Restoration of Competitive Appointment to Prosecutors’ Positions at the Prosecutor General’s Office and Regional Prosecutor’s Offices under Martial Law

The Problem

Competitive selection is a basic tool for ensuring professionalism, integrity, and political neutrality in the prosecution service. The comprehensive reform of the prosecution service in Ukraine has lasted nearly 20 years, and the complete HR reset across all levels of the prosecutor’s office (Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices) was carried out in 2019–2021 through the attestation process. 

Since then, appointments to positions of prosecutors in district prosecutor’s offices were carried out only on the basis of a selection announced and conducted by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). Appointments to positions of prosecutors in regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office were also based on the results of competitive selection for the transfer of prosecutors from district and regional prosecutor’s offices to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The special order of appointment and transfer of prosecutors without competition under martial law was implemented by the Law No. 4555-IX, introduced in July 2025. Any person without a criminal record with the required legal experience received the opportunity to be appointed to higher-level prosecutor’s offices based on the submitted application, which became an opportunity, including for former law enforcement officers who, according to the results of the attestation (vetting), were recognised as not meeting the criteria of professionalism and integrity.

The particular issue was described in the:

1. European Commission report on Ukraine’s progress within the framework of the 2025 EU Enlargement Package, where it is recommended in the coming year to remove the provisions allowing the transfer and appointment of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition and giving the right for the Prosecutor General to access any pre-trial investigation material, abstain from further enforcement of these provisions until they are repealed;
2. Shadow Report complementing the European Commission’s 2024 Report on Ukraine, which provides the recommendation to repeal the amendments introduced by Law No. 4555-IX, that significantly restricted the scope of prosecutorial procedural independence and unjustifiably strengthened the procedural role of the Prosecutor General;
3. Joint Statement between Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka that introduced 10 priorities, one of which is to adopt, within a year, a law, in line with European standards and after consultation with the Venice Commission, to ensure a transparent and merit-based selection process, appointments and transfers for prosecutors to managerial positions and other prosecutorial positions in the Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices, including clear criteria and a transparent, competitive, and meritocratic selection procedure that includes an assessment of professional competence and integrity;
4. EU accession benchmarks for Ukraine under Cluster 1 that repeat the requirement of removing provisions allowing the appointment and transfer of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition, and giving the Prosecutor General’s Office the right to access any pre-trial investigation material. 

In addition, the Law No. 4555-IX introduced a hidden tool of pressure on the prosecutor — dismissal from the prosecutor’s office in the event of liquidation or reorganisation of the structural unit in which he held the position. This allowed the head of the prosecutor’s office to lay off the independent prosecutors, create a new staffing list, and appoint only those prosecutors who meet the ‘vision’ of the new leader.

Since July 2025, for more than 8 months, no law has been adopted that would abolish non-competitive appointments to the prosecutor’s office, and the prosecutor’s office actively uses the opportunity to appoint prosecutors to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

Why It Matters

• abandonment of the meritocratic approach and the destruction of the career growth model for prosecutors;
• undermining the quality of the staff and weakening the independence of the prosecutor’s office;
• formation of lobbying groups in prosecutorial bodies by appointing loyal employees;
• deviation from European standards and reform requirements, and undermining trust from international partners.

Current Solution

Currently, three legislative initiatives (Draft Law No. 13601 dated 06.08.2025, Draft Law No. 13601-1 dated 22.08.2025 and Draft Law No. 13699 dated 26.08.2025) have been tabled in Parliament. All the legislative initiatives are from MPs, not the Government or the President of Ukraine.

The key idea of the first one (No. 13601) is to restore the previous wording of the Law ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’:

• repealing all the amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ introduced by the Law No. 4555-IX and returning to the wording of the law that preceded such amendments;
• restoration of the procedure for appointment to prosecutorial positions in prosecutorial offices at all levels that existed before the introduction of martial law.

The second one (No. 13601-1) provides for:

• the gradual cancellation of recruitment for the positions of prosecutors at the district prosecutor’s offices, carried out by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, which means actual deterioration of the independence of prosecutors through the complete abandonment of any competitive procedures at all levels;
• establishing an equal approach to resolving the issue of appointing prosecutors at all levels during the period of martial law.

The third one (No. 13699) on amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ addresses a wider range of issues than HR policy and provides for:

• return to the procedure of appointment to prosecutorial positions in prosecutorial offices at all levels that existed before the introduction of martial law;
• cancels the expansion of the powers of the Prosecutor General regarding the provision of pre-trial investigation materials to him, establishing the time limit and method of its implementation, thereby restoring the independence of each prosecutor in criminal proceedings.

Key Risks

Irreversibility of reform roll-back. The prosecution reform of 2019–2021 established merit-based competitive transfer as the only legitimate pathway to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

Continuation of non-competitive appointments:

1. dismantles the core architecture of that reform;
2. normalises exceptional mechanisms;
3. creates dual standards for prosecutors appointed before and after July 2025.

Once institutional practices shift toward discretionary appointments, restoring competitive mechanisms becomes politically and administratively more difficult. Temporary derogation risks becoming permanent regression.

