Since the creation of the White Paper on Ukrainian Parliamentarism, and since the beginning of the comprehensive parliamentary reform in 2016, experts and MPs have repeatedly stressed the importance of strengthening parliament’s control function. But what does that mean? And does the call for strengthening the parliament’s control function always mean increasing the constitutional parliamentary control?

For starters, a little context. Recently, MPs passed in the first reading the draft law №4131 to ensure the effective implementation of parliamentary control. It does not propose radical measures, but given the explanatory note and the comments provided by the Central Scientific Experts Office and parliamentary experts, it can be concluded that there are terminological difficulties in the discussion on parliamentary control. Comments on the draft law will be set out at the end. And first, let’s deal with the concept of parliamentary control.

In legal doctrine, “parliamentary control” is interpreted quite broadly. The most common will be the following definition:

Parliamentary control is the ability of the legislature to restrain the activities of the executive.

Restraint, however, may mean the ability to influence the actions of the executive branch. However, this effect can be different in form and intensity.

The specificity of the control function is that

“Control powers are” present “in all functions of the Verkhovna Rada and at all stages of the parliamentary process. Thus the control function is realized through two groups of powers: powers of the first group have only control value; others are complex, and equally belong to the control and other functions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”.

So we can talk about parliamentary control in the broadest sense and parliamentary control in the narrow sense. In turn, the latter means the possibility of direct influence on the results of control actions – for example, dismissal.

Researchers distinguish the following types of parliamentary control:

• party control (usually used by the opposition);
• non-partisan control (through parliamentary oversight, which can take many forms: questions, committees, hearings, etc.);
• control with the possibility of applying “sanctions” (for example, expressions of no confidence in the Government, the Prosecutor General, dismissal, etc.).

In Ukrainian legal thought, a similar division was proposed by Barabash, who divided parliamentary control according to the consequences of “mandatory” and “recommended”. For simplicity, we will use this division.

It is the “mandatory” type of parliamentary control, or control with the possibility of applying “sanctions”, which is the most radical way of influencing. Because of this, it is the subject of the Constitution. This is what the Constitutional Court draws attention to in its judgment of 10 May 2000 № 8-rp / 2000:

“The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine exercises parliamentary control in various organizational and legal forms, but only within limits set by the Constitution of Ukraine.”

In this sense, the Constitutional Court interprets parliamentary control in a narrow sense. We cannot but agree that parliamentary control, with the possibility of direct adverse consequences (for the executive branch), can be exercised only within the Constitution. This naturally follows from the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Here we can mention such forms of parliamentary control as reporting of the Governor of the National Bank, the Prosecutor General, reports of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, etc.

In general, there should be no difficulty with mandatory parliamentary scrutiny. The bodies subject to such scrutiny must report to parliament in setting the deadline. Here you can discuss the timing of reporting and its content. It is necessary to consolidate the options for the parliament’s response to such reports.

At the same time, in a broad sense, “parliamentary control” is a component of any activity of the Verkhovna Rada. Even the adoption of laws carries a share of control (to pass a quality law, you need to have information about problems in implementing existing laws). And in this context, parliamentary control can be regulated by law. This is when we talk about the formal expression of parliamentary control.

But what does parliamentary scrutiny include in a broad sense? And what forms can be offered? In addition to parliamentary inquiries, parliamentary hearings, and “government question hours,” we should focus on such a seemingly insignificant way of parliamentary control as informing.

Control, in this case, is primarily the possession of information. Having sufficient information on the implementation of laws, problems, and implementation of policies, the Verkhovna Rada can influence public authorities through legislation changes.

In addition, the dual nature of parliamentary control is clearly manifested here: 1) as state control and 2) public control. Subjects of parliamentary control, having all the hallmarks of state oversight institutions, also influence violators of the law through such instruments of public scrutiny as public opinion and widespread media coverage. Even hearings in plenary or committee meetings of information from any public body can be considered parliamentary scrutiny in a broad sense.

Information is an important part of parliamentary scrutiny. Many researchers have written about increasing the role of parliamentary control without “sanctions”.

Parliament should communicate with other government agencies and request information and the presentation of this information from various government agencies.

Such information helps the Verkhovna Rada to understand current issues, the state of implementation of laws.

Coverage of public authorities in parliament makes their work more transparent and public reporting processes systematic. We can talk about creating a certain culture of reporting by public authorities to the public and submitting such reports to the Verkhovna Rada through the information procedure.

However, such measures’ effectiveness largely depends on the organization of work (especially on the design of the reporting system) within the Cabinet of Ministers. The key here is the reform of public administration. In this context, close cooperation between the government and parliament is needed. This implies clear requirements for public authorities to report to the public and the Cabinet of Ministers. The Verkhovna Rada can play the role of a catalyst in this process.

It is probably necessary to legislate the procedure of informing the state bodies of the Verkhovna Rada or its committees. However, the current provisions of the Rules of Procedure allow doing so without further detail. It all depends on how determined the committees are to communicate with the relevant bodies, receive and process information from them, and the general understanding of the MPs of such actions priority. With the advancement of public administration reform, committees must organically come to the principle of “more intensive control over specific issues”. However, for supporters of the positivist concept of law, the following can be noted: the Rules of Procedure can enshrine the process of initiating the information procedure, set reasonable deadlines for the preparation of such information, oblige the Verkhovna Rada or the committee to form a clear list of issues. Standard forms of reporting should also be considered so that each body understands what may be required of it and documents its activities in a pre-agreed manner.

Another aspect that confuses terminology in parliamentary control is the “reporting” of a number of independent institutions that have a special legal status. For example, the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Utilities (the Regulator). The Verkhovna Rada only indirectly participates in the formation of this body through the appointment of part of the tender commission and has no leverage over the Regulator’s dismissal.

In cases with the Regulator and a number of other institutions, we have terminological confusion in the context of parliamentary control. The fact is that the Regulator must report annually to the Verkhovna Rada, but the latter cannot influence it in any way due to consideration of this report. So technically, it’s not reporting. It’s just informing. The purpose of such information is clear: the Verkhovna Rada should know whether the legal framework is being implemented effectively and what are the problems in this area, as well as to draw the attention of the public and the media to the activities of the Regulator. Therefore, it cannot and should not directly influence the Regulator, but it can influence the legislative regulation of the area in which the Regulator operates. What is important in such cases for effective control? Forms of reporting, constant communication, obligatory consultations with these bodies in case of changes in the sectoral legislation are coordinated with each such independent body.

It is necessary to mention the peculiarity of parliamentary control in the presence of a mono-majority in parliament. According to Duverger, the executive and legislative branches, government and parliament, are only constitutional facades. In reality, only parties exercise power.

In a parliamentary mono-majority case, the parliament (represented by the majority) has all the necessary levers for control through party mechanisms. At the same time, provided there is a majority, parliamentary control is informal, hidden from the general public and reduced to the party’s control over the government.

In other words, the majority has all the means to influence the government. In our current context, this means that claims that parliament does not have sufficient mechanisms to influence the government or individual ministers are not true (although weak party discipline may complicate such control). This, of course, does not preclude the need to improve the legal framework for parliamentary scrutiny and to launch a new round of discussions on guarantees of participation in parliamentary scrutiny by the opposition.

The draft law proposes to set specific reporting dates for some government agencies. Such an initiative can be supported, although there is no urgent need to change these provisions. Because setting specific reporting dates could be part of informal regulation.

The draft law proposes to expand the participation of committees in the consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of the report of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the progress and results of the implementation of the approved Program of Activities of the Cabinet of Ministers. This approach is justified because it improves the quality of control over the activities of the government. However, the intensity of measures and their quality remains subject to internal regulation. In short, it will depend only on the committees themselves whether the quality of control over the government will improve. After all, it is, first of all, about development by committees of internal standards of estimation of this program. It would be appropriate to organize some training for the staff of the committees’ secretariats (perhaps even joint training with representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers and ministries).

