provisions of Draft Law No. 8327. The latter actually stipulates that the Committee to be established recommends to the Chairperson of the VRU to make a decision on the responsibility of a member of parliament. The MSED used this interpretation (it is the Chairperson who imposes sanctions) in the third paragraph of its opinion. As for the mechanism of cancellation of the decision of the Chairperson of the VRU by a majority vote of the MPs, such a mechanism is already available in the Rules of Procedure (Part 2 of Article 78): the orders of the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine may be amended or cancelled by a decision of the Verkhovna Rada adopted by a majority vote of the MPs from the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada. Based on the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, the Chairperson of the VRU makes decisions that are formalised in the form of an order. In other words, an order is a way to formalise a decision. In order to avoid further misinterpretations (whose decision may be cancelled by the VRU), the relevant provisions of the Draft Law can be finalised before the second reading.

This quite reasonable MSED’s comment can be considered by amending the Draft Law appropriately when preparing it for the second reading.

An impeccable reputation and high moral qualities are indeed estimative concepts. They should serve as a guideline for the MPs in determining the candidacy of the Committee’s Chairperson and Secretary. It is expected that MPs will independently assess the extent to which the candidates meet these criteria. Morality and ethics are concepts that, by their nature, cannot always be interpreted unambiguously. This applies both to other proposed rules of Draft Law No. 8327 (e. g., what exactly constitutes discriminatory expressions, what does the economical use of property mean, what does respectful treatment mean, etc.) and to the existing provisions of the Constitution and acts of parliamentary law. The above-mentioned member of parliament’s oath of allegiance to Ukraine contains many concepts that are not unambiguous, such as “loyalty to Ukraine”, “good of the Motherland”, “welfare of the Ukrainian people”, and “interests of all compatriots”. Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine, “On the Status of the Member of Parliament of Ukraine”, which currently regulates the issue of parliamentary ethics, also contains concepts that can be interpreted in different ways: “1. In his/her activities, a member of parliament shall adhere to generally recognised rules of morality; always preserve his/her own dignity, respect the honour and dignity of other MPs, officials, and citizens; refrain from actions, statements and deeds that compromise him/herself, voters, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the state. 2. It is inadmissible for a member of parliament to use his/her parliamentary mandate contrary to generally recognised rules of morality, human and civil rights and freedoms, and the legitimate interests of society and the state. 3. A member of parliament should not use his/her parliamentary mandate for personal, in particular deceptive, purposes”.

In fact, the law cannot but leave room for interpretation of its provisions depending on the context. Self-assessment of candidates for compliance with the above criteria is at the same time: 1) a manifestation of the Verkhovna Rada’s subjectivity, and 2) a link between MPs and their voters through shared values.

Draft Law No. 8327 stipulates that an authorised person registers a complaint on his/her own behalf, acting as a complainant. This makes the complaint non-anonymous, as the complaint has a specific author and a specific complainant, i. e. the authorised person.

Draft Law No. 8327 stipulates that the complaint submission mechanism should be detailed in the complaint procedure. In particular, this procedure may clearly establish which entity and in what manner must establish the “validity” of the appeal of an employee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Secretariat in order for the authorised person to register the complaint on his/her behalf and act as the complainant. Again, such a procedure may be approved by the Verkhovna Rada or the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada, and the relevant amendments may be made to the Draft Law at the stage of its finalisation.

The logic of introducing the possibility of closed consideration of violations of the rules of conduct is based on the idea that the very fact of filing a complaint and its consideration may damage the reputation of a member of parliament. This mechanism can be used by political opponents for reputational attacks, which is explicitly stated in the OSCE Background Study: Professional and Ethical Standards for Parliamentarians (Section: Safeguards during an investigation). Moreover, there was a consensus on this mechanism among the relevant parliamentary subgroup of the Work Group on the reform of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Therefore, in some cases (Draft Law No. 8327 generally provides for open meetings), the possibility of closed meetings is proposed to reduce the potential for using the Code of Ethics as a tool for reputational attacks.

Nevertheless, we believe that the mechanism can be improved and detailed at the stage of preparing the Draft Law for the second reading.

This quite reasonable MSED’s comment can be easily considered at the stage of preparing the Draft Law for the second reading. It requires editorial amendments to certain structural elements of the Draft Law, without changing its content, purpose or the relationship between its individual structural elements.

This comment can be easily taken into account at the stage of preparing the Draft Law for the second reading. It requires editorial amendments to the preamble of the Draft Law, without changing its content, purpose or the relationship between its individual structural elements.

In general, the MSED’s comments can be divided into two groups. The first group is conceptual comments (comments Nos. 2.1, 2.2, 3, and 6.3), and the second group is technical and legal comments (all other comments).