Undermining prosecutorial independence. Non-competitive appointments to higher-level prosecutor’s offices increase institutional dependence on the appointing authority.

Without transparent procedures and professional assessment, prosecutors may be perceived as personally loyal appointees rather than independent procedural actors. 

This increases the risk that:

1. key positions in regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office will be filled with personally loyal candidates;
2. informal vertical dependencies replace institutional guarantees of independence;
3. prosecutorial discretion in sensitive cases becomes indirectly influenced by personnel expectations.

Legal uncertainty and selective application risk. The absence of clear, transparent criteria for selecting among applicants creates space for selective or inconsistent decision-making.

Even if appointments formally comply with Law No. 4555-IX, lack of:

1. open list of vacancies and job descriptions for positions;
2. ranking mechanisms;
3. independent commission, undermines predictability and equal access to public office.

This creates:

• perception of unfair advancement;
• fragmentation among prosecutors appointed through a competitive and non-competitive procedure.

EU accession and conditionality risk. Merit-based and transparent appointment of prosecutors is directly linked to Ukraine’s obligations under Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) of the EU accession framework. Furthermore, the problem was highlighted in the European Commission report within the 2025 Enlargement Package. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos identified solving the relevant problem as one of ten key priorities. EU accession benchmarks for Ukraine under Cluster 1 underlined the importance of removing provisions that allow the appointment and transfer of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition.

Maintaining a simplified, non-competitive regime:

• contradicts previously implemented reform commitments;
• weakens Ukraine’s negotiating position in rule of law assessments;
• may affect conditional financial and technical support linked to governance benchmarks.

Given that prosecution reform was repeatedly referenced in European Commission assessments, deviation at this stage carries strategic geopolitical implications.

Conclusions

The continued application of non-competitive appointments to prosecutorial positions at the regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office under Law No. 4555-IX constitutes a direct deviation from the core principles of prosecutorial reform in Ukraine.

Merit-based competitive selection is not a technical HR procedure, but a structural safeguard of independence, professionalism, and political neutrality. Its suspension at the highest levels of the prosecution service undermines the institutional architecture built during the 2019–2021 reform and reverses progress achieved in aligning Ukraine’s prosecution system with European standards.

The argument of wartime necessity cannot justify the systematic replacement of competitive procedures with discretionary appointments. When exceptional mechanisms are applied without strict limitations, they cease to be temporary and instead reshape institutional practice in a way that weakens accountability and transparency.

Moreover, the concentration of HR powers in the hands of prosecutorial leadership creates additional democratic risks. When the same authority simultaneously:

• decides on appointments to higher-level positions without competition;
• has an effective influence over organisational restructuring and liquidation of positions within prosecutorial bodies. This combination of powers creates structural imbalances.

Dismissals based on staff reduction or reorganisation, in a context where appointment decisions are discretionary, may create precedents perceived as instruments of influence rather than as an objective administrative necessity. If prosecutorial leadership can both appoint without competition and eliminate positions occupied by prosecutors, the safeguards against arbitrary HR decisions are significantly weakened.

Such concentration of power contradicts the principle of institutional checks and balances and undermines guarantees of prosecutorial independence. In democratic systems governed by the rule of law, appointment and dismissal mechanisms must be insulated from discretionary political or managerial influence.

Restoring full competitive appointment and transfer procedures is therefore not merely a matter of procedural refinement but a prerequisite for preserving the independence, legitimacy, and democratic accountability of the prosecution service.

Recommendations

Short-term (urgent legislative action):

Immediately repeal the provisions of Law No. 4555-IX that allow the appointment of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competitive selection on the basis of a submitted application.

Competitive appointment must be restored as the only lawful mechanism for access to higher-level prosecutorial positions. 

Abolish the legal provision introduced by the same law that allows dismissal of prosecutors due to liquidation or reorganisation of a prosecutorial body without adequate safeguards.

When a single authority can effectively eliminate a position occupied by an independent prosecutor and subsequently create a new position to which a loyal individual may be appointed, this creates structural conditions for abuse. Such a model contradicts democratic governance principles, weakens institutional checks and balances, and endangers prosecutorial independence.

Medium-term:

Improve and modernise the competitive transfer procedure for prosecutors moving from lower-level to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The restoration of competition should not merely replicate the pre-martial law model but strengthen it. In particular:

• ensure clear, published evaluation criteria;
• establish structured scoring methodology;
• ensure monthly open reporting on available vacant positions and corresponding job responsibilities, and announcement of competitions for lower-level prosecutors to fill such positions.

Mandate the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) to actively resume and systematically conduct competitive selection procedures for transfers to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The QDCP should:

1. adopt and publish a detailed methodology for assessing professional competence, managerial skills (where relevant), and integrity;
2. standardise interview procedures;
3. set predictable timelines for regular competitions (once a month or once every three months).

A clear separation of appointments and dismissal powers and a strengthened institutional role of the QDCP are essential to maintain independence and democratic accountability. 

This Infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.