The draft law proposes to detail the provisions on consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of reports and reports of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. One of the novelties: The Verkhovna Rada is invited to provide an opportunity to formulate recommendations for the Cabinet of Ministers.

The draft law proposes to detail the procedure for reviewing the reports of several bodies on which the Verkhovna Rada makes personnel decisions (Prosecutor General, Chairman of the Security Service, Chairman of the National Bank, Antimonopoly Committee, State Property Fund, Accounting Chamber, Commissioner for Human Rights). Given that the rules are duplicated, it would be appropriate to create a single generalized rule that would regulate in detail the process of reviewing these reports and add options for decisions that may be taken as a result of the review. The alternative proposed in the draft law is slightly contrary to the legal technique and overloads the Rules, but does not pose a danger.

The most controversial in the draft law is Article 232-8, which provides for the consideration of reports, reports, and other government agencies and officials’ information. And although we noted above that parliamentary scrutiny in a broad sense may include information procedures, the draft law’s way of proposing this procedure is questionable. It is necessary to distinguish between reporting and informing because, according to the reporting results, the Verkhovna Rada can influence the reporting body. According to the results of informing the Verkhovna Rada can only indirectly influence the body’s activities through amendments to legislation. That is, those bodies to which the Verkhovna Rada has no relation cannot report to the Verkhovna Rada. Even if they present their annual report to the plenary, in parliamentary scrutiny, such a report will be considered informing. This raises the question of whether it is appropriate to include the concept of “report” in this rule. Therefore, in our opinion, this part needs significant refinement, as it does not follow from the text of the bill whether the MPs understand this difference. And the creation of additional terminological difficulties seems to be typical for the legislative process but still superfluous.

It seems important to carry out explanatory work on parliamentary control’s nature, its forms, and importance among MPs. The parliament has sufficient powers to exercise effective parliamentary control, especially given the fact that there is a mono-majority. The issue is to change MPs and committees’ patterns of work and increase interaction with the executive branch.

As a result, we have a draft law with a beautiful name, a noble purpose, without special “hardships” and special benefits.

We hope that this draft law will be a starting point for discussing the essence of the parliament’s control function. One could start (as always, in theory, and, as never before, in practice) by examining the control function’s implementation and identifying the main intra-parliamentary barriers to parliamentary control in the broadest sense.

On October 25, 2020, local elections will be held in Ukraine. Many experts consider this election to be one of the most difficult in Ukraine’s history:

• a new electoral system.
• many multi-member constituencies.
• optional voting for candidates on the list.
• funding problems.
• Russian pressure to cancel the election.
• a coronavirus pandemic with weekly record updates.

In addition, it is proposed to conduct a nationwide poll on election day.

Despite one of the basic principles of public policy – predictability, the details of this survey were unknown from the beginning. The questions that citizens are asked to answer were voiced by the President in video appeals, and still (a week before the election and the announced poll) have no formalization.

Although there were statements that the poll would be private (i.e., funded by an “unknown oligarch”), it was announced by the President of Ukraine. Moreover, in September, one of the leaders of the parliamentary majority – Oleksandr Korniienko – registered a bill on public opinion polls (Draft Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Central Election Commission” on Public Opinion Polls Number, registration date: 4043 dated 03.09.2020). The bill proposes to give the CEC the authority to conduct (according to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers) public opinion polls on the day of voting in local elections. The bill was never passed before the local elections, and Volodymyr Zelensky announced a “nationwide poll” without any legal grounds.

As the constitution of a democratic state, Ukraine’s Constitution establishes that “the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine is the people“. The question arises as to the significance of the opinion of the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power. If the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power supports or does not support a certain issue, it is logical to conclude that the people’s representatives – public authorities – must act following the people’s will, namely – to support or not support a decision. Only the expression of the will of the people to support or not support a certain issue is called not a “public opinion poll” but a “referendum”. And the legitimacy of the results of such expression of the will of the people through a referendum is ensured by predictable, transparent, and understandable for all procedures.

Sociological agencies conduct public opinion polls. The public opinion poll results do not have the status of expressing the will of the people. They do not have to be fulfilled. Public opinion polls do not establish the opinion of every citizen of Ukraine: about 2-3 thousand respondents express the opinion. There is a methodology for conducting opinion polls, which determines and declares a certain level of error as to how correctly a sample of 2-3 thousand respondents conveys all Ukrainians’ opinion. No one has a monopoly on conducting surveys – if you want and have the resources, you can create your sociological agency and conduct surveys on any topic. The poll does not claim to establish the will of the people and has no legal consequences. Unlike a poll, a referendum (which obliges the authorities to respond to the results in one way or another) can only be organized and conducted by the state. It is funded transparently through special funds or budget funds. It aims to reflect the opinion of as many citizens as possible (as a rule, there should also be a certain required level of voter turnout). It involves not a few thousand but millions of citizens.

The “public opinion poll”, as proposed by the bill, will be conducted by the state monopoly. If it is planned to be held on election day, millions of citizens will be asked instead of 3,000. And all this is presented not as a referendum, but as a poll!

Besides, the President assured the citizens that the will of the people expressed during the poll will be fulfilled.

But we emphasize: first, there are no legal grounds for conducting the survey; secondly, the President, by the Constitution, has no authority to announce any “poll”.

At this point, it is worth pausing and congratulating all readers who have read this paragraph. After all, the number of words from the beginning of this article to this paragraph already exceeds the number of words in the draft law introduced by Oleksandr Korniienko.

The procedure for conducting a poll, which by all indications is a referendum, is almost not regulated at the legislative level. The level of turnout, the issue of mandatory participation in the “survey”, its legal consequences, the procedure for counting the results of the “survey”, protection against falsification of results, protection against manipulative issues, the procedure of campaigning, etc. The bill does not regulate all this.

The CEC should establish the procedure for conducting such a “poll” and its organization (according to the draft law). However, public opinion polls are not within the competence of the CEC. Logically, the CEC organizes the referendum, but the procedure for holding a referendum (according to the Constitution) is established exclusively by laws, not by CEC resolutions. The draft Law on Democracy through an all-Ukrainian referendum adopted in the first reading, although it has shortcomings, will still comprehensively regulate the issue of holding a referendum.

Both public opinion polls and referendums can be forms of consultation with citizens. However, the form of this consultation must be coherent. Public opinion polls should be representative: consider the distribution of citizens by gender, age, place of residence, etc. If proper distribution (representativeness) is not ensured, the results of such consultation will be skewed. The referendum must be held according to prescribed procedures; otherwise, its results will also be distorted.

Citizens of Ukraine are already familiar with the distorted referendums, which were not conducted according to the proper procedure (or rather the procedure did not exist at all, because as of 2014, the Law “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums” was no longer in force) and were not representative. “Referendums” in Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk are good examples of neglect of procedures. And this is a danger to the democratic system. In addition to the pseudo-referendums mentioned above, there are many examples of usurpation of power through a referendum. In such cases, the referendum created an additional channel of legitimacy, allowing a strong figure, usually the president, to bypass parliament or other constitutional bodies and usurp power.

The draft law on public opinion polls proposes polls, which in essence and features are a referendum. Still, it brings the order of its organization into the sphere of bylaws – CEC resolutions. Polls that will claim the will of the people, to which Ukraine’s leaders will refer to making the most important decisions, will not be regulated by law. This opens up a huge space for distorting the will. The Electoral Code of Ukraine has 289 articles to protect the electoral process from distortions and manipulations. The draft Law “On Democracy through an All-Ukrainian Referendum” has 131 articles and occupies 157 pages to protect the referendum process from distortions and manipulations. The rhetorical question is why the draft law on public opinion polls is two pages long and has less than 400 words? Maybe not from, but for manipulation?

