Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
On 18 April, gunshots were reported in the Holosiivskyi district of Kyiv. Seven people were killed and at least 14 were injured. Two police officers have been notified of suspicion on allegations that they fled the scene, leaving civilians in danger. This terrorist attack has once again reignited debate on the reform of the National Police and its effectiveness — much like previous incidents in Vradiivka, Kryve Ozero, Knyazhychi, Pereiaslav and Kaharlyk. Each of these cases prompted public outrage and promises of change. None, however, led to a systemic breakthrough.
ZN.UA has previously examined what needs to change in police training and in the broader security system. Yet the issue is not only about identifying solutions. The key question is whether the system itself is capable of delivering them.
Following the incident, Minister of Internal Affairs, Ihor Klymenko, instructed the Head of the National Police, Ivan Vyhivskyi, to conduct an internal investigation into the actions of the officers involved and to submit all relevant materials to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). The entire chain of command of the Kyiv patrol police was also suspended from duty. Minister Klymenko further noted that response protocols and the training of law enforcement personnel must be reviewed in light of the risks associated with civilians’ access to weapons and ammunition.
This will also require changes to the training system for patrol officers. Ihor Klymenko has once again endorsed the draft law on civilian firearms, which introduces mandatory training and a clear classification of different types of weapons — an initiative that has been under development for several years as part of Ukraine’s European integration process. On 27 April, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee on Law Enforcement established a dedicated working group on this issue, despite the existence of a similar group within the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has been working on it for several years. Importantly, Ukraine has committed to the European Commission in the Rule of Law Roadmap to adopt this draft law by December 2026.
Meanwhile, both social and traditional media are competing to assign blame and determine who should be held accountable: ‘Klymenko must resign’, ‘police officers must be imprisoned’, ‘re-certify everyone’, ‘send everyone to the front’ and so on. However, in the context of a full-scale war — where internal security directly depends on the police — such responses are superficial and unlikely to result in meaningful change. Action is clearly needed — both at the personnel and institutional levels.
However, the problem goes beyond individual mistakes or staffing decisions. The issue lies in how the system itself is designed. To understand this, it is necessary to examine how police reform has been shaped and where it has fallen short.
Process for the Sake of Process: a Brief Overview of Police Reform
The transformation of the post-Soviet militia into the Ukrainian police after the Revolution of Dignity did take place. However, the success of the patrol police — effectively the ‘shop window’ of the reform — was presented as the reform itself. In 2015, patrol officers were recruited from scratch through an open competition, and this branch of public safety did indeed differ markedly from the rest. Other militiamen underwent attestation in 2015–2016 and following the dismissal of the ‘Georgian team’, a consultative competition was held in 2017 for the second Head of the National Police. At that point, large-scale reform efforts effectively came to an end.
From the outset, the police lacked a clear development strategy, and changes were introduced in a piecemeal manner — resembling ad hoc firefighting rather than a coherent system driven by shared objectives. The transformation primarily affected public safety policing, while the criminal investigation branch remained largely untouched. At the same time, systemic problems persisted — including torture, unlawful detention, abuse of power or, conversely, institutional paralysis and the inability to prevent crime or investigate it effectively. According to official data, 7.7% of former militiamen were dismissed, half of whom were later reinstated by court decisions and awarded compensation. In practice, the ‘new police’ largely consisted of former militiamen who carried over entrenched institutional memory and informal practices — constraints that continue to shape the National Police to this day.
This is not merely an institutional problem — it is a feature of Ukraine’s new reality under a full-scale war. Rising social inequality, the challenges of demobilisation, post-traumatic stress and a weak veterans policy all inevitably affect levels of violent crime. Criminology and the experience of other countries show that this trend typically intensifies after the end of a war. It is precisely this reality for which the system has proved unprepared.
Despite the stated aim of ‘depoliticising’ the police — that is, reducing ministerial influence over its operational management — the National Police has remained dependent on the MoIA in areas that fall outside the Ministry’s proper remit. At present, the position of Head of the National Police is effectively determined by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the absence of a competitive selection process has been identified as a concern by the European Commission. As a result, the post currently held by Ivan Vyhivskyi remains under the control of the Minister. Moreover, the appointment of all heads of territorial bodies and their deputies is also subject to the Minister’s approval.