Article 102 (Part 2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine gives us a hint as to what the further fate of the Draft Law should be, which states that “Consideration and adoption of a Draft Law under the procedure of three readings includes: 1) the first reading, i.e. discussion of the basic principles, provisions, criteria, and structure of the draft law and its adoption as a basis; 2) the second reading, i. e. article-by-article discussion and adoption of the draft law in the second reading”. In other words, if the basic principles, provisions, criteria, and structure of the draft law are satisfactory, it can be adopted in the first reading and certain article-by-article changes can be finalised by making amendments at the second reading stage. The MSED’s opinion and analysis thereof is an excellent basis for refining the text of the Draft Law and proves that it is possible to adopt Draft Law No. 8327 as a basis, with its further refinement at the stage of preparation for the second reading.

Important conceptual issues highlighted by the CSE O include, in particular, the issue of a new Committee establishment, the mechanism for imposing sanctions for violations of the rules of ethical conduct, and their cancellation. It is important to note that similar mechanisms and instruments already exist in the current legislation. Moreover, they were introduced by the current, ninth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada, and the MSED, the MLD and Standing Committee agreed to the introduction of these amendments or even directly supported them.

All other comments can be finalised at the stage of preparation for the second reading. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, it is at this stage that draft laws must undergo detailed technical and legal revision, considering amendments and proposals from the MPs. Moreover, the Verkhovna Rada has recently been actively using the mechanism of adopting draft laws as a basis with further refinement under Article 116 (Part 1) of the Rules of Procedure, which provides for consideration of proposals and amendments to correct, clarify, eliminate errors and/or contradictions in the text of the draft law, other structural parts of the draft law and/or other legislative acts that were not considered in the first reading. There are already more than 60 such draft laws approved in the first reading. Each individual amendment that can be finalised at the stage of preparation for the second reading may be excluded from the text of the draft law. However, if all such amendments are excluded, this may unbalance Draft Law No. 8327. Therefore, it is important to find the right balance between finalising certain amendments proposed by the law and excluding those that are fundamentally opposed by key stakeholders.

In any case, the lawmaking process has never been a set of norms and technical and legal rules. It has always been a combination of political will a desire to change the current state of affairs and legal constructs. Draft Law No. 8327 is the result of extensive discussion, consultations, and the work of a work group chaired by a member of the ruling Sluga Narodu (Servant of the People) faction, which included representatives of most factions of the Verkhovna Rada and extra-parliamentary experts. This demonstrates multi-factional political support for the introduction of rules of ethical conduct for MPs. At the same time, the current legislation contains many tools and mechanisms similar to the conceptual instruments proposed by Draft Law No. 8327. Its technical and legal revision can be carried out at the stage of preparation for the second reading. In fact, the analysis of the CSE’s opinion showed that the adoption of this Draft Law is a matter of political will. After all, the introduction of ethical rules of conduct for parliamentarians is primarily the responsibility of Ukrainian MPs.

The biggest interrelated problems that the Ukrainian parliament has been suffering from for years include a large number of draft laws and their low quality. Thousands of draft laws (as of 29 January 2024, 6,277 of them were registered during the IX convocation), most initiated by MPs, have been accumulating in the Ukrainian parliament for years, draining the resources of the Verkhovna Rada. After all, the committees and expert analytical subdivisions of the parliament shall consider, work on, and provide conclusions on each draft law.

However, due to such a large number of registered draft laws, MPs suffer, too. After all, they find themselves in a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, they are required to make a decision, and on the other hand, the number of documents required for a balanced and reasoned judgement exceeds human capabilities.

In general, excessive workload reduces the effectiveness of the whole legislative process. Can this be changed?

There are different approaches, such as reforming the requirements for accompanying documents. If the standards regarding compulsory accompanying documents to the draft law are changed, this will force the initiators to work more carefully on draft laws and enable the Verkhovna Rada to issue conclusions faster and with higher quality. There is progress here already: last year, the law “On Law-Making Activity” was adopted, which stipulates the reform of requirements for accompanying documents.

Another version of the changes, prescribed in the Roadmap by the European Parliament’s mission, proposes creating an exhaustive list of 20 priority draft laws that are being processed by the Verkhovna Rada. That is, MPs must choose 20 draft laws, which the Verkhovna Rada will process. Only after the draft law passes through the entire legislative cycle will another one be voted for at its place in the list. This will allow Verkhovna Rada to focus the resources on specific solutions and avoid the pressure created by the incredible backlog of draft laws to be considered.

Another way to address the problem consists in restricting the right of legislative initiative. Currently, every MP can register a draft law, regardless of its relevance and quality. Over time, the number of registered draft laws became a sort of indicator of effectiveness for the MPs. So, restricting the right of an individual legislative initiative looks like a logical solution to the problem. And they have already tried to do it several times.