At least the questions announced by Volodymyr Zelensky seem manipulative.

Legislation in some countries explicitly prohibits the referendum on issues related to justice. However, we have the question №1:

“Do you support the idea of ​​life imprisonment for corruption on a particularly large scale?“

This question is formulated as if non-support of this type of punishment means supporting corruption on a particularly large scale, leading to an affirmative answer.

This is even though the system of anti-corruption bodies is still not working properly. So far, the accusations supported by the court and, accordingly, the sentences for top corrupt officials have yet to be sought. If the existing system of anti-corruption bodies, which has been built for a long time, cannot ensure the implementation of the current legislation, it is difficult to imagine that increasing the level of punishment will somehow correct this situation.

The peculiarities of the free economic zone’s legal status, which is proposed to be created on Donbas’ territory in question №2, are unclear.

Citizens can only guess whether this economic zone will be “a cat in a bag” or “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”, because the phrase “free economic zone” does not have any specific meaning. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of free economic zones in the world. It is not clear which of them citizens are invited to choose.

The Verkhovna Rada has previously approved the bill on reducing the number of MPs to 300. It is unclear why the President wanted to consult with citizens right now by asking question №3, and not before initiating consideration of this bill.

Although there is a nuance: the Constitutional Court of Ukraine issued an opinion with reservations on this bill. This means that, following the Rules of Procedure, the Verkhovna Rada had to finalize the draft amendments to the Constitution and re-initiate its consideration in the CCU. However, the parliamentary majority did not do so, deciding to ignore the reservations of the CCU, which were purely technical and legal, aimed at preventing inconsistencies between the various articles of the Constitution. In this context, bringing this issue up for a “referendum” looks like an attempt by the President (and his majority in parliament) to legitimize his actions on the bill (again, contrary to the position of the CCU and the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada). Such a populist flirtation with the “people’s expression of will” on, in fact, not a very simple issue, which puts law and procedure on one scale and the will of citizens on another, is alarming in its resemblance to authoritarian regimes.

Questions №4 and №5 are double.

The fourth question can be asked as follows – “Do you support the legalization of cannabis for medical purposes?” and “Do you support pain relief in critically ill patients?” The manipulation is that by supporting pain reduction, we automatically endorse the legalization of cannabis.

The fifth question can also be divided into two: “Do you support Ukraine’s right to use the security guarantees set out in the Budapest Memorandum?” and “Do you support the restoration of Ukraine’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity?” And a person who does not support the memorandum, at the same time, does not support our territorial integrity. The memorandum’s legal force, which has not been ratified by the signatory countries and did not contain any levers of influence or mechanisms to force the signatory countries to adhere to the memorandum, also raises questions.

The level of manipulation of questions in the informal public poll raises significant concerns about the manipulation of public opinion in the case of the adoption of Bill 4043 of 03.09.2020 or in the case of attempts to conduct such a poll without any legal grounds.

In general, the motives for initiating such a poll can be twofold: 1) to somehow revive the ratings of the “Sluga narodu” party and mobilize the turnout of its electorate in local elections, and 2) to legitimize dangerous steps for Ukrainian sovereignty in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The effective functioning of any public authority is impossible without establishing an effective system of control over the implementation of its decisions because the very “effectiveness of any decision depends on control”. For example, the parliament is responsible for the supervision of the activities of the executive branch. And soon the Verkhovna Rada may get more tools for this. In May, MPs registered the draft law №3499, which provides the introduction of the newest form of parliamentary control for Ukraine – interpellation.

This is another form of parliamentary control, which is used to discuss the executive branch’s activities. In general, it can be described as follows: members of parliament have the right to invite government representatives to parliament so that government officials or one particular official can explain their policies, specific documents, or actions. Members of parliament can ask questions to government officials or debate the results of a speech by a member of the government. Sometimes, as a result of such debates, parliament can express a vote of no confidence.

An interpellation is a new form of parliamentary control for Ukraine, which was previously exercised only through parliamentary inquiries and an hour of questions to the government. The procedure of the current Rules of Procedure closest to the interpellation is the procedure of considering the answer to the MP’s request, which is established by Art. 226, but still, the interpellation procedure provides a more specific impact of the parliament on the government’s activities.

In particular, Art. 226 also stipulates that the executive branch members may be summoned to parliament (to discuss a response to an MP’s request). But we will consider the differences:

The procedure of discussing an MP’s request requires twice as many MPs to initiate it, the decision of at least 226 MPs to appoint it, lasts 4 times less and has no clear legal consequences. However, it can apply to any official, not just members of the government.

Considering the interpellation in the Verkhovna Rada’s plenary hall can take about two hours. It includes speeches by the MPs who initiated the interpellation and the “respondent” minister. After that, the discussion takes place in the format of questions and answers. The Prime Minister can also speak.

Based on the discussion results, the Verkhovna Rada may request some additional documents – then, a new date for consideration of the interpellation is set. If there are no additional issues, after discussions, the parliament votes to declare the work of a member of the Cabinet unsatisfactory. If less than 226 MPs voted in favor, then the work of this member of the government is considered satisfactory – and he/she receives “immunity” from interpellation for three months.

Suppose the work of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers is considered unsatisfactory. In that case, the Prime Minister must submit a motion to dismiss such a member of the Cabinet of Ministers within 15 days, or the Verkhovna Rada itself considers the issue of his dismissal.

We emphasize that the interpellation alone cannot lead to the dismissal of a member of the Cabinet. His/her work can only be considered unsatisfactory, and then a new consideration of dismissal of a member of the Cabinet and a new vote on this issue. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect at least 226 votes for the minister’s dismissal once again, after the interpellation vote.

The idea of ​​introducing a law on interpellation is valuable. However, it is alarming that the MPs are trying to introduce an interpellation by a separate law, not through changes to the Rules of Procedure. Thus, there may be a problem of compatibility of this law with the Rules of Procedure.

And here are the likely political consequences of the adoption of this draft law:

• First, the adoption of the draft law could lead to increased parliamentary control over the executive branch. MPs’ inquiries are mostly non-public, and the hour of questions to the government is very vague, as MPs ask different questions on different topics to different ministers, while ministers mostly answer something like “did not know about this situation, we will get to it soon” or say general facts. The interpellation should focus the discussion on a specific list of issues, and this will be the subject of public attention. Finally, the interpellation consideration may result in the dismissal of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers.
• Secondly, the factions will receive a new instrument of politics implementation, part of the criticism of the government will be carried out in the form of interpellations.
• Third, there will be a strengthening of the ruling majority, which appoints the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, as it is the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, who receives the authority to moderate the interpellation process and may refuse to consider it.
• Fourth, suppose the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada strictly adheres to the Rules of Procedure and the Law on Interpellation and accepts the interpellation initiated by the opposition. In that case, a large part of the plenary time will probably be devoted to the consideration of interpellations.

Ukraine is preparing bills on the introduction of remote voting. Currently, there is also a lot of news that MPs, factions, parliaments are moving to telecommute. If remote work is a discussion of certain issues or even legislative initiatives, which in its legal consequences does not differ from participation in video interviews and TV shows, then indeed many individual parties, factions, groups, or simply members of parliament work remotely. If we talk about the consideration and voting on issues on the agenda, the consequence of which is the adoption of legislation, there will be much fewer such examples.