Instead, the Minister of Internal Affairs should be responsible solely for shaping state policy, participating in Cabinet of Ministers meetings and representing budgetary and regulatory matters, while the Head of the National Police should manage the police itself. In practice, however, all ministers have simultaneously engaged in both policymaking and the operational management of the police. The Minister is a political appointee, appointed by Members of Parliament. By contrast, police operational activity should be insulated from political influence.
During the full-scale war, the police have continued to avoid addressing sensitive issues of social inequality — for example, maintaining public order during mobilisation measures. Minister Klymenko has explicitly opposed assigning such functions to police officers, who are legally authorised to use coercive measures. The police have therefore minimised their involvement in this process to avoid triggering a political crisis and a renewed wave of demands to hold the police themselves accountable. As a result, the reputational fallout has largely been borne by the Territorial Centres for Recruitment and Social Support.
Interestingly, even under the conditions of a full-scale war, the police continue to enjoy a relatively high level of public support — surveys indicate that trust in the police stands at around 48% (Razumkov Centre, Rating Group). Significant approval is also driven by the direct participation of nearly 10% of police officers (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs) in combat operations at the front — including units such as ‘Liut’ and rifle units — while service both in frontline areas and in the rear entails daily risks to life.
Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Police’ of 2015, the principal indicator of police performance is public trust. To implement this provision, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution in 2018 providing for state-funded tenders to commission such surveys. Until 2022, independent sociological services conducted these studies, but with the introduction of martial law, the tenders were suspended. At that time, trust levels were likewise reported at over 40%. However, a key problem is that different sociological services may apply different methodologies from year to year, making it impossible to compare results on a consistent basis. The 2018 resolution was repealed in March 2026. A new resolution has since been adopted, under which such surveys are to be conducted across all criminal justice institutions. The issue of differing methodologies, however, remains unresolved.
The reform of the law enforcement system is formally ongoing, including as part of Ukraine’s European integration commitments. Chapter 24 of the EU acquis, ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, directly requires strengthening the institutional capacity of authorities in combating crime, in particular organised crime.
In this context, the National Police is now planning a shift from addressing isolated incidents to tackling systemic cases and organised crime. This includes developing analytical capacities, integrating the police into the broader criminal policy framework and introducing the European system for assessing organised crime threats (SOCTA), including in the field of cybersecurity (IOCTA), among other measures. Part of these European integration measures has been reflected in the first National Police Development Strategy for 2026–2030. Their implementation is expected to complete the reform of the criminal investigation branch. Ukraine has now reached a point where the reform can finally address what remained unfinished in 2015–2019 and, under the European Commission’s rigorous assessment, there is a real opportunity for meaningful change.
Collective Responsibility and the Staffing Crisis
It is misguided to assume that any high-profile incident involving police officers should automatically lead to the resignation of senior leadership. Such an approach may be viable in established democracies with sufficient resources and institutional capacity — for example, in Switzerland — but not in a country facing a full-scale war.
In the aftermath of the 18 April terrorist attack in Kyiv, responsibility for subordinates should lie with the leadership of the patrol police and the National Police as a whole. However, if Ivan Vyhivskyi were to be dismissed now, the new Head of the National Police would likely be much the same, as the appointment would again be determined by the Minister of Internal Affairs, reflecting the continued lack of depoliticisation of the police. In other words, a change of name does not equate to a change in direction. This directly affects the system’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crisis situations.
Approaches based on collective responsibility reflect political logic rather than professional standards. Political retribution is not a hallmark of the European-style policing model Ukraine seeks to build. What matters far more is which systemic measures are taken to prevent such tragedies in the future.
At the same time, there are very few — if any — are willing to take on leadership roles in the police at any level. Qualified professionals are clearly deterred by low salaries and the constant risk of dismissal not based on audits or performance evaluations, but simply as part of ‘collective responsibility for subordinates’, among other factors.
The scale of the problem is also acknowledged by the leadership of the National Police itself. According to its Head, the staffing shortfall in the patrol police stands at around 25% and is even higher in Kyiv. In such conditions, officers are routinely redeployed to reinforce units, even if they lack sufficient experience in response operations. As Ivan Vyhivskyi admitted, one of the officers involved in the events of 18 April had not been systematically engaged in such duties.