For example, draft law No. 1311, “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Exercise of the Right to Legislative Initiative,” was registered in 2014, setting this goal. The draft law’s path turned out to be short — it did not even reach a voting phase. However, the conclusion of the Verkhovna Rada Chief Scientific and Expert Department (CSED) is interesting: “The idea of ​​refusing to submit draft laws by any MP of Ukraine deserves support.” According to their proposal, two changes are sufficient: 1) establishing the minimum number of MPs with the right to submit a draft law; 2) the possibility of registering a draft law of an individual MP in the event that such a draft law was developed at the request of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and previously approved by the decision of the specialised committee.

Another idea was prescribed in draft law No. 6640 of 2017, “On Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (Regarding the Letter of Support for Draft Laws).” It proposed to introduce two conditions for the continued work on the draft law after its registration: 1) support by a certain number of MPs, equal to the number of MPs of the smallest faction; 2) government support.

Both draft laws proposed a similar mechanism: legislative initiatives are developed only when they have the support of most MPs. It seems logical: if a relatively small number of MPs do not support the draft law registration at the basic stage, then the needed number of votes is unlikely to be found during voting in the session hall. Working on draft laws doomed to failure at the very start is a waste of the limited resources of the Verkhovna Rada and MPs.

Collective legislative initiative is a common practice in many countries, particularly in Europe. As ALI mentioned in the concept of the legislative process, “from the beginning to the end,” “in Spain, this threshold makes 15 MPs for the lower house and 25 senators for the upper house. In Poland, the minimum number of MPs required to submit a draft law is fifteen; in Latvia, five MPs, and in Germany, the signatures of at least 15% of Bundestag MPs are required.” Therefore, it is difficult to equate the introduction of a collective legislative initiative with the moving of the Ukrainian state towards authoritarianism.

Many large-scale reforms are currently set aside until the post-war period because they require amendments to the Constitution. Can restriction on the legislative initiative contradict the Constitution?

Article 93 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that “the right of the legislative initiative in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine belongs to the President of Ukraine, MPs of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.” Certain parliamentarians propose to interpret it literally: this right belongs only to the majority of MPs and not to each one individually. Also, the Constitution does not specifically establish what the “legislative initiative” is. It may be the legislative proposal (this norm also existed in the 1996 Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada), which requires support letters from a certain number of MPs.

However, some problems may arise with the implementation of these ideas. In fact, MPs already feel limited subjectivity, and even more restrictions on their rights may cause a negative reaction. At the same time, improving the quality and reducing the number of registered draft laws can positively influence their work because both the committees and individual MPs will need to make fewer decisions, which will translate into quality.

“Legislative spam” is deeply rooted in the Ukrainian parliamentary tradition. There is no simple solution to this problem, but a combination of measures can work: restricting the right of legislative initiative, strengthening the requirements concerning accompanying documents, and compiling a list of draft laws. MPs are aware of these issues and options for solving them. However, neither public pressure nor recommendations of the European partners can replace MPs’ work — they bear full responsibility for implementing these amendments.

Over this year, the Rada worked fruitfully, having adopted [at the time of this text publication] 231 laws). Some of them caused a whole range of emotions – from screams of “Betrayal!” (Zrada in Ukrainian) on social networks to a more positive reaction to innovations. Other laws seem to have been disregarded by the public, although they will have a significant impact on society. Here are 5 laws adopted this year which will influence Ukraine, the war, and society.

Disclaimer: The mentioned laws are not necessarily “good” or “bad.” Their quality is to be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers and specialised experts following their implementation. We have highlighted the most important ones, those where their considerable influence is hard to deny.

Why is it important? This law was recognised by the relevant committee as one of the priority laws in the field of decentralisation. They worked on its development for two years, having involved numerous public organisations and associations, and the adoption of this law received positive feedback from the public. The draft law on service in the local government is an integral part of decentralisation reform, as well as the state service reform. The law will take effect after the war. However, the preparations for new regulations are underway.

What does it change? Optimising remuneration processes and their transparency, respective payments will be published in the public domain. Approving a new position – manager of the local government service, who will ensure appropriate employment conditions and fair competition for managerial positions. The competitions will also become more transparent: interviews with the winners will be published for the public. Generally, employees will receive additional legal protection, and their status will finally be properly stipulated by law.

Initiator(s): The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Why is it important? With the beginning of the full-scale invasion, cash payments to military servicepersons increased significantly. However, over time, mass mobilisation and the simultaneous economic decline caused discussions about the reduction of payments: the burden on the budget turned out to be excessive. As the Minister of Finance later said, “It is impossible to calculate and impossible to fund.” Although with different arguments, the Ministry of Defence agreed: the department emphasised “the adherence to the principles of justice in terms of motivating soldiers of the security and defence forces of Ukraine.” Hence, starting February 2023, the amount of additional monetary compensation for some categories of military servicepersons was reduced. This decision caused a harsh response from the society. After six months of discussions and struggle, a decision was adopted to increase payments to some categories of military servicepersons, and the Cabinet of Ministers specified categories and the amount of payments by its resolution.