Due to the coronavirus epidemic, many parliaments around the world have been forced to change their regimes, all because politicians have a greater chance of contracting the coronavirus because of their publicity. But it is the parliament that is the key institution in democratic governance. Therefore, in order not to block the work of the legislature, many MPs around the world began to talk about the introduction of remote voting in their parliaments. In particular, the speaker of the Georgian parliament instructed to develop an initiative that will allow for electronic discussion and voting on bills. In the UK, the debate on remote voting is quite old. Initially, it concerned women MPs who had recently given birth, but the coronavirus has returned to the issue. In the United States, both congressional and state parliaments have also proposed remote voting.

And the President of Latvia has decided to follow a very original path. After consulting with lawyers, he stated that according to the Constitution, in case of emergency, “the parliament may convene elsewhere”. Another place, according to the President of Latvia, is the electronic space, i.e., the parliament can hold its meetings online. Although currently there are no precedents for remote voting in Latvia.

The vast majority of the world’s parliaments are in no hurry to implement legislative initiatives on remote voting. Leaders of both Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress opposed such initiatives. Other parliaments also favor measures to combat the coronavirus, such as:

• correction of the time of plenary sessions (their cancellation or postponement);
• disinfection of parliament buildings;
• transfer of all non-plenary activities of the parliament to remote mode (offices of MPs, staff members work remotely);
• permission for remote participation of individual MPs in plenary sessions: speeches, observation of the meeting, participation in the discussion (but not voting);
• maximum reduction of time for discussion of issues in the plenary hall and transfer of such preliminary discussion to remote mode;
• Transfer of rules of conduct in public places to the plenary hall (distance between people, wearing masks, etc.).

In Italy, where the coronavirus epidemic has become particularly widespread, lawmakers have limited the number of plenary sessions to just one day a week (on Wednesdays). Also, in the Italian parliament was ensured a distance between MPs of at least 1 meter.

If we talk about the possibility of remote voting, we managed to find only two parliaments, where it is possible, and both parliaments are not parliaments of sovereign states.

In previous statements, the head of the European Parliament stated that only remote participation of MPs in plenary sessions would be possible, but not voting. However, with the rapid spread of the coronavirus, he changed his mind and, according to media reports, on March 26 will be the first session of the European Parliament with the possibility of remote voting. Voting will take place via email.

The second parliament is the Legislative Assembly of the Perm region. On March 19, 2020, MPs supported the amendments that allowed the Legislative Assembly, committees, and commissions to operate remotely for the introduction of high alerts or emergencies. The issues on the agenda will be considered via video link, and absentee voting will be carried out with the help of the “Single Virtual Cabinet of MPs”. Moreover, members of parliament already have experience in using absentee voting.

It is not known whether MPs of Ukraine were inspired by one of the above examples, but bills on remote plenary work were developed in the Verkhovna Rada as well. To achieve this goal, the Verkhovna Rada plans to adopt Bill №3250 “On the grounds and procedure for holding plenary sittings of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and sittings of Verkhovna Rada committees by videoconference for the period of measures aimed at preventing the emergence and spread of coronavirus disease (COVID-19)” (hereinafter – the bill 3250).

The motivation for the adoption of this bill is clear and understandable. But we would like to discuss a few points. The actions of the Verkhovna Rada (especially in emergencies!) must be legal and following the Constitution. And critical and urgent legislative initiatives must be adopted lawfully, as a result of which it is impossible to question the legitimacy of the decisions made or the intentions of MPs (or the pro-presidential majority).

We are also deeply convinced that the legislative process should be open, even in the most challenging situations, and society should be fully informed about legislative initiatives, their purpose, and possible consequences, and if necessary, could respond at least online.

Bill №3250 establishes the possibility of holding plenary sessions in the format of a videoconference.

The Constitution does not contain provisions that would limit the possibility of holding plenary sessions in the format of videoconferences, but such a form should provide for personal voting. The decision of the CCU of July 7, 1998, states that the individual vote of the member of parliament of Ukraine at the sittings of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine means his direct expression of will, regardless of the method of voting.

The legislative method of consolidating the procedure for holding such plenary sessions is questionable. The bill itself is new, i.e. it will exist in the form of a separate legislative act, rather than amending other laws. This is important because part 5 of Article 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that “the procedure of work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is established by the Constitution of Ukraine and the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”, and part three of Article 88 states: Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It naturally follows that changes in the procedure of the Verkhovna Rada (for example, the possibility of holding a video conference) must be contained in the Rules of Procedure.

The subjects of the legislative initiative have proposed an option according to which the procedure of the Verkhovna Rada will be determined by a separate legislative act, and not by the Rules of Procedure. The draft law in the final provisions also provides for amendments to Article 1 of the Rules of Procedure, which stipulates that the procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (…) is established by the Constitution of Ukraine, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and several other laws. It is proposed to add to the list of laws a new law on holding plenary sessions by videoconference. However, such a reference is not sufficient to ensure legality. The Rules of Procedure (approved by the law) are the main act that regulates MPs’ work. The other laws to which Article 1 of the Rules of Procedure refers are complementary to the provisions of the Rules, but cannot contradict it because the Rules have higher legal force, as the provisions of the Constitution refer directly to it. That is, in a situation when the Rules of Procedure and, for example, the Law “On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” contradict each other, the provisions of the Rules of Procedure shall prevail.

Thus, the proposed changes should be contained in the Rules of Procedure, for example, as an additional Chapter, which will have a temporary effect. Of course, the creation of comprehensive changes to the conduct of plenary sessions by videoconference and the modernization of the Rules of Procedure following them in terms of legal technique is a more prudent and correct option. However, the short deadlines for drafting the bill make such an approach dangerous, as the development of comprehensive changes takes time. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada’s experience in videoconferencing will make it possible to develop such changes after the expiration of the adopted temporary provisions.

Why is it so important that the provisions on videoconferencing are contained in the Rules of Procedure? Because this is a way to ensure the legitimacy of the decisions of the Verkhovna Rada. Theoretically, the Verkhovna Rada decisions adopted by video conferencing, if such a possibility is not provided by the Rules of Procedure, may be declared unconstitutional. This can lead to many unpleasant legal consequences – such as lawsuits against the European Court of Human Rights, lawsuits against international arbitration, and so on. After all, in such conditions – during a video conference – there may be a vote for the introduction of a state of emergency, which will restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens, which are guaranteed by the Constitution and several international legal acts.

The voting process is fixed in Article 10 of the draft law.

After the appearance of his image on the information board, the member of parliament of Ukraine names his last name, first name, patronymic, the ID number of the MP of Ukraine, registration number of the bill, draft other act under consideration, then personally votes by raising his hand indicating the position “yes”, “no” or “abstained “. The duration of the voting time of each of Ukraine’s MPs is not more than 15 seconds. If necessary, the duration of voting time may be increased by the chairman. This process can be considered sufficient to ensure the will of MPs and prevent abuse. In the absence of appropriate software and previous experience of its use, the proposed option can be considered optimal.

On the other hand, the short deadlines for acquainting MPs with draft law (Article 4 of the draft law) are confusing – at least 24 hours. It is hoped that the Verkhovna Rada will plan its work so that this period is longer.

In a pandemic, there is a need for quick decisions. However, MPs must not forget the need to justify their decisions to society. In such emergencies, this is important for the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement in practice. Under normal circumstances, new rules of law tend to evolve in practice to meet social realities. There is no such time now, so MPs need to be able to justify the need for measures to be taken, as well as to predict in as much detail as possible how these norms will work. That is why it is necessary to increase the information and analytical capacity of the Verkhovna Rada, in particular, by involving external think tanks and NGOs. At present, every step of the Verkhovna Rada significantly affects the level of trust in the government. Even if the action is correct, but not refined – it can cause anger and despair.

