The Verkhovna Rada, like most parliaments in the world, has a system of parliamentary commissions. The current system of commissions in the VRU was formed during the second convocation, and they have been divided into temporary special and temporary investigative commissions since 1996.
In this text, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives describes the activities of the VRU’s temporary investigative commissions (hereinafter referred to as “TICs”) and the results they have achieved, as well as the main problems that affect their efficiency. The full research results are included in the new Parliament Journal publication prepared by ALI.
What is a temporary investigative commission of the Verkhovna Rada?
The TIC is one of the main instruments of parliamentary supervision, which is formed to investigate issues of significant public interest A high-profile criminal case, cases of embezzlement or corruption, or other violations of the law . At the same time, the TIC operates separately from the investigation and cannot replace it, administer justice instead of a court, or establish a person’s guilt or innocence in committing a crime.
MPs can establish such a commission at their own initiative. To this end, they must register a commission establishment resolution in the parliament At least 150 MPs must vote in favor of the commission , which specifies the name, purpose and main tasks of the future TIC.
The TIC may consist of MPs from all factions and groups on a proportional basis, which is important to ensure the participation of both the coalition and the opposition in parliamentary supervision. Each faction independently decides whether to participate in the TIC or who should be its representative in the commission.
The powers of such a commission are broad: it has the right to receive information, documents and materials from public authorities, local governments, law enforcement officers and others. The commission may seize the requested documents or receive copies thereof, invite witnesses to testify or provide explanations, and engage third-party experts and law enforcement officers.
Temporary investigative commissions report to the Verkhovna Rada. They have to draw up a report on their performance results. The commission describes the results of its work in the document, namely the measures taken, conclusions, proposals and recommendations to the authorities.
The Verkhovna Rada must consider the TIC report at its next meeting out of turn. After hearing the report and adopting (or rejecting) it, the parliament can terminate or extend the commission’s work.
TIC: statistics
During the period under review, from the 3rd to the 9th convocations, MPs resorted to parliamentary investigations quite often – a total of 164 temporary investigative commissions operated in the VRU during this period. In the 6th convocation 2007-2012 , the Verkhovna Rada established the most TICs – 37. Since the beginning of the current 9th convocation in 2019, the parliament has already established 29 investigative commissions.
For which investigations did the Verkhovna Rada establish commissions most often? The leader is 25 TICs to investigate corruption offences ranging from bribery to mismanagement of state property and public expenditure. During its term, the parliament of the 9th convocation established seven TICs to deal with corruption cases. One of the most high-profile examples is the TIC, which investigated embezzlement and mismanagement at Ukrzaliznytsia.
Crimes against public figures (activists, journalists and others) rank second. Twenty-two commissions were established during the period under review. Among the most famous cases are the commission on the murder of In total, three TICs of the III, IV and V convocations worked on this case journalist Georgiy Gongadze, the poisoning of In total, two TICs of the IV and VI convocations worked on this case Viktor Yushchenko, and the contract killing of Two TICs were established in the VIII and IX convocations Kherson activist Kateryna Handziuk.
Another 12 investigative commissions were established to investigate electoral fraud. Ten of them dealt with issues related to the economy and trade.
TIC: existing problems
The report and its consideration by the Verkhovna Rada are the main indicators of the work of the temporary investigative commission. Although this requirement is contained in the legislation, only a minority of the temporary investigative commissions’ reports are, in practice, approved by the parliament.
Out of 164 commissions that operated during the period under review, at least one report was approved in 55 cases, i.e., less than a third of the commissions. In addition, no report was registered in 66 cases (and this is the most common result of TICs’ work), and it was not approved by the Verkhovna Rada in another 33 cases. Another ten commissions We are talking about the current convocation of the parliament have prepared reports, but they are awaiting consideration in the session hall.
The main problem with the efficiency of TICs is the absence of a report, as it is in this report that it should set out the facts that it has found out during the parliamentary investigation, recommendations, or instructions to the authorities. The report itself should, in most cases, be sent to the judicial bodies and law enforcement agencies for review.
It is also important that recommendations to the authorities, law enforcement agencies and judicial bodies are binding. As part of the official investigation, law enforcement agencies must review the facts established by the commission in the course of its work, search for property and persons involved, and provide procedural documentation of the information received.
However, even after the commission presents its conclusions and recommendations, law enforcement agencies implement them only formally or even ignore them, as there are no effective tools for implementing such instructions and recommendations. This negates the work of MPs and reduces the effectiveness of the investigation as a whole. Therefore, the only method left to parliamentarians is political and reputational pressure.
According to MPs, the legislation must provide for the follow-up of the execution of orders received from the TIC. For example, as mandatory reports by law enforcement agencies or other authorities.
On the other hand, the fact that reports are not available or not approved by the Verkhovna Rada is no less negative, as it is impossible to assess the efficiency of the TICs’ work, and the authorities do not receive information and recommendations.
MPs themselves complain that, despite the requirement to consider the report at a VRU session out of turn, this provision is ignored, and the reports may not be put to a vote.
For a long time, the only documents that regulated the activities of temporary commissions in the Verkhovna Rada were articles of the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the parliament. In 2019, the VRU adopted a separate law on TICs, which defined the legal status of parliamentary commissions and the organisational framework for their activities.
However, parliamentarians criticise the document because of its fragmentation. In particular, MPs cannot procedurally formalise the evidence and information they have received within the TICs. Currently, this can only happen after the report is approved, if the VRU decides to send it to law enforcement and investigative agencies.
However, the argument against this is the constitutional provision that TICs cannot replace the investigation. On the other hand, according to MPs, this provision can be circumvented by engaging a special prosecutor who would, at their request, procedurally formalise the evidence found.
The law also does not establish uniform requirements for preparing this document, and temporary commissions prepare it at their own discretion rather than according to a certain established structure. This can lead to fragmented information in the reports and formal preparation and registration of this document.
Another problem is the unwillingness of the authorities, including law enforcement officers, to cooperate. Despite the obligation under the relevant law to respond to requests from TICs and attend their meetings if necessary and the liability for refusal, in practice, public officials respond with formal replies. To remedy the situation, parliamentarians consider it necessary to introduce penalties for non-cooperation into the Ukrainian Criminal Code.
In conclusion, we should add that over all the years, the Verkhovna Rada has only once adopted a document (in 2006, during the 4th convocation) analysing the activities of TICs. The text of the VRU resolution shows that the problems remain the same: imperfect legislation (in particular, the commissions’ lack of powers), poor logistics, and cooperation with the authorities. Despite the fact that additional powers for TICs have since been added to the VRU Rules of Procedure, the situation has not improved significantly.