What does it change? Different categories of military servicepersons received different increases in additional monetary remuneration. This way, UAH 100,000 is now paid to military personnel of missile and artillery forces, as well as to those who are engaged in demining in the area of combat operations. UAH 50,000 is paid to military personnel from command and headquarters. Those who perform demining outside the combat area will be paid an additional remuneration of UAH 30,000. Remuneration to wounded military servicepersons was increased to UAH 20,100, as well as to training centre instructors – from UAH 15,000 to UAH 30,000. Furthermore, this law increased the vacation period to 30 days per year.

Initiator(s): Davyd Arakhamia, Head of the parliamentary faction “Servant of the People,” and 125 more MPs.

Why is it important? For more than 30 years after Ukraine’s independence, there was no “law on laws” in place to regulate law-making activity. The definition of the “law,” “regulatory act,” and other important instruments were present only in theory. In the history of Ukrainian law-making, other problems related to the lack of high-quality regulation of the process became apparent. Lack of long-term planning of law-making activity, the absence of established rules for registration, as well as ineffective control over the implementation of laws by the executive power – all had a negative influence on the development of Ukrainian legislation. Therefore, a new law, “On Law-Making Activity,” is supposed to rectify this.

What does it change? The Law “On Law-Making Activity” is aimed at establishing the rules for the effective development of legislation and high-quality control over its implementation. The law establishes definitions of such notions as the “law,” “code,” “legislation of Ukraine,” and others. Legal monitoring is also introduced for more specific parliamentary control over the effectiveness of legislation application. Law-making will also be subject to regulation: the creation of a number of analytical, forecasting and programme documents for public policy will be introduced. Each stage of regulatory act drafting is elaborated in detail.

Initiator(s): Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chair of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and 190 other MPs.

Why is it important? At the beginning of the invasion, the Verkhovna Rada suspended the obligation to submit declarations for officials until peacetime. The reason for such a decision was the reaction to a full-scale war – a significant part of public officials and their families were located in the occupied territories, and accessibility of public information could expose them to direct danger. However, over time, the fight against corruption came back into the focus of civil society and international partners. The return of declarations and opening of the registry was one of the requirements: of the IMF – in order to receive funding, the EU – had to start negotiations regarding membership in the EU. The law on resuming compulsory submission of declarations was adopted, although with one exception: the opening of the registry was scheduled for the time after the end of martial law. This little detail caused a harsh reaction from the public, which is why the President vetoed the law, demanding that declarations be made accessible immediately and that the necessary number of votes be gathered.

What does it change? No later than 90 days after the enactment of the law, authorised persons shall be obliged to submit declarations for 2022–2023 (unless submitted before). If declarants are serving in the military or stay in the temporarily occupied territories, the deadlines for submitting declarations for them shall be different: declarations shall be submitted within 90 days after de-occupation of the person’s place of residence; return from the place of permanent deployment; from the date of the termination of powers; from the day when martial law is lifted. In addition, the Unified State Register of Declarations shall become accessible within 30 days from the date of enactment of the law.

Initiator(s): Davyd Arakhamia, Head of the parliamentary faction “Servant of the People,” and 40 more MPs.

Why is it important? The full-scale invasion and significantly greater mobilisation level caused a considerable increase in state expenses for payments to military servicepersons. This resulted in the increased amount of personal income tax to be paid to local budgets where military units are deployed. Hence, while the state budget suffered a significant deficit of 50%, a considerable share of local budgets increased their revenues through the personal income tax of military personnel. Expenses of communities attracted the attention of citizens, in particular, mass media. Questions appeared: is it worth spending money on parks and paving in the midst of a full-scale war? Central authorities also had similar questions concerning the efficiency of spending, given the significant deficit of funds in the state budget. So, the idea was born to reallocate personal income tax from military personnel’s salaries to the state budget, though such a step raised even more questions. On the one hand, the state needs more money in the armed fight against the invader. At the same time, during recent years, Ukraine has made moderate progress towards decentralisation, providing communities with more power. This law means a drastic U-turn from declared values. Finally, the decision to transfer the “military” personal income tax to the central budget was adopted. But what will it mean in practice: regular centralisation of the state in conditions of war or an attack on communities and moving back to authoritarianism? Only time will tell.

What does it change? In 2024, around UAH 96 billion are expected to be received from the “military” personal income tax. Of them, 45% will be allocated to the Administration of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine for manufacturing and procuring UIVs; 45% – to the Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine for developing the defence and industrial complex, and 10% – to military units relative to the paid personal income tax. Expenditures on donations to local budgets were also increased to prevent their deficit and compensate for the loss of the “military” personal income tax.