This should be kept in mind, especially when considering initiatives to strengthen law enforcement to ensure the implementation of rules that restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens during the coronavirus pandemic. If the decisions are as well-founded as possible, and the citizens are informed, then, obviously, the loyalty to such decisions will be much more significant, and, accordingly, there is no need for enhanced control by law enforcement agencies.

First of all, it is necessary to note the positive component of the bill: the introduction of a simplified system (without tenders). At the same time, there are some nuances in the text of the draft law.

The bill introduces administrative liability for violating “human quarantine, sanitary and hygienic and sanitary and anti-epidemic rules and regulations”. In the explanatory note, the authors noted that this rule is aimed at the possibility of prosecution for leaving the place of observation (quarantine) by a person who may be infected with coronavirus COVID-19. However, the norm itself is formulated much more broadly in content, as it covers all sanitary and hygienic and sanitary and anti-epidemic rules and regulations, as well as refers to an infinite list of legislative regulations. This wording violates the principle of certainty, as it remains unclear what actions will be considered an administrative offense.

Moreover, the wording “quarantine of people” is incorrect because any legal action does not operate such a concept. The Law “On Protection of the Population from Infectious Diseases” distinguishes between the concepts of “observation” and “quarantine area”. Thus, “persons who have expressed a desire to leave the quarantine area before its abolition must be in the observatory under medical supervision during the incubation period of the disease and undergo the necessary examinations. After the expiration of the period of stay in the observatory, considering the results of medical supervision and tests, they are issued a certificate entitling them to leave the quarantined territory”. Therefore, it is not entirely clear what the responsibility is for leaving the observation or quarantine territory without permission.

The issue of determining the quarantined territory also remains open. According to the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, quarantine is introduced throughout Ukraine. But in the conditions of virus spread, it is logical to divide the quarantined territory into a city, village, district, etc. The possibility of “closing” cities for entry and exit is being discussed by mayors, and this needs further clarification by the Ministry of Health. After all, under the conditions of restriction of movement on the territory of Ukraine, we can talk about the limitation of constitutional rights, which in turn requires other legal regulations, namely – the introduction of a state of emergency.

Undoubtedly, the introduction of responsibility is necessary. However, there is a question of the responsibility of persons diagnosed with COVID-19 and, due to the mild course of the disease, medical instruction was given to isolating themselves. If such persons violate the conditions of self-isolation and endangerment of other people, it is necessary to develop a mechanism of responsibility (such a situation was, for example, in Japan). Besides, it is appropriate to provide tools for responding to a person’s refusal to take the test (occasionally, we can mention the case in South Korea).

The bill also proposes to significantly increase the responsibility for violating the rules and regulations established to prevent epidemics and other infectious diseases. And although only government officials and business officials can be prosecuted, the real deadline for violating rules and regulations is worrying about the increase in liability. In a pandemic, it seems that such an increase in responsibility is appropriate, but we must not forget that sooner or later, we will return to normal, and this rule will remain the same. Under normal circumstances, this will mean pressure on businesses due to inspections and a corresponding increase in corruption risks.

The following norms proposed by the Project also cause a lot of concerns:

• Addition of Article 84 of the Labor Code of Ukraine and Article 26 of the Law of Ukraine “On Holidays” with a new part: In case the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine establishes quarantine, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Infectious Diseases”, the period of unpaid leave is not is included in the general term established by the current parts of the same articles – 15 days.
• Establishment in the final provisions of the Project that for the period of quarantine or restrictive measures the employer may instruct the employee, including a civil servant, a local government employee, to perform work specified in the employment contract at home for a certain period, as well as provide the employee, including the state employee, employee of the local government, with his/her consent leave.

Taken together, these two rules (without detailing the type of leave in the final provisions) can lead to a situation of mass sending of employees (including civil servants and local government employees) “with consent” to unpaid leave for a sufficiently long time. First, such leave will not be limited to 15 days and will not be taken into account at all when calculating the days of unpaid leave currently provided by law. And, secondly, according to Article 29 of the Law “On Protection of the Population from Infectious Diseases, “a quarantine is established for the period necessary to eliminate an epidemic or outbreak of a particularly dangerous infectious disease“. Currently, the Cabinet of Ministers has established quarantine throughout Ukraine until April 3, 2020. However, given global trends, this period may be extended. In the event of a prolonged pandemic and the need to continue quarantine for a long time, the above rules can lead to a socio-economic crisis, and in the case of mass unpaid leave of government and local government employees – to the collapse of state institutions.

To minimize the socio-economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting economic recession, it is necessary to consider additional or alternative options to stimulate social exclusion of workers while ensuring the constitutionally guaranteed right “to a sufficient standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing, and housing“.

Also, Project №3219 in the final provisions proposes to suspend the application for administrative and other services and the deadlines for the provision of these services, as defined by law, from the date of quarantine announcement. “From the date of termination of quarantine, the duration of these terms shall continue, taking into account the time that has elapsed before its suspension”. Such a decision seems quite logical given the need to limit the contacts of citizens in places of administrative services, as well as the possibility of mass “leave” of employees of public authorities and local governments. However, the question remains whether, by the same logic, the deadlines for preparing responses to a request for public information during the quarantine period should be suspended. After all, this is not an administrative service. For non-provision and untimely provision of information, public information managers are responsible in accordance with the Law “On Access to Public Information”. Combined with previous innovations of the Project (regarding unpaid leave), this situation further threatens the stable operation of state institutions.

The event was organized by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in co-operation with the The Center for Innovation Development and the Interns’ League under the Professional Fellows Program, administered by the American Councils for International Education with the support of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State.

Jacob Ventura has an extensive work experience at the Massachusetts Legislative Office (USA); he also provided legal assistance in reforming the ethical standards of the French judicial system. In addition, Mr. Ventura was a member of the rule-making teams of elected representatives both at the state level and at the federal level.

During the seminar, Jacob Ventura outlined the peculiarities of governance in the United States, key competences and principles for the functioning of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government; he also described in detail the legislative process in the United States: from the idea for a bill and until its final vote. In addition, he revealed the peculiarities of work and interaction of the government with the non-governmental organizations in the United States.

Someone will have an idea for a bill as a result of a public policy need or a need to update or repeal a current law already in existence. Often times members of the legislature and their staff (House or Senate) will have the idea. Other times, a constituent, a citizen of the district will have an idea based on a societal or individual need. NGOs, lobbyist, businesses, non-profits, health care, industry, education, transportation and other groups will have an idea for the bill and propose it to a member of the legislature.

Generally, NGOs, lobbyists, constituents and organizations will directly lobby their Representative or Senator. Often times, larger organizations will lobby many legislators to get the necessary support for or opposition to a bill. Depending on the issue, and in many cases, just as many people are for a bill as are against the same bill. In this case, a particular legislator must weigh the pros and cons to voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for the bill. Considerations include how their particular district feels about the bill and the prospects of re-election during the next cycle; special interest political funding; personal relationships with the particular parties lobbying; the merits of the bill and the likelihood of legislative success; influence from party leadership in the legislature.