This is compounded by broader staffing challenges affecting not only the police but the entire civil service. The European Commission emphasises the need for merit-based career progression — including competitive selection procedures for leadership positions, up to and including the Head of the National Police. At present, such rules apply to the appointment of all heads of law enforcement bodies except for the Head of the National Police. Removing this exception would help reduce the institution’s dependence on the Minister of Internal Affairs.
Introducing competitive selection for leadership positions in the police is more complex, given that there are thousands of such posts, making it practically impossible to organise a comprehensive process, as this would require the establishment of numerous selection panels. It is therefore more reasonable to apply competitive procedures not to all positions, but only to senior leadership roles and selected mid-level posts. At the same time, the MoIA is willing to support competitive selection only on the condition that the positions to which it applies are defined in a subordinate legal act at the Minister’s discretion. This creates a risk that the Minister may limit competitive selection to a small number of non-influential posts. A more balanced approach would be to prioritise competitive procedures for senior leadership positions — namely those whose decisions have a systemic impact on the functioning of the police.
Accordingly, a rapid resolution of staffing problems should not be expected, particularly when it comes to competitive selection procedures. The appropriate response to the consequences of the terrorist attack should instead be to strengthen internal oversight mechanisms — including impartial internal investigations and the establishment of clear grounds for the disciplinary liability of managers for the inadequate organisation of their subordinates’ work.
An Office of (Not-So) Simple Solutions: What Next?
The problems within the police highlighted by the terrorist attack in the Holosiivskyi district of the capital are unlikely to be resolved through a handful of ad hoc personnel or political decisions. Instead, what is needed is a strengthening of the institution’s capacity. This entails the depoliticisation of governance, effective internal oversight, updated response protocols and professional training, among other measures. Taken together, these changes can ensure a proper balance between citizens’ rights, their security and the effectiveness of law enforcement bodies in wartime.
- Criminal liability is individual. The case of the ‘police officers who fled’ falls under Part 3 of Article 367 of the CC of Ukraine. Within these criminal proceedings, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), having examined the relevant protocols and procedures, will assess whether the elements of a criminal offence are present, after which the prosecution will refer the case to court.
- Accountability of leadership. As part of the internal investigation, it is necessary to examine whether there are grounds for the disciplinary liability of police leadership — including the Kyiv patrol police, the Head of the National Police and other officials responsible for organising the counter-terrorism operation.
- Response protocols. Protocols for responding to terrorist attacks involving hostage-taking must be improved. While KORD fulfilled its role, the effectiveness of negotiators and special units, as well as their coordination with patrol officers who are first to arrive at the scene, can help reduce the number of casualties before the terrorist is neutralised.
- Tactical and technical training. Skills in the use of physical force, special means and firearms must be continuously developed. The number of training hours should be increased, particularly for practical shooting exercises — including firing in unconventional and high-risk conditions. It is not enough to possess a weapon; officers must be proficient in its use and prepared to deploy it on lawful and strictly necessary grounds.
A separate, critical issue must be highlighted — the readiness of police officers to use firearms.
- Psychological preparedness of police officers. This is precisely what was lacking on 18 April: the officers fled not only due to individual factors, but also because of a systemic lack of readiness to act in situations where the use of firearms inevitably leads to an investigation. In Ukraine’s legal system, the use of firearms is treated a priori as a problem for which someone must be held accountable. This creates a powerful psychological deterrent, clear in practice. Over time, the mindset of ‘better not to use force to avoid consequences’ in a society at war undermines public safety and order. At present, every instance of firearm use triggers an internal investigation, but such investigations are not always objective. Judicial practice on the lawful use of firearms remains underdeveloped, particularly in comparison with case law on civilian self-defence.
- Improving the licensing system. It is essential to finally adopt legislation establishing clear rules on civilian access to firearms (either draft law No. 5708 or its revised version developed by the relevant working group or groups). The licensing system must be streamlined — including stronger oversight of firearm registration and re-registration, proper assessment of the mental fitness of applicants, improved training requirements for firearm owners and ballistic testing of rifled firearms.
Some of these measures have already been announced by Minister Klymenko. However, what will ultimately matter is not political statements made in the wake of a high-profile tragedy, but the ability of the law enforcement system to implement these changes in practice. The key question, therefore, is whether this institutional capacity exists. As long as the depoliticisation of the police remains declarative rather than real, the limits of reform will be defined not by the war, but by the system itself.
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