Initiator(s): The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

During the second year of full-scale war, the most important laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada are distinguished by the continued armed resistance against the occupying state. In spite of the war, Ukraine keeps undertaking reforms in other spheres, in particular, in the anti-corruption sector. Some laws were adopted under public pressure and based on assumed commitments, and others were the result of many years of hard work. Some laws became objects of long and fierce discussions, while others received unconditional support. 2024 will present new challenges to Ukrainian parliamentarians. We hope that the Parliament will be able to address them with dignity.

In simple words, lobbying is any influence exercised on representatives of the authorities to shape state policy in a certain field or defend the interests of certain groups.

It is important to understand that lobbying is a multi-million, if not multi-billion, business. Pharmaceutical companies, electronics manufacturers, and owners of mining companies spend hundreds of thousands of dollars annually on the services of lobbyists because their future income depends on them.

In international practice, lobbying for the interests of individual groups is a fairly common phenomenon. Several recommendations and resolutions of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) cover the main international guidelines in the field of lobbying and everything related thereto. Individual states have their own legislative regulation functions at the state level.

The United States is the most striking example of the application of lobbying capabilities in its fullness. Hence, it is not surprising that numerous nations that are presently attempting to legalise lobbying are following in American footsteps. Hence, most countries of the European Union have rules and norms on lobbying in place today. Hence, six countries enacted distinct laws governing lobbying activities (Ireland, France, Austria, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia), and nine implemented self-regulation of lobbyists, which is exemplified by a lenient control mechanism (Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Finland, Czech Republic, Croatia, Latvia, and Romania).

As a general rule, the common characteristics of lobbying in these countries include the registration of individuals wishing to provide lobbying services in accordance with a predetermined procedure, the availability of a public lobbyist registry, the reporting of lobbyists on their activities to authorities and the public; the imposition of certain restrictions during the performance of such activities; the obligation to adhere to established rules of conduct, etc.

Lobbying in Ukrainian realities can be compared to “Schrödinger’s cat”: you can see what’s inside only after opening the box. Because lobbying in Ukraine is not enshrined at the legislative level, one might think that it does not exist in politics, but this isn’t the case. Lobbying is used in many ways. To a certain extent, this latency fits all, as there are no predetermined rules of the game, and thus, one may exercise their discretion, frequently opting for unethical methods to attain the desired outcome.

For more than 20 years, Ukrainian authorities have been trying to normalise public relations in the field of lobbying. There were numerous attempts to develop and adopt the required regulatory acts. In 2009, the Concept of the draft Law of Ukraine “On the Influence of the Public on the Adoption of Regulatory Acts” was approved, and the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy in Ukraine (the Anti-Corruption Strategy) for 2014–2017” was adopted. This Law provided, among other things, the adoption of legislation on the legal framework of lobbying. Yet, there is no legislative framework even now.

The attention of government officials, experts, and the public is currently focused on two draft laws, whose authors aim to finally elevate lobbying from formal relations to a legitimate state. The first is the draft law by MPs Y. Tymoshenko and S. Vlasenko, “On State Registration of Lobbying Entities and Lobbying in Ukraine” (register No. 3059 of 11 February 2020). The second draft law is called “On Honest Lobbying in Ukraine.” It was developed by the National Agency for Corruption Prevention to implement the Anti-Corruption Strategy until 2025 and the State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives team attempted to study both draft laws from the perspective of international experience and their compliance with the Council of Europe and the OECD regulations. It is important to start with what the draft laws have in common and which norms consider international standards. Draft law No. 3059 and draft law of the NACP both define the fundamental principles of the lobbying process, establish a public register of lobbyists in Ukraine, specify minimum requirements for the information to be contained, and mandate lobbyists’ obligation to report on their activities.

The draft laws often adhere to at least a portion of the principles outlined in the Council of Europe Recommendations regarding the avoidance of conflicts of interest and the introduction of ethical guidelines for lobbyists. However, the proposed norms raise certain concerns. For instance, in the future, NACP proposes to approve the Code of Ethics for lobbying participants through its own legislation, thereby establishing a set of ethical guidelines that will become mandatory for all lobbying participants. It is hard to express a complete consensus on such a proposal, given that, under international practice, a code of conduct (code of ethics) is an internal document of a specific professional association, including lobbyists, who have committed to adhering to certain guidelines in their activities. In this particular instance, the NACP will serve as an external regulator with regard to participants in the lobbying process. As a result, there may be a potential for bias towards the conduct guidelines imposed on them, even if preliminary consultations have been conducted. Instead, draft law No. 3059 only briefly mentions restrictions in the context of conflicts of interest, stating that a lobbying entity cannot give gifts or arrange trips for people covered by the law.