1. File the bill. Once a legislator receives the idea for the bill, he or she will generally have their staff draft the language for the bill. Both members of the Senate and the House of Representatives may file bills in their respective chambers. The Executive (President or Governor) may also file a bill that can be sent directly to the legislature for consideration.
2. Committee Hearing. Many bills that are filed never make it to a hearing. In some states, every bill filed must have an opportunity to be assigned to a committee for pubic testimony. Bills are assigned to committees based on issue areas. Once a bill has been assigned to a committee, the committee leadership will schedule a hearing on the bill sometime during the legislative session. Hearing rules are determined by committee membership. Generally, experts and concerned parties will be allowed to testify to the committee on the bill at hand, either for the bill or against the bill. After a bill has been heard at a committee hearing and all testimony has been submitted, the Committee will often take a private poll of the members and leadership to determine the level of support for the bill.
3. Debates.
4. Conference. In the U.S. Congress, there are 435 members of the House of Representative apportioned by population throughout the states. There are 100 U.S. Senators in the upper chamber, each state getting equal representation in this body, 2 Senators per state. In State Legislatures, the number of House and Senate members may vary. Generally, simple majorities are required for bill approval however there are hundreds of procedures and rules in each body that could lift the requirements for particular actions.
5. Final Legislative Vote. Once a bill has finally passed both chambers for final approval after conference, the House and the Senate, it is sent to the Executive Branch.
6. Executive Approval / Veto. The President of the United States owns the right of legislative approval or a veto at the Federal Government level. In any of the state governments, the executive is the Governor. The Executive is prescribed a certain amount of time to sign a bill in to law. The President has 10 days to sign the bill in to law or veto. Many governors have line-item veto power which allows them to change only portions of the bill or budget. The President does not have line-item veto power. The President must sign the entire bill in to law, or veto it, sending it back to the Congress for reconsideration. The President can also refuse to sign a bill but still allow it to become law.
7. Legislative Override of Veto. Usually, if the Executive fails to sign a bill, the bill is automatically vetoed. If the legislature disagrees with the executive’s veto, both chambers must re-vote to override the veto (usually by a 2/3 majority in each chamber). This is a very tough task and high threshold at the federal government level and in many states.
8. Constitutional Challenges. Once a bill becomes a law, citizens, members of the legislature and even the executive may challenge the law on constitutional grounds. The third, and often times most important branch of the U.S. government, the Judicial branch will decide if the law is to remain valid and if people’s constitutional rights are violated.

Article 71 of the Charter of the newly formed United Nations first defined ‘non-governmental organization’ in 1945. An NGO can be any kind of organization so long as it is independent from government influence and it is not-for-profit. There are approximately 10 million NGO organizations world-wide. Global Journal. There are 1.5 million NGOs in the United States that employ approximately 11.4 million Americans. According to the CAAF World Giving Index, nearly 31.5 percent of people worldwide donated to a charity/NGO in 2015 and 24 percent volunteered for one. According to Walden University, 80 percent of citizens across the globe believe that NGOs make it easier to be involved in positive social change.

NGOs address a variety of issues including women’s rights, human rights, economic development, political rights, health care, environmental regulation, the battling of disease, and increasing the standards of living for the most vulnerable populations.

NGOs play a critical role in advocating for changes in law, policy, procedure and administrative rules. NGOs are effective in highlighting the stories of individuals they serve. This direct contact and evidence gives elected officials an important perspective that policy on paper often cannot. NGOs must determine the ability of its organization to be a successful advocate for its cause. NGOs must strategically ‘pick their battles’ to determine if a cause should become a legislative priority (considerations are timing, funding, will of Congress, current events, and likelihood at success).

On May 22, 2017 the Draft Concept of the “End-to-End” Legislative Process presentation took place.

The draft concept paper on the “end-to-end” legislative process contains analysis of current practices, a review of international experience, as well as proposals concerning the concept of “end-to-end” legislative process reform with an emphasis on strengthening coordination between the subjects of legislative initiative. This document offers alternatives of changing the “end-to-end” legislative process, which can be described as “government-centred” (based on the experience of France), “parliament-centred” (based on US experience) and “the concept of minimally necessary changes” (on the basis of analysis of existing practices in Ukraine).

Dear friends,

This is a concluding publication of pilot results produced by the Voter Guide project. With this project our experts continued their efforts of monitoring legislative processes in the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament), analyzing legislation, and fulfilling the idea of raising voter awareness of how those whom they elected back in 2002 meet their campaign commitments.

The first such efforts were made in the same 2002, the year of parliamentary elections when we prepared the initial analysis, assessment, and interpretation of how public policies were implemented at the legislative level. The Voter Guide 2002 became a primary attempt to inform the broad public, professionals, and politicians on operation of political factions in the Rada in terms of solving the existing problems of public policies in various areas.

The project, the first stage of which is accomplished with this publication, aims at continuous and efficient update of voters and all other interested parties on the progress made by Ukrainian elected representatives in terms of fulfilling their campaign obligations for the purpose of implementing their party and personal programs. With this project we stand for the right to information or the right of any voter to be aware of activities and affairs of political forces delegated by such voter to the national legislature.

Through this project we also express our sincere belief in the necessity of the political reform that would provide political parties with the right and legislative possibilities to influence public policies through formation of the government and fulfillment of their campaign programs.

Sincerely yours,

Ihor Kohut
Chairman of the Board
Laboratory for Legislative Initiatives

* * *

The main idea of the Voter Guide project is to provide as many voters as possible with a regularly updated information and analysis resource for them to estimate objectively election obligations generated by members of parliament. Since the key parliamentary business is legislation, our attention shall focus on monitoring legislative initiatives or bills filed for deliberation in Rada. In view of considerable volumes of comprehensive information on legislation, we rely on the Internet as the main tool for dissemination of this information.

The Laboratory for Legislative Initiatives has its own web-site (parlament.org.ua) with a Voter Guide Section in it where you can find a news line covering main parliamentary developments, analysis of legislative initiatives, comments of politicians, professional assessment of pivotal parliamentary decisions, positions of parliamentary factions and members of Ukrainian parliament in relation to the most pressing social problems.

However, since the majority of voters have no Internet-access, we have used mass media and NGO possibilities to update the public on the progress made by their elected representatives.

At the beginning, the concept of the project provided for analysis of legislation that was related only to campaign programs produced by parties and blocs. However, it appeared that such limitation would hinder procurement of comprehensive and complete information on the legislative process. Therefore, the concept was adjusted with extension of the monitoring to bills drafted by majoritarian members of parliament and by the government.

The project methodology is based on the following approaches. To analyze the relevance of legislative initiatives to election commitments, we examined the programs of members of parliament elected in one-seat constituencies and programs developed by parties and election blocs. The analysis covers both specific commitments (e.g. to pass specific acts, to raise pensions to the cost of living level etc) and declarative ones that do not envisage any specific result (e.g. to raise public well-being, to improve free public health care etc). There are certain peculiarities associated with assessment of declarative commitments. For example, if any member of parliament promises “to provide young families with residential property”, such a commitment does not refer to specific terms and ways of its fulfillment, therefore it cannot be assessed simply as fulfilled or not fulfilled in 2006. That is why any bills initiated by such member of parliament to solve the residential problem shall be assessed as partially relevant to program commitments. If the analysis reveals no positive effective of the bill in any specific area (e.g. provision of young families with residential property), a conclusion may be that it contradicts program commitments).

Any bill is also deemed partially relevant to the program if it is compatible with certain provisions, but runs counter others. The same conclusion is also made if objective reasons prevent a bill from solving the problem it is aiming at. For example, a program provides for raising minimum wages to the cost of living level. However, with due consideration of state budget potential, the legislator proposes to increase wages only to 50% of the cost of living. Since this increase does not meet the program commitment, it may be regarded as partially relevant to the program. However, this conclusion shall be seen more as an indicator, rather then a verdict. Members of parliament may fulfill their commitments before 2006 when all bills related to minimum wages will be analyzed, and such analysis may yield positive results then.

To sum it up, specific election commitments in terms of their timing (e.g. over the term of parliamentary powers), method (e.g. state funding) and final aim (e.g. 100% increase of health care funding) may be assessed as fulfilled or not fulfilled, while declarative (not specific) commitments may be defined as partially fulfilled or not fulfilled. Conclusions shall be proved by direct quotations of program provisions.

There may also be cases when MPs file a bill aiming to solve a problem not mentioned in the program. Such bills are taken as irrelevant to the program.

First, there are interim reports prepared on the results of each session. The interim reports are then revised altogether for the purposes of a general report on fulfillment of each election campaign program. The final report is based on final versions of initiated bills. This means that if between the interim and final reports a bill is amended in the way that runs counter the program, the final results may differ from the initial ones.

It is important to note, however, that it is quite difficult to preserve univocal objectiveness of conclusions due to the nature of election commitments per se. Therefore, the presented conclusions shall be used only as a voter guide. For these purposes, this information resource provides original texts of election programs and bills for the voters to make their judgments about them.

The election campaign program developed by Victor Yushchenko Our Ukraine Bloc defines responsible, professional, and fair government as a guarantee of public well-being. Consequently, ethics is described as the main principle of politics.

The concept of the program is developed on the necessity to pursue efforts initiated by Yushchenko government. Our Ukraine divides its key parliamentary tasks into long-term priorities and short-term moves.

Strategic priorities and tasks are grouped into four sections. The first section includes transparency of relations between the public and the government through introduction of arrangements for civic oversight of public spendings, civic discussion of public decisions, and continued law-enforcement and judicial reforms.

The second section aims at making the economy work for the well-being of every individual though a transparent and comprehensive tax system, simplified licensing procedures, introduction of the property tax, as well as improved quality and decreased cost of public health care. This implies that the program is bases on the following economic policy principles: support to legal business, secured social justice in relevant relations, and improved quality and accessibility of health services.

The third section targets recovery of traditions of individual development through introduction of innovative forms of education, involvement of the youth in politics, support to business activity among the youth, and introduction of simplified taxation for domestic publishers. In other words, Our Ukraine youth and education policies should be aiming at modernization of education, encouragement and promotion of political and business activity among the youth.

The forth section embraces international activity priorities for development of transborder cooperation, Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization, introduction of the European environmental standards, and establishment of cooperation with the Ukrainian Diaspora.

The Our Ukraine program provides for ten top priority moves that aim at bringing professional officials to power, repaying depreciated individual savings, increasing salaries and pensions, setting up the system of target social assistance, mother and child care, legalizing Ukrainian labor migration by international treaties, ensuring efficient lending of the agrarian sector, eliminating bribery, securing transparency of the budget process, and preventing youth violence and drug addiction.

Characteristically, though, the program features almost no provisions that could be measured exactly in terms of their fulfillment or failure. The text abounds with evaluative notions like “efficacious”, “efficient”, “coherent”, “fair” etc, as well as vague and slogan type of verbs like “increase”, “activate”, “enhance” and others. This makes the Our Ukraine program look like that of objectives, as it defines practically no measures or moves required for their achievement.

In terms of the content, the program:

– Describes no vision of the system of government development;

– Tacitly avoids issues related to development of priority economic sectors (excluding the publishing business); and

– Touches on social issues only in the most general and declarative sense.

106 bills were analyzed as to their relevance to the Our Ukraine program. Out of them, 41 bills were filed by MPs elected on the Our Ukraine list, and 65 – jointly with MPs elected in one-seat constituencies and on other lists.

Out of the total number, 45 bills are relevant to the program, 8 are partially relevant, 5 contradict the program, and 46 are irrelevant.

The Communist Party program is distinguished by its clear structure with aims and tasks followed by results that the Communists strive to achieve if they win elections. However, this did not prevent them from including countless demagogic statements (“The earth will burn under the feet of criminals”, “Ukraine’s prosperity in the equal union of fraternal peoples of sovereign states” etc) and populist promises (“Workers and not criminals or criminal authorities shall become the masters of life”, “Let’s set up decent conditions for the woman, guardian of the humanity”, “The Ukrainian black earth shall yield generous harvests for all people, and shall not serve for enrichment swindlers” etc).

The program features certain legislative plans, which, even if unlikely to be implemented, can be easily assessed in terms of their accomplishment. Such plans are:

– To cancel the Land Code in the version that was adopted illegally;

– To establish state monopoly for production, use and sale of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products, foreign trade, use of power supply networks, railroad, pipeline, maritime, and aircraft transport;

– To cancel the VAT and set a flat sale tax for volumes of goods and services;

– To make Russian the second official language;

– To set minimum wages and pensions at the level not less than the cost of living in 2003;

– To repay indexed individual savings over the period of five years;

– To provide proper funding to science and education as required by law; and

– To transform Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential republic.

Out of the 17 Communist tasks, 8 deal with economic policy, 4 with social policy, and 2 tasks are set for foreign policy and law-enforcement. At the same time, almost all results that the Communist Party is planning to achieve after winning elections concern solution of social problems.

69 bills were analyzed as to their relevance to the Communist Party program. Out of them, 21 bills were filed by MPs elected on the Communist Party list, and 48 – jointly with MPs elected in one-seat constituencies and on other lists.
Out of the total number, 26 bills are relevant to the program, 12 are partially relevant, 8 contradict the program, and 23 are irrelevant.

There is quite a number of provisions in the campaign program developed by the For United Ukraine bloc that are purely declarative making it impossible to define the general trend that the Bloc may follow in Parliament to implement the program. Such provisions, in particular, include commitments to strengthen the efficiency of the system of government; recover Ukrainian family values; develop efficient systems of social and pension security, and public health care; provide the youth with realistic prospects; ensure cooperation between the government, political parties, and civic society; modernize science and education; rejuvenate official public authorities; set up a continuous dialogue between the government and the public; speed up the administrative and the judicial reforms; harmonize the interests of the center and the regions; counteract extremism and intolerance; and support respect of constitutional human rights.

There are, however, a few provisions that suggest general guidelines for the Bloc to follow in Parliament. These provisions are also quite abstract and include the following commitments arranged by areas:

Economy:

– To ensure stability of the national currency; to increase the real income of the population by 1,5; to lead economy out of the shadow; to support entrepreneurship, small and medium business; and to stimulate development of the internal market;

Environmental Protection:

– To ensure environmental security of the country and to overcome the consequences of Chernobyl disaster;

Social Policy:

– To protect Chernobyl victims; to guarantee social rights of military servants, pensioners, and disabled individuals; to ensure productive employment; and to create 1,5m of new jobs;

Foreign policy:

– To support complex European integration of Ukraine; to strengthen relations with CIS countries; and involve Ukraine into the international coalition of combating terrorism;

Development of Government System and Local Self-Governance:

– To set up the parliamentary majority that shall be responsible for the results of economic and social development; to introduce civic oversight of the system of government; to support development of municipal and regional democracy and local self-governance;

Agrarian Policy:

– To develop the agrarian market infrastructure; to set up an efficient system of legal protection of land title and its holders; to provide state support to farms, family, small and medium agricultural companies.

There are also certain provisions suggesting specific actions to be taken in Parliament. In the economic sector, it is a promise to in crease the GDP by 6-7% annually, to pass the Tax Code and to decrease a tax burden; in development of government system and local self-governance, it is an obligation to set up a second parliamentary chamber, the House of Regions, and introduce a new system of interbudget relations where no less than 40% of taxes shall stay in regions; in the agrarian sector, it is a commitment to introduce mortgage lending.

58 bills were analyzed as to their relevance to the For United Ukraine program. Out of them, 13 bills were filed by MPs elected on the For United Ukraine list, and 45 – jointly with MPs elected in one-seat constituencies and on other lists.

Out of the total number, 25 bills are relevant to the program, 10 are partially relevant, 4 contradict the program, and 19 are irrelevant.