Furthermore, regrettably, the draft law content failed to distinguish between lobbying and public advocacy, thereby neglecting the crucial principle of the Council of Europe Recommendations on the involvement of civil society in political life. These recommendations stipulate that the legal regulation of lobbying activities should not violate the democratic right of citizens to express their opinions, petition public officials, bodies and institutions, conduct campaigns for political changes, and amendments to legislation. It is clear that there are certain concerns that ordinary citizens or public organisations will not be able to exert influence on MPs and government officials to effect beneficial changes in public life.

So, both draft laws need to be improved, and the ideas and comments of stakeholders should be taken into account. This can make it more likely that some draft law will be adopted. It is worth mentioning that draft law No. 3059 of late March 2021, despite undergoing some revisions, failed to make it to the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. At the same time, based on the information in the Information System for Monitoring the Implementation of the State Anti-Corruption Policy, the NACP’s draft law has not been forwarded to the Government for consideration yet. So, we will see the fate of these draft laws later. Perhaps in the near future, we may witness the emergence of a new draft law or even several of them.

In any case, Ukrainian society needs a law on lobbying that is balanced and effective and considers the best international experience and the views of stakeholders. This legislation ought to serve as a catalyst for positive transformations, a means to prevent corruption, and not merely as another manifestation of populism of the power entities.

The text has been prepared as part of the “Civil Society for Ukraine’s Post-Ware Recovery and EU-Readiness” Project, which is implemented with financial support from the EU.

Information brief available only in Ukrainian

The first month of the full-scale invasion is a unique period in the history of the Ukrainian parliamentary system. At that particular moment, representatives of the ruling elite were in immediate danger, and the Verkhovna Rada, as a place housing MPs, was one of the primary targets for destruction.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainian parliament kept working despite all odds. MPs needed to amend the legislation immediately to fit the conditions of a full-scale invasion, and they did so in a very short time and under the threat of shelling and operations of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. However, given the rapid alterations in circumstances, what was the degree of stability of laws enacted during this period?

We have analysed all laws adopted in March 2022. The absolute majority of them were amending other laws. So, we reviewed all laws and codes that had been amended.

According to our estimates, after 18 months following March 2022, most amendments were modified again. This means that MPs once again tried to re-write what had been changed just before that. Such laws can be called unstable.

One of the reasons includes continuously changing circumstances. When enemy tanks are within a few kilometres from the capital, changes are needed here and now. This is what the Rada was doing: settling the situation in a very stressful environment. Subsequent developments at the frontline and in the international arena forced parliamentarians to amend newly adopted laws again and again. The general instability also affected the instability of legislation.

In peacetime, however, a slightly different paradigm exists: constant amendments to the legislation, especially during a relatively short time since its adoption, mean that the quality of the law is not very high. Amendments to it may be compared to patching old clothing that no longer fits by any parameters.

In March 2022, laws were developed and enacted with utmost speed, and hence, errors were unavoidable. The frequency of amendments to the regulations may be related to the low quality.

It is hard to tell what was the actual reason in each specific case. Since there are sufficient resources and information available, the Cabinet of Ministers is the only body that may speak with certainty of the quality and clarity of any draft law. Although sometimes, everything is obvious.

For instance, the Main Scientific and Expert Administration saw a violation of laws in draft law No. 7118 already after its registration due to the introduced possibility of forwarding cases investigated by NABU to another pre-trial investigation body. After all, it is for a reason that NABU has a special status. But the draft law was adopted without recommendations being taken into account. Therefore, a month later they were to be introduced by means of a separate law.

And it is sometimes apparent that laws were adopted with great speed during this period. It is especially noticeable in the laws elaborated with obviously superficial mistakes. For instance, draft law No. 7185 was adopted on 24 March 2022. This law was supposed to amend the law “On Baby Food,” which had been invalid for almost six months at the time.

Draft law 7151 is similar. It was intended to change the words that do not exist in the law! It seems like this paragraph will stay in the law forever as a recollection of March 2022, when two days passed between the law’s registration and adoption.

“{Amendments to part one of Article 18 adopted by Law of Ukraine No. 2121-IX of 15 March 2022 are infeasible (the words that need replacement are missing)}”

Of the 51 laws that were adopted in March 2022, only 17 remained unchanged. It is noteworthy that we do not consider ratifications and resolutions, which are regarded as crucial pillars of stability in the unstable framework of Ukrainian legislation (as they are hardly ever amended). One ratification was found among March laws. Two additional laws remain unsigned and are still sitting on the shelves of the President’s Office.

The norms of 68% of the laws have undergone changes, while a third of them remain in the version of March 2022. A comparison will help us figure out whether it is many or not.

Let’s review similar periods – March 2021 and March 2023. In March 2021, 27 laws were adopted (and another 15 ratifications and resolutions). Of them, only five were subsequently amended. More than 80% of unchanged laws is a striking difference compared to the results shown by MPs a year later.

The situation in March 2023 is interesting. During this time, MPs adopted 17 laws and another 13 resolutions. Out of these 17 laws, 24% – almost a quarter – were later amended. This figure is higher than two years before. However, considering that less than six months have elapsed, the current situation is beginning to resemble the one in March 2022.

The temporary nature of the laws enacted in the initial month of the full-scale invasion is apparent. This is not surprising, as the unstable nature of the legislation is directly linked to the broader instability that engulfed the country, resulting from the full-scale invasion. During this time, laws were drafted and passed with haste, which caused problems with technical and legal aspects.

Simultaneously, the need to “keep the finger on the pulse” compelled legislators to repeatedly revisit previously enacted laws with amendments. Currently, despite the global situation appearing to be more stable compared to the disastrous March 2022, the legislative process has not fully recovered, and amendments to the adopted laws are being made more frequently than before the full-scale invasion.

The law is the foundation and framework for regulations, particularly in the context of the general uncertainty of war. Indeed, during times of war, it is imperative to swiftly respond to the circumstances, including through modifications in legislation. But if Ukrainian legislators keep changing the same lines several times within a short period, this once again indicates that the legislative structure is unstable and that Ukrainian legislators are short-sighted. The tumultuous processes of state functioning increasingly resemble a game of Jenga, where players alternate removing blocks from the base of a tower and putting them on top, resulting in a tower becoming taller and less stable.

On September 15, 2023, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) held a training event for parliament and government representatives to discuss problematic issues arising while developing and processing draft laws. This event is prepared within the framework of the “Civil Society for Ukraine’s Post-War Reconstruction and EU Readiness” project financed by the European Union.

Context. The legislative process is a living organism that constantly needs improvement. A legislative impact assessment is one of the tools for this which can be used right now. This practice is rightfully considered an effective tool for improving draft laws, particularly during expert-analytical review.

During the event, the participants discussed existing gaps and challenges in the process of developing draft laws and ways to solve these problems.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyy, director of the analytical direction of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, moderated the discussion. He spoke about the advantages of the legislative impact assessment methodology:

Tetiana Lukeria, the author of the Manual on the preparation of legislative impact assessments, spoke about the international experience of using this tool and the nuances that must be considered when adapting the tool to Ukrainian needs:

Mykhailo Teplyuk, Deputy Head of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – head of the Main Legal Department of the VRU, emphasized the need to rethink the approach to evaluating the effectiveness of draft laws:

Oleh Voitovych, Deputy State Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, noted that the development of quality laws requires the cooperation of the parliament and the government:

Accountability and control of political party funding may soon be restored. The draft laws on this issue were submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers and MPs on the initiative of the first deputy chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Korniyenko.

This is already the third iteration of the introduction of state financing of parties and control over their finances. The first attempt took place back in 2008. At that time, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives was one of the organisations that promoted the idea of state financing of parties and effective control over their receipts and expenditures.

Unfortunately, 15 years ago, the majority of political forces did not accept such an idea, contenting themselves with opaque oligarchic financing. Unwillingness to be accountable and populist rhetoric slowed everything down.

But why is reporting needed at all? The general logic of state financing of parties and control over their finances is that it can:

• reduce the influence of big capital (that is, individual private donors and industrial and financial groups) on political parties and, accordingly, on the adoption of political decisions;
• make the financing of political parties transparent and strengthen control over party finances by the state;
• provide conditions for the development of new political parties, fair and transparent interparty competition.

Ukrainian parties returned to financing and control for the second time in 2015. It was part of a broader reform to fight corruption. The Ukrainian public and influential international organisations, such as the OSCE, the Venice Commission, and GRECO, supported the reform.

A special body was created – the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), which was supposed, in particular, to administer the budget financing of parliamentary parties and control the activities of all parties, collecting and checking reports on income and expenses. In case of detection of violations, administrative and, in some cases, criminal liability could be imposed. If a violation concerned the parliamentary parties, NACP had the authority to stop funding from the state budget.

The second attempt to introduce party financing and reporting proved more successful. Money from the state budget began to flow to the parties in 2016 and continues to flow to this day. However, reporting was not such a continuous process – it was mandatory from the fall of 2016 until the spring of 2020, that is, for three and a half years.

And then, the COVID-19 pandemic started. The Verkhovna Rada allowed the parties not to submit reports for the quarantine period. Because of this, it is impossible to control the parties’ activities to detect violations and questionable contributions.

This step seemed logical at one time because the coronavirus pandemic complicated the work of many bodies – both party and state. It was more difficult for them to obtain the documents necessary for reporting and organising this process.

But already in 2021, it became apparent that society had adapted to the pandemic, the work of both state and non-state bodies improved, but control over funds was not renewed.

Parliamentary parties received funds but didn’t have to report on them. They were not forbidden to do this, but they were not obliged either.