In general terms, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc’s program is quite specific and well-structured. Its text is based on listing key conflicts and contradictions in various public sectors and proposals of their solutions.

The top priority is given to the ethics area where it is proposed, inter alia, to combine the efforts of the government and religious confessions to fight drug addiction, AIDS, children homelessness, prostitution, crime and other social diseases. Quite indicatively, the program lists “the birth of true freedom of speech” as one of the ways to overcome problems in the ethics area.

To solve problematic issues in politics, the program advocates introduction of systemic trainings for efficient public management, legislative regulation of impeachment procedures for all “unconscionable elected officials”; and definition of the status of the opposition in the Basic Law and provision of the opposition with certain important oversight powers over operation of the government. In addition, it is proposed to transfer part of the personal income tax to the account of the party/bloc elected and supported by each specific individual. This also means that, the general tax volume shall be decreased.

There is a special part of the program that is dedicated to the legal policy where a number of measures are proposed to improve legal culture and education of citizens in line with simplified procedures and enhanced efficiency of judicial protection of civic rights. The Bloc also suggests differentiation and mitigation of punishments for criminally liable actions.

The program contains extensive and detailed provisions on measures proposed in the economic sphere. Such measures aim to solve the existing conflicts and include inspection of legality of privatization and inventory description of public property; development of “openly protectionist conditions” for the national capital at the stage of its establishment; prohibition of tax inspections more than once in three years; use of economic levers to decrease loan rates to 5-6% etc. The program contains an important proposal of limiting land title holders only to the Ukrainian citizens “living and working on the land”. Besides, there is a proposal to exclude corporate bodies from the agents entitled to hold agricultural land titles.

The program suggests a few comparatively specific measures for social policies, including preservation of the existing pension age definitions and repayment of depreciated and “stolen” saving over four years. One of the most interesting measures, however, is reimbursement of material and moral damages to deported individuals (including those deported from Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Lemkivshchyna, and Nadsyannya).

Irrelevance of the “low” status of Ukraine in international relations to its huge potential possibilities is defined as the key conflict in the foreign policy area. The program, however, lacks clearly defined trends of Ukraine’s foreign policies. Instead, it pronounces implementation of national foreign policies in relation to all countries with which Ukraine has common interests.

42 bills were analyzed as to their relevance to the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc program. Out of them, 18 bills were filed by MPs elected on the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc list, and 24 – jointly with MPs elected in one-seat constituencies and on other lists.

Out of the total number, 16 bills are relevant to the program, 2 are partially relevant, 3 contradict the program, and 21 are irrelevant.

The Socialist program seems to be maximally precise and concise. It is developed on the principle of very specific commitments combined with measures necessary to achieve the defined objectives. For example, it is proposed to raise teacher salaries to 350 UAH by introduction of 1.5% of tax for imported cars that cost more than 50,000 UAH and residential property valued at over 500,000 UAH. The program also requires that children allowances paid to parents form the state budget shall be no less than 200 UAH per month. These are the type of specific commitments that dominate the program.

The Socialists advocate transformation of the system of government. Their efforts aim at enhanced role of Parliament and independence of the Cabinet of Ministers (the Ukrainian government). The program provides for adoption of the Presidential Impeachment Act and promotion of direct election of oblast and district public authorities.

In terms of support to the rural areas, there are both specific and declarative statements, like “Ukraine shall trade bread, not land!” that can be understood in a number of different ways. It is proposed to keep a fixed flat land tax, provide long-term loans and guarantee “beneficial” governmental orders.

The program suggests introduction of a flat fixed tax for small and medium business and commits to eliminate “bandit racket, tax authorities raids, and bribers “in law”. There are also protectionist measures proposed to protect domestic producers.

Despite of other provisions, however, the key emphasis is made on various aspects of social policies, which is rather characteristic of leftist parties. In particular, the following commitments are made:

– Average salary fixed in legislation at the level of no less than double cost of living and mandatory governmental enforcement of this norm;

– Pensions and other social payments not less the cost of living (342 UAH);

– Guaranteed preservation of privileges, free health care, moral peace and respect of the society for the older generation.

By using Ukrainian natural gas and “cheap” nuclear power, the Socialists undertake to decrease utility charges by 30% and establish a legislative limit of 12% of the family income on such charges.

Young men can become interested in the promise to decrease the term of military service to 12 months.

One of the important aspects of this program is that it is absolutely void of provisions that would characterize the party’s foreign policy aspirations not counting the reference to the bill on principles of domestic and foreign policy developed, according to the program, by the Socialists.

41 bills were analyzed as to their relevance to the Socialist Party program. Out of them, 9 bills were filed by MPs elected on the Socialist Party list, and 30 – jointly with MPs elected in one-seat constituencies and on other lists.

Out of the total number, 12 bills are relevant to the program, 5 are partially relevant, 1 contradicts the program, and 23 are irrelevant.

The program of the Social Democratic Party (united) features clear and logic structure. It states key program priorities and sets certain tasks for the party.

Government Development and Local Self-Governance

The program objectives are to overcome legal nihilism of the government system; to establish a party political system; to ensure public oversight of the government; to form the majority in Parliament and a politically responsible government. At the same time, the program covers no issues related to local self-governance.

Legal Policy

This area also does not get enough attention in the program. The program only mentions that there is need to prevent Ukraine’s transformation into a “shadow society” governed by illegal norms.

Economy and Industry Policy

The program defines the following priorities in this area: development of efficient and socially oriented economy; stabilization of economic legislation; state enforcement of mandatory execution of commercial agreements and strict compliance of all business agents with their commitments; protection of the internal market and domestic producer by all means that are compliant with international rules including moderate protectionism; support to development of small and medium business; creation of strategic planning systems to ensure continuous efforts of the state aiming at long-term problems. The program sets elimination of consequences of the exhausted social and production infrastructure as the top strategic task. It also stresses the urgent need to pass the Tax Code and a set of laws to support full-fledged implementation of the Land Code.

Social Policy

The program is quite focused on the issues of social policy, culture and ethics development. The priorities in these areas include: stable job supply (through creation of new jobs); possibility of free and high quality medical treatment; decreased gap between the richest and the poorest social groups; simplified and less bureaucratic social security arrangements; provision of the young people with a possibility of getting modern education, profession, and residential property; ensured state support to families, mothers, and children; elimination of beggary and children homelessness. Achievement of these tasks provides for development and adoption of a number of important legislative acts and codes: a new Labor Code and trade union legislation; a set of laws to guarantee reformation of the public health care system through improvement of budgetary funding arrangements combined with gradual introduction of social health care; amendment of the tax and labor legislation to decrease differentiation of incomes.

In culture and ethics area it is planned to recover traditions of high Ukrainian culture, spirituality, and ethics; ensure and multiply intellectual potential of the society; harmonize interethnic and inter-confession relations; develop national, language, and religious originality; ensure full-fledged and free development of the Russian language and culture.

Information Policy

No reference is made in the program.

National Security and Defense

No reference is made in the program.

Foreign Policy

The Program provides for strengthening national sovereignty and active participation in international division of labor; Ukraine’s accession to world and European international organizations; development of relations with Russia under the conditions of partnership, equality and mutual benefits; setup of the all-European collective security system together with Western European and Central and Eastern European countries and Russia.

All in all, the program focuses on such areas as development of the system of government, economic and social policies. At the same time, it pays no proper attention to such important issues and legal and information policies.

11 bills were analyzed as to their relevance to the SDPU(u) program. Out of them, 2 bills were filed by MPs elected on the SDPU(u) list, and 9 – jointly with MPs elected on lists of other parties and blocs.

Out of the total number of bills only 1 bill is relevant to the program, 2 bills contradict the program, and 8 bills are irrelevant to any provisions of the program.