Parties could voluntarily report, but this option did not become popular. Large parties, with a few exceptions, did not submit reports. If any parties did report, they were usually small parties that had [almost] no expenses and income. Therefore, the problem of uncontrolled financing of parliamentary parties was not solved.

Talks about renewing reporting and control were cut short in February 2022. In March 2022, Verkhovna Rada relaxed the reporting requirements of legal entities: reports could be submitted or not submitted, liability for non-submission/late submission was abolished, and authorised bodies could conduct or not conduct audits of reports. There were objective reasons for this – part of the documentation was destroyed, and banks and control bodies had significant interruptions in their work.

Parties have the status of legal entities, so these rules also apply to them. This means that NACP could neither check party reports nor impose liability on the party.

Additional relaxations were created, common to all legal entities during martial law, in addition to specific relaxations established specifically for parties during quarantine.

After a year and a half of martial law, a new demand for party accountability appeared in society. So there were registered two draft laws to resolve this issue.

Its main focus is on detailing the party financing mechanism and possible party expenses, but in general, the draft law is quite versatile and provides for:

1. Limitation of contributions to party support through related legal entities and non-profit organisations, in particular, to limit indirect influence;
2. Limitation of the total amount of the contribution at the level of 20% of its total aggregate income for the last five years (to avoid financing by fictitious persons);
3. Separately, it is allowed to finance the involvement of persons with disabilities in parties;
4. The priority areas of party financing have been determined;
5. Prohibited types of expenses financed from the state budget have been established;
6. The system of distribution of state budget funds between parties is changing;
7. COVID-19 relaxations for party reporting are going to be cancelled.

This draft law is more comprehensive in terms of restoring reporting. It provides:

1. Reduction of the percentage barrier that a party must overcome in elections to receive funding from 5 to 3%, which should facilitate the development of smaller parties.
2. Martial law reporting exemptions that apply to all legal entities will no longer apply to parties.
3. If the party has state funding, its reports for previous periods (from 2020) must be submitted by 90 days after the date of entry into force of this law.
4. If the party does NOT have state funding, its reports for previous periods must be submitted by 120 days after the date of entry into force of this law.
5. Reports for these earlier periods may be in an annual format, and quarterly reports should resume in the future.
6. The NACP must verify these reports and reports voluntarily submitted during martial law within 60 days from the date of submission or the date of entry into force of the law.
7. Parties are released from responsibility if they cannot provide information due to force majeure circumstances related to hostilities (destruction, damage or unavailability due to occupation – documents or computers). Force majeure must be documented.
8. The register of party reporting resumes.

If we compare these two draft laws, the task of restoring reporting and control is better performed by draft law No. 9419-1.

Draft law No. 9419 in its current version will not lead to the resumption of reporting because martial law is currently in effect. Therefore parties will be subject to general relaxations for reporting that apply to all legal entities.

Draft law No. 9419 cancels only the COVID-19 relaxations. In addition, it does not define any transitional norms and rules for submitting reports for previous periods, nor does it consider the limitations of martial law.

Transitional provisions and cancellation of COVID-19 and martial law relaxations are in draft law No. 9419-1.

Although draft law No. 9419 does not restore party reporting, it can improve the general mechanism of state financing. Still, its current version contains part of unfinished norms that do not have real implementation mechanisms or appear to be unnecessary.

In general, draft laws No. 9419 and No. 9419-1 do not contradict each other too much. Therefore, it will be interesting to observe their consideration process because they are alternatives. Both draft laws have quite promising initiators – the Cabinet of Ministers for No. 9419 and the First Deputy Chairman of the VRU with the support of several factions and groups for No. 9419-1.

So, there is a reasonable prospect of restoring the accountability of political parties, especially those that receive state funding. Control over how they spend these funds can finally be restored.

At the same time, it is essential to avoid making mistakes made in the previous period. Most recently, on June 6, 2023, the Accounts Chamber’s report on the audit of state financing of parties in 2016-2019 was released, which covers three out of three and a half years of total control and reporting on party finances. The conclusion of this report is quite sad:

“The National Agency on Corruption Prevention has not ensured effective management, productive, economical, effective and legal use of state budget funds allocated for leadership and management in the field of corruption prevention and financing political parties’ statutory activities”.

Party financing lacks performance indicators, making it difficult for the Audit Chamber to evaluate relevant budget programs. Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of using UAH 1.5 billion to finance parties was impossible. Control over how money was spent on party financing by the NACP was complicated due to shortcomings in the legislation, which the NACP still needs to correct.

Unfortunately, neither draft law No. 9419 nor No. 9419-1 take into account parts of the recommendations of the Accounting Chamber. For example, the recommendation regarding “determining the reporting of local organisations of political parties on the spending of state funding and the crediting of state funding to separate accounts of local organisations to improve control over the targeted use of these funds” was not considered.